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Introduction
Autonomous software agents are considered by many as the next step in com-
puter automation. Given a set of goals and tasks, an autonomous agent will try
to maximally satisfy the interests of its owner. These agents should be capable
of autonomously performing certain tasks which are currently done manually, like
searching for information on the Internet, planning, booking a holiday, and buying
and selling goods and services.
Especially in the ﬁeld of electronic commerce, an increased use of autonomous
agents is expected [30,56,65,70,92,119,144]. Such agents should be able to au-
tonomously negotiate with other agents about the price and other relevant aspects
of a product or service, such as delivery time, quality, quantity, payment methods,
and return policies. Furthermore, the agents should be adaptive in order to cope
with diverse and changing environments. Current electronic markets are becoming
increasingly transparent with low search costs. From a business perspective, this
potentially results in strong price competition and low margins, with a negative
eﬀect on aspects such as quality and service. Through automated bargaining about
a multitude of aspects, a business can go beyond price competition and gain a com-
petitive advantage by personalising products and services to the needs of individual
customers.
In such a setting, where multiple self-interested adaptive agents perform complex
negotiations, the key question is how they will behave in a given environment and
with speciﬁc rules of interaction. Moreover, an important challenge is to ﬁnd eﬀective
bargaining strategies for the agents, and, if the rules can be changed, to determine
the set of rules that achieves the best results. These are the main issues addressed
in this thesis.
Game theory is a ﬁeld that studies the behaviour of interacting agents and can
be used to address the above issues through mathematical analysis. The limitation
of game theory, however, is that many restrictive assumptions need to be made
in order for a mathematical analysis to be feasible. Commonly made assumptions
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are, for example, that the agents act rationally and are completely informed. This
means that the agents completely understand the rules of the game, have inﬁnite
reasoning capabilities, make no mistakes, and know all that needs to be known about
the world and other agents’ preferences to derive optimal outcomes. If such agents
really existed, games like chess would no longer be a challenge. In reality, both
humans and computational agents have only limited forward looking capabilities
and information; instead, many tasks are learned through experience, by a process
of trial and error. To analyse such settings with so-called boundedly rational agents,
computer simulations are a helpful addition to the set of game-theoretic tools.
In this thesis we consider the setting where agents are adaptive to their en-
vironment, and learn eﬀective bargaining policies by trial and error. We apply
learning techniques from the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence, speciﬁcally evolutionary
algorithms, to model the adaptive nature of bargaining agents in practical settings.
In the ﬁrst part of the thesis, we consider fundamental aspects of bilateral bargaining
between a buyer and a seller. We ﬁrst validate the evolutionary model for bilateral
bargaining by comparing the outcomes with game-theoretic results of relatively sim-
ple bargaining settings. We then investigate several extensions of game-theoretical
bargaining games, which are more complex and closer to real-world settings than
traditional models. Such settings are diﬃcult to analyse game-theoretically, but can
be approached using computational techniques.
In the second part, a number of business applications of automated bargaining
are introduced and investigated using computational simulations. The focus here
lies on one-to-many bargaining, where for example a seller negotiates with many
buyers simultaneously. Either an auction or a bilateral bargaining protocol is applied
to the one-to-many setting, depending on the application. Auctions can be an
eﬀective way to allocate scarce resources eﬃciently, or in other words, to ensure
that goods are awarded to whoever values them the most. If resources are ﬂexible,
however, and negotiation involves multiple aspects, bilateral bargaining can again
be the preferred way to reach an agreement. For the ﬁrst case, we investigate the
eﬀectiveness of various auction rules using an evolutionary simulation for problems
which are unwieldy to analyse mathematically. For the latter case, we present novel
bargaining strategies for the agents that can be used in practical applications. These
strategies are able to cope with complex goods and can maximise the gains of trade
(i.e., the joint gains that results from an agreement) by adjusting diﬀerent aspects
of the goods to individual needs. We furthermore combine auctions with bilateral
bargaining and propose strategies which beneﬁt from the fact that the setting is
one-to-many, even though the actual bargaining is bilateral. The performance of
the strategies is evaluated using computational simulations.1.1 Terms and deﬁnitions 3
1.1 Terms and deﬁnitions
This Section introduces the general terminology used throughout this thesis. A more
detailed explanation of game-theoretic concepts related to bargaining is presented
in Chapter 2, particularly Sections 2.1 and Sections 2.3. Furthermore, additional
local deﬁnitions are provided in the corresponding chapters. Some deﬁnitions are
numbered in order to facilitate the lookup. Note that the numbers contain the page
number where the deﬁnition is introduced, plus an additional index number.
1.1.1 General economic concepts
In order to analyse the choices that people make, such as in bargaining, it is impor-
tant to consider the preferences of decision makers for diﬀerent outcomes. Within
economics and in this thesis the notion of utility is used to quantify individuals’ pref-
erences. Utility can be considered as an individual’s measure of goal achievement
and is usually expressed in real numbers. In general, this measure is subjective and
cannot be compared to the utility of other individuals. For many real-world appli-
cations, however, utility corresponds to a monetary value, in which case comparison
is possible. A utility function describes an individual’s preferences over possible
outcomes in terms of utility.
In many cases, outcomes depend not only on choices made by individuals, but can
also be aﬀected by unpredictable events or lotteries. When such uncertainty exists,
the notion of expected utility is used. Expected utility speciﬁes the preferences over
lotteries, and is computed by multiplying the utility of an event by the probability
that this event occurs, and adding across all events (see [72, Ch.6] for further details).
Often, people have several goals and trade-oﬀs between these goals. For example,
when buying a house, trade-oﬀs exist between the location, size, and price of the
house. A multi-attribute utility function [10,101] can be used in order to represent
preferences in case of several (often independent) goals:
Deﬁnition 3.1 Multi-Attribute Utility Function A multi-attribute utility
function deﬁnes the utility over multiple weighted attributes, where each at-
tribute corresponds to a goal, and the weight indicates the relative importance
of the corresponding attribute. An attribute is also called a dimension or an
issue. In general, the attributes are assumed to be preferentially independent
or additive. In that case, the utility is calculated by multiplying each attribute
by its weight and adding across the attributes.
1.1.2 Game-theoretic concepts related to bargaining
Game theory [11,90][72, Ch.8+9] is a collection of mathematical tools designed to
analyse situations where decision-makers interact, for instance when bargaining.4 Introduction
The decision-makers are usually assumed to be fully rational (utility maximising)
and to be completely informed of the circumstances in which the game is played1 [11,
Ch.10+11]. These assumptions are far from realistic, but are often necessary in order
to make mathematical analysis feasible. We will elaborate on these assumptions in
Chapter 2 (see Section 2.1).
A decision maker in a game is henceforth called a player. We often use the term
agent instead of player, especially in a computational context.
Game theory is used in this thesis to investigate situations of bargaining. In a
bargaining situation two or more players have the option to make a joint choice from
a set of possible outcomes. The players may beneﬁt from an agreement, but they
have diﬀerent preferences for the various outcomes. In economic terms, the players
can jointly produce some type of bargaining surplus, provided that they agree on
how to divide it [81]. Examples include bargaining over the price of a house, but also
choosing a restaurant together; in both cases, all parties involved beneﬁt from an
agreement, but might have conﬂicting preferences for the diﬀerent outcomes. The
bargaining surplus or just surplus is the joint gains that can be achieved through
cooperation. For example, if a seller wants to sell a house for at least $100000, and
buyer is willing to pay up to $150000, then the bargaining surplus that is jointly
produced equals $50000. We deﬁne bargaining as the corresponding attempt to
resolve a bargaining situation, i.e., to determine the particular form of cooperation
and the corresponding division of the bargaining surplus. Bargaining is bilateral
when it concerns two players. We use the term negotiation interchangeably with the
term bargaining.
The interaction between negotiating agents is usually restricted by certain rules.
For instance, in the alternating-oﬀers game (discussed in Section 2.3.2), the players
are restricted to making oﬀers and counter oﬀers in a sequential order. The rules
are set by the so-called bargaining protocol:
Deﬁnition 4.1 Bargaining Protocol A bargaining protocol (also called negoti-
ation protocol) speciﬁes the rules that govern the negotiation process [5].
The outcomes of a bargaining game have two desirable features: individual ratio-
nality and Pareto-eﬃcient [11, Ch. 5]:
Deﬁnition 4.2 Individually Rational A bargaining outcome is individually
rational 2 if the utility assigned to each player is at least as large as a player
can achieve by himself without cooperation.
1Complete information does not rule out uncertainty (e.g. about the preferences of other play-
ers). In case of uncertainty, however, it is assumed that the probabilities are known to the players.
This topic is further discussed in Section 2.1 of the next chapter.
2Individual rationality is also used to denote a property of a mechanism (see Def.5.1). In short,
a mechanism is individually rational if it induces voluntary participation.1.1 Terms and deﬁnitions 5
Deﬁnition 4.3 Pareto-Eﬃcient, Pareto-Eﬃcient Frontier A bargaining
outcome is Pareto-eﬃcient if no outcome exists that is strictly preferred by
one player and not less preferred by any other player. The Pareto-eﬃcient
frontier connects all the Pareto-eﬃcient points in an N-dimensional space,
where each dimension corresponds to the utility level of a player (see Fig. 2.1
on page 21 for an example in a 2-dimensional space).
Loosely put, individual rationality of the bargaining outcome ensures that an agent
beneﬁts from the agreement. In most cases, a utility of zero is set as the agent’s
status quo (i.e., the agent’s utility for not participating). Any positive outcome is
then individually rational. A Pareto-eﬃcient outcome is desirable since there is then
no waste in the allocation of the resources [72, p. 313]. If outcomes are not Pareto
eﬃcient, another deal could have been made which was at least better for one player
(and equally good for the other player), or even better for both.
The players are endowed with strategies that determine how the bargaining pro-
ceeds. In general, a player’s strategy is a plan which lays out a course of action for
each possible state or history [90]. In a bargaining setting, a strategy determines
the bids of a player, given the history of the game. Moreover, the strategy decides
how the player responds to the bids received by other player(s) in the game. In
the alternating-oﬀers game (see Section 2.3.2), for example, a player can respond by
accepting or refusing the bid received by the opponent.
Mechanism design An important application area of game theory is setting up
the rules of the games, such as voting procedures or auctions rules, as to induce a
certain outcome, given that players act rationally and in their own best interest.
For example, game theory can help to understand what type of penalties, rewards
or tax system are most eﬀective to induce industrial companies to apply environ-
mentally friendly production methods. In the context of bargaining, common goals
are maximising social welfare (i.e., the sum of utilities of the players) or maximising
revenue. Choosing the right rules in order to achieve desired outcomes is known in
economics as the problem of mechanism design [133][72, Ch. 23]. First, we deﬁne
the notion of mechanism.
Deﬁnition 5.1 Mechanism A mechanism is a set of decision rules that map the
strategies of the agents to a collective outcome.
A mechanism can be viewed as an institution with rules governing the procedure for
making the collective choice [72, p. 866]. In a direct mechanism, the agents are asked
to state their preferences directly (either truthfully or not). An agent’s preferences
or type is represented by a utility function, expressing the valuation of the possible
outcomes or allocations. In an indirect mechanism, players do not communicate6 Introduction
an entire utility function, but for instance bids in an iterative auction such as the
English auction.3
Mechanism design deals with the problem of ﬁnding a mechanism that results in
a desired collective outcome, given that the agents maximise their individual utility,
and given that the institution that governs the rules does not know the preferences or
types of the agents beforehand (i.e., we are in a setting characterized by incomplete
information, see [72, Ch. 23.B] and Section 2.2). In other words, mechanism design
tries to answer whether or not, and if so how, a desired social outcome can be
materialised in a world of selﬁsh agents.
A mechanism is called incentive compatible if it induces the agents to reveal their
preferences truthfully. An interesting theorem is the revelation principle [11, Ch.
11][72, Ch. 23], which states that if a desired social outcome can be realised by an
indirect mechanism, there exists an incentive compatible direct mechanism that also
reaches the desired outcome.
1.1.3 Concepts from computer science
We describe software agents [144] in this thesis that fully or partially automate the
task of negotiation. We deﬁne a software agent as an autonomous software program
which operates on behalf of its owner. Software agents have a certain goal, which
in this thesis is to maximise a given utility function. The software agents described
here can usually learn from experience and adapt their behaviour given feedback from
the environment, without any human intervention. When multiple software agents
interact, the entire system is called a multi-agent system. Note that in a multi-agent
system the agents can reside on diﬀerent platforms, in which case communication
occurs via a physical network. We also use the term evolutionary agent to denote
an agent who’s strategy is adapted using an evolutionary algorithm.
1.2 Evolutionary algorithms
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are powerful search algorithms from the ﬁeld of ar-
tiﬁcial intelligence that are based on the principles of natural evolution [8,45,51,
75,103,115]. EAs are originally applied to solve optimisation problems, such as the
travelling salesman problem and the knapsack problem [29], but are now increas-
ingly being used to model societies of learning agents, especially within the ﬁeld of
agent-based computational economics (ACE) [4,29,104,124,127,139]. Throughout
this thesis EAs are applied to model adaptive agents that can learn to bargain ef-
fectively by means of trial and error. This section ﬁrst brieﬂy explains the basic
3In an English auction players call out increasingly higher bids until no more increases are
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principles of EAs. Then it motivates and explains the use of EAs in the context
of bargaining. Furthermore, Section 1.2.3 describes in more detail the actual algo-
rithm used in this thesis. The basic approach is the same in all chapters that apply
evolutionary algorithms.
1.2.1 Principles of evolutionary algorithms
The cornerstones of evolution in nature are “survival of the ﬁttest” together with the
transfer (with some variation) of genetic material from one generation to the next.
EAs apply these aspects of biology to evolve an artiﬁcial population of individuals.
These individuals are not living organisms in this case, but for instance solutions
to a optimisation problem or bargaining strategies of an agent. The solutions are
encoded on a chromosome of an individual, often consisting of a string of real or
binary values.
As in natural ecosystems, the survival of these individuals depends on their
ﬁtness. A suitable ﬁtness measure in artiﬁcial ecosystems depends on the problem
domain. It can for instance be an objective function in case of an optimisation
problem, or the mean utility obtained by a strategy in a game. Using the example of
the well-known prisoner’s dilemma4 [90, p.16], an individual’s chromosome encodes
a player’s (binary) strategy: confess or not confess. The ﬁtness is determined by the
ﬁnal payoﬀ (or utility) obtained when the game is played.
By reproduction new individuals are generated that inherit genetic material from
the existing individuals in a population. Natural selection then removes individuals
with a relatively low ﬁtness from the population. This process of evolution causes
good traits (i.e., that contribute to a higher ﬁtness) to remain and bad traits to die
out in the long run. Additionally, variation or “errors” in the transfer of genetic
material creates new type of individuals or solutions.
1.2.2 Modelling adaptive bargaining agents
Traditional game-theoretic studies of bargaining rely on strong assumptions such
as full rationality of the agents and common knowledge of beliefs and preferences
(for details see Chapter 2). In reality it is rare that these criteria are met. Even
in the case of computational autonomous agents, which are capable of performing
calculations much faster than humans, optimal or “rational” solutions cannot always
be found. More importantly, since agents can be programmed by diﬀerent parties,
it is better to avoid strict assumptions on other agents’ behaviour, in particular
concerning their rationality. Rather than fully rational, we assume that bargaining
4In this game, two suspects in a crime can choose either to confess or not to confess, without
knowing the strategy of the other player. The payoﬀ or ﬁnal utility of a player depends on both
his choice and of the choice made by the other player.8 Introduction
agents have little a-prori knowledge and gradually adapt and search for optimal
solutions by a process of trial and error. Such agents are called boundedly rational.
In this thesis we apply an EA to model this learning aspect of bargaining agents
and to develop eﬀective strategies for these agents. EAs are frequently used for
modelling (adaptive) behaviour of human societies and societies of computational
agents from the bottom up, especially within the ﬁeld of agent-based computational
economics (ACE).5 EAs are also increasingly being used to study situations of bar-
gaining that are diﬃcult to analyse game-theoretically, as in [31,34,73,88,126] (see
also Section 2.4.1). The advantage of EAs is that they make no explicit assumptions
or use of rationality; basically, the ﬁtness of the individual agents is used to deter-
mine whether a strategy will be used in future situations. Nonetheless, surprisingly
rational behaviour often emerges from such “low-rational” agents [146] (as we will
also show in this thesis).
There are several ways of modelling adaptive agents using EAs. In the approach
used in this thesis, agents select their bargaining strategies from a pool of strategies.
A separate pool of strategies exists for each agent type, where a type is deﬁned
by the preferences (i.e., utility function) of the agent and/or the agent’s role (e.g.
buyer or seller). Agents of the same type select their strategies from the same pool,
as these agents are likely to have similar behaviour. On the other hand, agents of
diﬀerent types will usually prefer diﬀerent strategies, hence the use of separate pools.
The pools then evolve independently, i.e. no genetic material is exchanged between
the diﬀerent pools. Note that if there is only a single agent of a certain type, all
strategies in a pool belong to that agent. This is also called a model of individual
learning. If there are several agents of the same type, this is called population
learning, since a population of agents (of the same type) learns as a whole. Below,
the implementation of the EA is explained in more detail.
1.2.3 Implementation
The term “evolutionary algorithm” refers to a broad class of algorithms. The imple-
mentation used in this thesis is based on a branch within EAs called evolution strate-
gies (ES) [8], originally developed by Rechenberg [103] and Schwefel [115]. The ES
were developed independently from the well known genetic algorithms (GAs) [45,75],
introduced by Holland [51]. Whereas GAs are more tailored toward binary-coded
search spaces, ES are originally designed for real-encoded representations, the latter
being a more natural encoding for the type of bargaining strategies we employ in the
simulations. Other classes of evolutionary algorithms include genetic programming,
evolution strategies, and evolutionary programming. For an interesting overview of
the various approaches within evolutionary computation, see [7].
5For an on-line survey of the ﬁeld of ACE, see [125].1.2 Evolutionary algorithms 9
Figure 1.1: Iteration loop of the evolutionary algorithm.
An outline of the EA is given in Figure 1.1. The EA starts with a randomly
initialised parental population of individuals. Each individual contains a bargaining
strategy which is encoded on the chromosome, a ﬁxed-size string [x0,...,xl−1] of
length l and real values xi ∈ [0,1]. Subsequently, oﬀspring individuals are created
(see Figure 1.1) by ﬁrst (randomly, with replacement) selecting an agent in the
parental population, and then mutating his chromosome to create a new oﬀspring
(the mutation operator is described below). Figure 1.2 depicts the chromosomes of a
parent individual and a corresponding (mutated) oﬀspring individual. This process
is repeated until the oﬀspring population reaches the required size.
Parent individual x0 x1 x2 ... xl−1
↓
Oﬀspring individual x′
0 x′
1 x′
2 ... x′
l−1
Figure 1.2: The chromosome of a parent individual and of an associated oﬀspring
individual. Each chromosome consists of l real values xi,x′
i ∈ [0,1]. The oﬀspring
individual is created by mutating the chromosome of the selected parent individual.
In the next stage, the ﬁtness or performance of both the oﬀspring and parent
individuals is determined by a process of negotiation. The way in which this is
achieved depends on the negotiation setup. Details are provided in the corresponding
chapters.
In the ﬁnal stage of the iteration (see Fig. 1.1), the ﬁttest agents are selected
as the new “parents” for the next iteration. Selection is performed using the deter-
ministic (  + λ)-ES selection scheme [7,8], where   is the number of parents and λ
is the number of generated oﬀspring. The   survivors with the highest ﬁtness are
selected (deterministically) from the union of parental and oﬀspring agents. This
ﬁnal step completes one iteration or generation of the EA.10 Introduction
Mutation and Recombination
Mutation and recombination are the most commonly used EA operators for re-
production. Recombination exchanges parts of the parental chromosomes, whereas
mutation produces random changes in a chromosome. In case of an ES, it is common
to use mutation-based models without recombination, especially because the muta-
tion operator (explained below) is much more advanced compared to the standard
operator used in e.g. genetic algorithms. Moreover, for many computational experi-
ments of the kind discussed in this thesis, the eﬀects of recombination seemed to be
negligible when using an ES (see also [126]). We therefore focus on mutation-based
models in this thesis.
The mutation operator of an ES implementation works as follows. Each real
value xi of a parent chromosome (see Figure 1.2) is mutated by adding a zero-mean
Gaussian variable with a standard deviation σi [8,126], thereby producing a new
value x′
i for the chromosome of the oﬀspring:
x
′
i := xi + σiNi(0,1). (1.1)
All resulting values larger than unity (or smaller than zero) are set to unity
(respectively zero).
In our simulations, we use two mutation models: a mutation model with self-
adaptive control of the standard deviations σi [8, pp. 71-73][126], and a model with
exponential decay of the standard deviations, which we describe below.
Self-Adaptive Control This model allows the evolution of both the strategy and
the corresponding standard deviations at the same time. More formally, an agent
consists of strategy variables [x0,...,xl−1] and ES-parameters [σ0,...,σl−1], where l is
the length of the chromosome.
The mutation operator ﬁrst updates an agent’s ES-parameters σi in the following
way:
σi := σiexp[τ
′N(0,1) + τNi(0,1)], (1.2)
where τ′ and τ are the so-called learning rates [8, p. 72], and N(0,1) denotes a
normally distributed random variable having expectation zero and standard devi-
ation one. The index i in Ni indicates that the variable is sampled anew for each
value of i. We use commonly recommended settings for these parameters (see [8, p.
72]).6 After the strategy parameters have been modiﬁed, the strategy variables are
mutated as indicated in Eq. 1.1.
Note that, since selection works on the σi’s as well as on the strategy variables,
the σi’s are part of the evolutionary process. The particular initial value chosen for σi
is therefore typically not crucial for this model, as the self-adaptation process rapidly
6Namely, τ′ = (
√
2l)−1 and τ = (
 
2
√
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scales σi into the proper range. For example, if solutions are far from the optimal
value, the σi can increase as a result of the evolutionary process. On the other
hand, if good solutions are found, the σi’s can converge to smaller values in order
to maintain these solutions. To prevent complete convergence of the population, we
force all standard deviations to remain larger than a small value εσ [8, pp. 72–73].
Exponential Decay Using this model, the standard deviations σi decay expo-
nentially such that every t generations their value is reduced to half the size. We
call t the half-life parameter. This model is similar to the simulated annealing mech-
anism, where a temperature parameter is slowly lowered to reduce variation in the
exploration space. Using this model, the EA always converges if the simulation is
run for a suﬃcient number of generations.
1.3 Organisation of the thesis
Readers that are new to the ﬁeld of game theory and bargaining are recommended
to read the introduction to this topic in Chapter 2. Speciﬁc topics include the ulti-
matum game, the alternating-oﬀers game, bargaining with incomplete information,
multi-issue bargaining, and one-to-many bargaining. Chapter 2 also contains a sur-
vey of approaches using techniques from artiﬁcial intelligence and are in that way
related to the general topic of the thesis. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a
discussion and an overview of the the main results.
The remaining chapters of the thesis are grouped into two parts: Part A consid-
ers fundamental aspects of bilateral bargaining systems using both game-theoretical
and computational techniques. Part B investigates two business applications of
automated bargaining, and introduces a number of eﬀective bargaining strategies.
Additionally, in the Appendix a game-theoretic analysis is provided for the games
described in Chapter 3. Each chapter of parts A and B can, in principle, be read
independently. Where necessary, cross-references are indicated within the chapters.
A recurring theme is the application of evolutionary algorithms for simulating the
strategic behaviour of the agents. The evolutionary algorithm is therefore treated
separately in Section 1.2. Parts A and B are organised as follows:
Part A: Fundamental aspects of bargaining systems
Chapter 3 describes a system for bilateral negotiations in which artiﬁcial agents
are generated by an evolutionary algorithm. The negotiations are governed by a
ﬁnite-horizon version of the alternating-oﬀers protocol. Several issues are negotiated
simultaneously. This can reduce the competitive nature of the game since trade-oﬀs
can be made to obtain mutually beneﬁcial solutions. These so-called Pareto-eﬃcient12 Introduction
solutions are indeed found by the evolutionary agents. The outcomes of the evolu-
tionary system are also analysed and validated using the game-theoretic subgame-
perfect equilibrium as a benchmark. We furthermore present and investigate an
extended model in which the agents take into account the fairness of the obtained
payoﬀ. The concept of fairness plays an important role in real-life negotiations and
experimental economics. We ﬁnd that when the fairness norm is consistently ap-
plied during the negotiation, the evolving agents reach symmetric outcomes which
are robust and rather insensitive to the actual fairness settings.
Chapter 4 extends the above game by allowing both agents to negotiate with
other opponents in case of a disagreement. This way the basics of a competitive
market are modelled where for instance a buyer can try several sellers before making
a purchase decision. Negotiations are limited to a single round, which corresponds to
the so-called ultimatum game. Whereas in the regular ultimatum game the proposer
demands the entire surplus, responding agents can now choose to refuse unaccept-
able take-it-or-leave-it deals and negotiate with another opponent. As before, the
game is investigated using an evolutionary simulation. The outcomes appear to de-
pend largely on the information available to the agents. We ﬁnd that if the agents’
number of future bargaining opportunities is commonly known, the proposer has the
advantage. If this information is held private, however, the responder can obtain
a larger share of the pie, even if the initial number of bargaining opportunities is
equal for both agents. For the ﬁrst case, a game-theoretic analysis of the game is
also presented and compared to the evolutionary results. Although a theoretical
analysis is hard for the incomplete information case, the evolutionary simulation is
very suitable for analysing both settings. The game is further extended to allow
several issues to be negotiated simultaneously. Furthermore, eﬀects of search costs
are investigated and the case where uncertainty exists about future opportunities
and a new opponent cannot always be found.
Part B: Bargaining systems for business applications
Chapter 5 considers a business application of automated negotiation, where sev-
eral supplier agents of goods and services compete for banner space or “consumer
attention space” by bidding in an auction. Bidding occurs based on information
about the consumers, their so-called proﬁle. As a result of the auction, a small
selection of banners is short-listed and presented to the consumer, for instance on
a web site. The supplier agents are simulated using an evolutionary algorithm,
and can learn, given feedback from the consumers and whether or not they were
short-listed, the type of consumers to target and the amount to bid. A number of
consumer behaviour models are investigated that simulate the consumer’s response
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of other banners displayed concurrently. In other models, the response contains
dependencies between the banners. The auctioneer can select the auction rules or
mechanism that generates the best advertisements for the consumers, but at the
same time provides the suppliers with suﬃcient proﬁts. Several mechanisms are
investigated using the simulation environment.
Chapter 6 applies automated negotiation to buy and sell bundles of information
goods. A single information provider agent or seller agent negotiates with a number
of buyer agents simultaneously. Whereas in Chapter 5 an auction is used for a one-
to-many setting, a bilateral negotiation protocol is applied in this case, where the
seller negotiates with each buyer by alternating oﬀers and counter oﬀers, as described
in Chapter 3. A bilateral protocol is more suitable here because information goods
have no constraints on the supply and diﬀerent buyers can be interested in very
diverse bundles of goods. A personalisation of bundles is achieved by bargaining
over multiple issues. Bargaining in this setting essentially has a double purpose:
(1) division of the surplus, and (2) maximising the joint gains that can be achieved
by ﬁnding win-win or Pareto-eﬃcient (see Def. 4.3) outcomes. This chapter focuses
on the latter part and introduces negotiation strategies for multi-issue negotiations
which can approximate Pareto-eﬃcient solutions.
Chapter 7 also considers the one-to-many bargaining setting using a bilateral
bargaining protocol, but focuses on the division of the surplus. Although the buyers
perceive bargaining as bilateral, the seller can actually beneﬁt from the fact that
bargaining occurs with many buyers simultaneously. This is especially the case if
buyers have time pressure and prefer early agreements. Several bargaining strategies
for the seller are investigated and compared using an evolutionary simulation. A
class of strategies are introduced which are based on the ﬁrst-price auction. These
strategies can especially beneﬁt from competition arising from the time pressure.
The seller’s bargaining strategies also take into account a notion of fairness, which
should ensure that buyers are treated fairly and do not feel discriminated based on
their individual bargaining behaviour or preferences.
1.3.1 Publications
Chapters 3-6 are based on published work and/or work that has been accepted
for publication but has yet to appear. Chapters 2 and 7 are based on technical
reports.
• Chapter 2 is based on [41]: E.H. Gerding, D.D.B. van Bragt, and J.A. La
Poutr´ e. Scientiﬁc approaches and techniques for negotiation: A game theoretic
and artiﬁcial intelligence perspective. Technical Report SEN-R0005, CWI,
Amsterdam, 2000.14 Introduction
• Chapter 3 is based on [42]: E.H. Gerding, D.D.B. van Bragt, and J.A. La
Poutr´ e. Multi-issue negotiation processes by evolutionary simulation: Valida-
tion and social extensions. Computational Economics, 22:39–63, 2003.
• Chapter 4 is based on [38]: E.H. Gerding and J.A. La Poutr´ e. Bargaining
with posterior opportunities: An evolutionary social simulation. In M. Galle-
gati, A. Kirman, and M. Marsili, editors, The Complex Dynamics of Economic
Interaction, Springer Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
(LNEMS), Vol. 531, pages 241–256. Springer-Verlag, 2004.
• Chapter 5 is based on [17]: S.M. Bohte, E.H. Gerding, and J.A. La Poutr´ e.
Market-based recommendation: Agents that compete for consumer atten-
tion. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, August 2004 (to appear).
A shorter version appeared earlier as [16]: S. M. Bohte, E. H. Gerding, and
H. La Poutr´ e. Competitive market-based allocation of consumer attention
space. In M. Wellman, editor, Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce (EC-01), pages 202–206. The ACM Press, 2001.
• Chapter 6 is based on [120]: K. Somefun, E.H. Gerding, S. Bohte, and J.A. La
Poutr´ e. Automated negotiation and bundling of information goods. In
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V, Springer Lecture Notes in Artiﬁcial
Intelligence (LNAI). Springer-Verlag, Berlin, to appear.
• Chapter 7 is based on [40]: E.H. Gerding, K. Somefun, and J.A. La Poutr´ e.
Bilateral bargaining in a one-to-many bargaining setting. Technical Report,
CWI, Amsterdam, to appear. A shorter version has been accepted for pub-
lication as [39]: E.H. Gerding, K. Somefun, and J.A. La Poutr´ e. Bilateral
bargaining in a one-to-many bargaining setting. In Proceedings of the 3rd
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Sys-
tems (AAMAS2004), New York City, New York. IEEE Computer Society
Press, 2004.Chapter 2
Bargaining: an overview
This chapter contains an overview of approaches and techniques concerned with
bargaining. We here focus on the large body of literature that has been published
in the ﬁelds of economics (in particular game theory) and artiﬁcial intelligence (AI).
To give a brief impression of the rapid developments in this ﬁeld, we ﬁrst highlight
some important breakthroughs in economic bargaining theory in Section 2.1. Sec-
tion 2.2 discusses assumptions frequently made in game theory to make mathemati-
cal analysis feasible, and motivates the use of computational techniques. Details on
game-theoretic bargaining approaches follow in Section 2.3. Bargaining approaches
using computational techniques from the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence are the topic
of Section 2.4. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes this chapter with a short discussion.
2.1 A brief history of bargaining
Perhaps surprisingly, the bargaining problem has challenged economists for decades.
Yet the bargaining problem is stated very easily [110]:
Two individuals have before them several possible contractual agree-
ments. Both have interests in reaching agreement but their interests are
not entirely identical. What “will be” the agreed contract, assuming
that both parties behave rationally?
Before the path-breaking work of Nash [82] and, much later, Rubinstein [110] the
bargaining problem was considered to be indeterminate. For example, in their inﬂu-
ential work Von Neumann and Morgenstern [137] argued that the most one can say
is that the agreed contract will lie in the so-called bargaining set. The bargaining
set is the set of all feasible outcomes (an outcome is feasible if it can be jointly
achieved by the players involved) that are individually rational (see Def. 4.2) and
Pareto-eﬃcient (see Def. 4.3), i.e., it is no worse than disagreement and there is no
agreement that both parties would prefer. But because this bargaining set consists
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in general of an inﬁnite number of diﬀerent agreements this requirement does not
yield a unique bargaining solution. A unique solution can be found, however, if
the agreed contract satisﬁes additional axioms such as those proposed by Nash [82].
This solution is called the Nash bargaining solution and is discussed in Section 2.3.1.
Because one can argue about which axioms are reasonable and which are not, Nash
suggested to complement this axiomatic approach with a strategic game. This route
was followed by Rubinstein [110] who proved that an important bargaining game
(the alternating-oﬀers game) has a unique solution (see Section 2.3.2). Binmore
[12] then connected the ﬁelds of axiomatic and strategic bargaining by proving that
the solution of Rubinstein’s bargaining model coincides with the Nash bargaining
solution under special circumstances.
2.2 Game theory and artiﬁcial intelligence
Game theory frequently makes simplifying assumptions to facilitate the mathemat-
ical analysis. Common assumptions are for instance: (1) complete knowledge of the
circumstances in which the game is played and (2) full rationality of the players.
The ﬁrst assumption implies that the rules of the game and the preferences (i.e., the
utility functions) and beliefs1 of the players are common knowledge.2 A game has
incomplete information if something about the circumstances in which the game is
played, such as the preferences of other players, is not known to the players. Game
theorists traditionally model incomplete information of other player’s preferences
and beliefs by specifying a limited number of player types (see also Section 2.4.3).
Each type is then uniquely determined by a set of preferences and beliefs. Players
are not completely certain about the exact type of their opponent. However, the
probability that an opponent is of a certain type is, again, common knowledge for
all players. In this manner, a game of incomplete information can be transformed
in a game of imperfect information.3
The second assumption relates to the need for common knowledge on how players
reason. It is assumed that players maximise their expected utility given their beliefs.
Players have inﬁnite computational capacity to pursue statements like “if I think
that he thinks that I think...” ad inﬁnitum. Furthermore, players are assumed to
have a perfect memory.4 These assumptions limit the practical applicability of game-
1Beliefs are subjective probability of events occurring about which the player is uncertain.
2Common knowledge means that the players know what the other players know, etc., in an
inﬁnite regress.
3In a game with imperfect information uncertainty exists about the state of the world. A game
is said to have perfect information if (i) there are no simultaneous moves and (ii) at each decision
point it is known which choices have previously been made [131, Ch. 1].
4Lately, much research in game theory focuses on the ﬁeld of “bounded” rationality, in which
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theoretic results. In the ﬁeld of AI, however, assumptions like complete knowledge
or full rationality are not necessary because the behaviour of individual agents can
be modelled directly.5 This gives the AI approach an important advantage over
more rigorous (but at the same time more simpliﬁed) game-theoretical models.
Researchers in the ﬁeld of AI are currently developing software agents (see Sec-
tion 1.1.3) which should be able (in the near future) to negotiate in an intelligent
way on behalf of their users. A survey of the potential of automated negotiation is
given in [144, Ch. 9]. The state-of-the-art of agent technology is reviewed in [70].
In future applications for e-commerce, multi-agent systems will need to be ﬂexible,
especially for trading, brokering, and proﬁling applications [128]. In particular, it is
important for the negotiating (software) agents to be able to adapt their strategies
to deal with changing opponents, changing topics and concerns, and changing user
preferences. Multi-agent learning, (the ability of the agents to learn how to com-
municate, cooperate and compete) becomes crucial in such domains [70, p.23]. This
should lead to much more advanced and universal systems.
Nevertheless, due to this rapidly increasing complexity, the connection between
the AI approach and a game-theoretic analysis remains important. Game theory
may aid in the diﬃcult task of choosing a suitable bargaining protocol [14] (see
Def. 4.1). Tools and techniques from AI can be used to develop software applications,
bargaining strategies, protocols and mechanisms which are currently beyond the
reach of classical game theory.
2.3 Game-theoretic approaches to bargaining
Traditionally, game theory can be divided into two branches: cooperative and non-
cooperative game theory. In cooperative game theory, groups of players are taken as
primitives and binding agreements can be made. Cooperative game theory abstracts
away from the rules of the game and is mainly concerned with ﬁnding a solution
given a set of feasible outcomes.6 A topic like coalition forming is typically analysed
using cooperative game theory. Often, in real life, companies can gain proﬁts by
working together, for example by securing a larger market share or by reducing direct
competition with the competitors. In such games, a surplus (see Section 1.1.2) is
created when two or more players cooperate and form a coalition. Cooperative
in this ﬁeld can be found in [112]. Binmore also gives a short discussion of this topic in [11, pp.
478-488].
5For example, agents can be programmed with a certain strategy and use for instance reinforce-
ment learning to improve this strategy. These agents are not explicitly rational or fully informed.
Nevertheless, after a period of learning, the agents could exhibit behaviour that resembles that of
rational and fully informed agents.
6Recall from above that an outcome is feasible if it can be jointly achieved by the players
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game theory can then determine how the surplus is to be divided, given a coalition
and a set of assumptions (called axioms). Likewise, cooperative bargaining theory
determines how the surplus is to be divided which results from an agreement, given
the set of axioms (an example of such axioms resulting in a unique solution, the
so-called Nash bargaining solution, is discussed in Section 2.3.1).
Non-cooperative game theory, on the other hand, is concerned with speciﬁc games
with a well deﬁned set of rules, game strategies, and payoﬀs rather than axioms.
All strategies, rules and payoﬀs are known beforehand by the players. A player’s
strategy is a plan which lays out a course of action for each possible state or history.
Strategies can be pure or mixed. A pure strategy determines the actions for a given
state deterministically. A mixed strategy requires a player to randomise between his
pure strategies. Payoﬀs are the ﬁnal returns (expressed in utility) to the players
when the game is concluded.
Non-cooperative game theory uses the notion of a strategic equilibrium or just
equilibrium to determine rational outcomes of a game. Numerous equilibrium con-
cepts have been proposed in the literature (see [131] for an overview). Some widely-
used concepts are dominant strategies, Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equi-
librium. We deﬁne these notions below.
Deﬁnition 18.1 Dominant Strategy A dominant strategy is optimal in all
circumstances, that is, the strategy achieves the highest payoﬀ no matter what
the strategies of the other players are.
This is obviously a very strong notion of an equilibrium strategy. A slightly weaker,
but still very powerful, equilibrium concept is the so-called Nash equilibrium [83,84]:
Deﬁnition 18.2 Nash Equilibrium Strategies chosen by all players are said to
be in Nash equilibrium if no player can beneﬁt by unilaterally changing his
strategy.
Nash proved that every ﬁnite game has at least one equilibrium point (in pure or
mixed strategies [83,84]). The concept of dominant strategies is a reﬁnement of
the Nash equilibrium. That is, if strategies are dominant, they also constitute a
Nash equilibrium. The reverse is not necessarily true, however. Another important
reﬁnement of a Nash equilibrium is Selten’s subgame-perfect equilibrium [116,117]
for extensive-form games. Extensive-form games are games with a tree structure,
i.e., where players can make decisions sequentially and at various stages of the game
(by contrast, in strategic-form games, players are required to make decisions once
and simultaneously). Subgame-perfect equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 18.3 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium Strategies in an extensive-
form game are in subgame-perfect equilibrium if the strategies constitute a a
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An overview of the main bargaining literature from the ﬁeld of cooperative game
theory is given in Section 2.3.1. We note that the concepts from cooperative game
theory are not necessary to understand the remainder of the thesis, and are intended
for the interested reader. In Section 2.3.2 several non-cooperative bargaining games
are discussed. Particular attention is paid to the most important bargaining proto-
col: the alternating-oﬀers game. In Section 2.3.2 bargaining over a single issue is
assumed. Section 2.3.3 covers work on multiple-issue negotiations.
As we mentioned before, traditional game theory assumes complete information,
implying that the player’s preferences and beliefs are common knowledge. However,
lately many researchers in game theory have focused on the consequences of play-
ers having private information. Among other things, incomplete information could
explain why ineﬃcient deals are reached or why no deal is reached at all. For in-
stance, the occurrence of strikes and bargaining impasses, but also the occurrence of
delays in negotiations can theoretically be addressed when complete information is
no longer assumed. Literature related to this topic is discussed in Section 2.3.4. We
also consider one-to-many bargaining, i.e., where one player interacts with multiple
opponents simultaneously. Auctions are the most common approach for such a set-
ting, and will be the topic of Section 2.3.5 (an alternative approach, using bilateral
bargaining, is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7).
2.3.1 Cooperative bargaining theory
Cooperative game theory considers the space of possible outcomes of a game, without
specifying the game itself in detail. In case of bargaining, the outcomes are often
denoted in terms of utilities (see Section 1.1.1). In case of two-player games, the
outcomes are then represented by utility pairs. Cooperative bargaining theory is
concerned with the question of which outcome will eventually prevail, given the set
of all possible utility pairs. A particular set of possible outcomes is also referred to
as a bargaining problem.
A function which maps a bargaining problem to a single outcome is called a
solution concept. Usually, a solution concept is only valid for a certain subset of all
possible bargaining problems. For instance, the ﬁrst and most famous solution con-
cept, the Nash bargaining solution (see below) only applies to convex and compact
bargaining sets (see [11, pp. 180–181]). Only if these requirements are satisﬁed the
bargaining problem can properly be called a Nash bargaining problem.
An alternative bargaining solution has been proposed by Kalai and Smorodin-
sky [57]. Their approach is discussed below. Both the Nash and the Kalai and
Smorodinsky bargaining solutions are invariant with respect to the calibration of
the players’ utility scales. The utilitarian solution concept diﬀers in that respect
and does actually depend on how the functions are scaled. For this reason, its appli-
cation is limited to those situations where inter-personal utility comparison makes20 Bargaining: an overview
any sense. Cooperative theories of bargaining are discussed in more detail in [106].
The Nash bargaining solution
Nash proposed four properties, now called the Nash axioms, which should be satisﬁed
by rational bargainers [82],[11, p. 184]:
1. The ﬁnal outcome should not depend on how the players’ utility scales are
calibrated. This means the following. A utility function speciﬁes a player’s
preferences. However, diﬀerent utility functions can be used to model the
same preferences. Speciﬁcally, any strictly increasing aﬃne transformation of
a utility function models the same preferences as the original function, and
should therefore yield the same outcome.
2. The agreed payoﬀ pair should always be individually rational (see Def. 4.2)
and Pareto-eﬃcient (see Def. 4.3)
3. The outcome should be independent of irrelevant alternatives. Stated oth-
erwise, if the players sometimes agree on the utility pair s when t is also a
feasible agreement, they never agree on t when s is a feasible agreement.
4. In symmetric situations, both players get the same.
The solution which satisﬁes these four properties is characterised by the payoﬀ pair
s = (x1,x2) which maximises the so-called Nash product (x1 − d1)(x2 − d2), where
d1 and d2 are player 1’s and player 2’s outcomes in case of a disagreement. Nash
proved that this is the only solution which satisﬁes all four axioms [82]. Given a Nash
bargaining problem where the set of individually rational agreements is not empty,
the Nash bargaining solution then leads to a unique outcome. Figure 2.1 illustrates
how to construct the Nash bargaining solution for a given bargaining problem.
Due to the fourth axiom, both players are treated symmetrically if the bargaining
problem is symmetric as well. In other words, if the players’ labels are reversed, each
one will still receive the same payoﬀ. A more general solution attributes so-called
bargaining powers α and β to player 1 and player 2, respectively. In this generalised
or asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, the fourth axiom is abandoned and the
bargaining solution comes to depend on the bargaining powers of the two players.7
The generalised Nash bargaining solution corresponding to the bargaining powers
α and β can be characterised as above as the pair s which maximises the product
(x1 − d1)α(x2 − d2)β [11, p. 189].
7What these bargaining powers represent depends on the actual (non-cooperative) game played.
For example, in case of negotiating companies the bargaining powers could be determined by the
strength of their respective market positions. It should be clear however, that the bargaining
powers have nothing to do with the bargaining skills of the players, since perfect rationality is
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Figure 2.1: Construction of the Nash bargaining solution. This ﬁgure shows the
Pareto-eﬃcient frontier (denoted by the solid line, see also Def. 4.3) and the Nash
bargaining solution for a speciﬁc bargaining problem. The bargaining problem is
deﬁned by the set of feasible utility pairs (denoted by the grey area) and the dis-
agreement point d which speciﬁes the players’ payoﬀs in case of a disagreement. To
ﬁnd the (symmetric) Nash bargaining solution, one needs to ﬁnd a supporting line
on the Pareto-eﬃcient frontier which is bounded by lines r and t such that the Nash
bargaining solution is exactly halfway between these lines. The lines r and t are
respectively the horizontal and the vertical lines drawn from the disagreement point
d.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
The third of the Nash axioms (independence of irrelevant alternatives) has been the
source of great controversy (follow the discussion in [69]). Kalai and Smorodinsky
therefore proposed an alternative to this axiom, which they refer to as the axiom
of monotonicity [57][72, p. 844]. For a set S of individually-rational and Pareto-
eﬃcient points, let mi(S) = max{si | s ∈ S} be the maximum utility value that
player i could attain (for i = 1,2), given that the players are individually rational.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution then selects the maximum element in S on the
line that joins the disagreement point (d1,d2) with the point (m1(S),m2(S)). An
example is given in ﬁgure 2.2.
Utilitarianism
A utilitarian policy in philosophy is one which prefers an outcome which maximises
the total welfare of the individuals in a society [80]. Any bargaining solution which22 Bargaining: an overview
Figure 2.2: Construction of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. m1 and m2 are the
maximum utilities for players 1 and 2 respectively, given that the players are in-
dividually rational. Point k is the unique solution which satisﬁes the four axioms
proposed by Kalai and Smorodinsky [57].
maximises the sum of utilities is therefore called a utilitarian solution concept.
Stated less formally, the utilitarian principle asserts that “you should do something
for me if it will hurt you less than it will help me”. Clearly, a utilitarian solu-
tion concept assumes that interpersonal utility comparisons are possible. Therefore,
Nash’s ﬁrst axiom (independence of utility calibrations) no longer holds in utilitarian
models.8
Concluding remarks
Apparently, many diﬀerent types of solutions to the bargaining problem exist in
cooperative game theory. The choice of a speciﬁc solution is of course based on
norms existing in a society, or, more speciﬁcally, on which axioms seem to be “rea-
sonable” in a speciﬁc bargaining context. Certain outcomes might be for instance
be considered as “unfair”. An example is given in [101, pp. 235–250].
Additionally, it is important to consider for which classes of non-cooperative
games the solution concepts from cooperative game theory are appropriate. For
instance, if no non-cooperative game can be found which results in a solution spec-
iﬁed by cooperative game theory, then the results from cooperative game theory
have little bearing. Fortunately, such a connection between cooperative and non-
8Note that the Pareto-eﬃciency axiom still holds. The other axioms depend on the speciﬁc
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cooperative game theory has been observed under special circumstances [12]. More
details are given in the next section.
2.3.2 Bargaining over a single issue
Four diﬀerent negotiation games or protocols (see Def. 4.1) are described in this
section. These protocols can be used by two bargainers to divide a given bargaining
surplus (see Section 1.1.2), that is, the mutual beneﬁt resulting when the players
reach an agreement. Without loss of generality, we assume that the bargaining
surplus is of size unity in the following.
The following protocols are considered below: (1) the Nash demand game, (2) the
ultimatum game, (3) the alternating-oﬀers game and (4) the monotonic concession
protocol. The ﬁrst three games are well-known and widely-used. The fourth game is
described in [105] and is an attempt to model a more realistic negotiation scenario.
However, in all games described here analytical solutions are obtained using the
strong assumption of common knowledge. The extrapolation of results obtained
here to real-world cases is therefore a non-trivial step.
The protocols described in this section have been applied mainly to evaluate
negotiations over a single issue. In real life, this issue is often the price of a good to
be negotiated. Although this keeps matters simple, important value-added services
such as delivery time, warranty or service are left out. Both the supplier and the
consumer could for instance beneﬁt if negotiations involve multiple issues. Moreover,
multiple-issue negotiations can be less competitive because solutions can be sought
which satisfy both parties. Multiple-issue negotiations are studied in more detail in
Section 2.3.3.
The Nash demand game
Both players simultaneously demand a certain fraction of the bargaining surplus
in this game, without any knowledge of the other player’s demand [11, pp. 299-
304]. In case the sum of demands exceeds the surplus, both players only receive
their disagreement payoﬀ. Otherwise, the demands are said to be compatible, and
both players get what they requested. This game has an inﬁnite number of Nash
equilibria: all deals which are Pareto-eﬃcient, but also deals where both players
receive their disagreement payoﬀ. For example, if both players ask more than the
entire surplus, no player could ever gain by unilaterally changing his strategy.
The concept of a Nash equilibrium thus places few restrictions on the nature
of the outcome. Nash therefore suggested a reﬁnement for this game which does
result in a unique solution. This reﬁnement of the demand game is called the per-
turbed demand game [89, pp. 77-81]. In this perturbed game the players are not
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of compatible demands) and which outcomes are not. When the degree of uncer-
tainty approaches zero, the Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game approaches the
Nash bargaining solution of the regular demand game (without uncertainty).9 The
reader is referred to [131] for technical details on this subject. A more introductory
overview is given by Binmore [11].
The ultimatum game
Playing Nash’s demand game, both players could easily receive nothing, or it could
occur that some of the surplus is “thrown away”. Players would do better by
choosing a somewhat less competitive game. If they are unable to reach an agreement
using this alternative game, the demand game still remains an option.
A very simple alternative is the so-called ultimatum game. In this game, one of
the players proposes a split of the surplus and the other player has only two options:
accept or refuse. In case of a refusal, both players get nothing (or the demand game
is played). Although the game again has an inﬁnite number of Nash equilibria, it
has only one subgame perfect equilibrium (in case the bargaining surplus can be
divided with arbitrary precision) where the ﬁrst player demands the whole surplus
and the second player accepts this deal [11, pp. 197-200].
The alternating-oﬀers game
Basically a multiple-stage extension of the ultimatum game, the alternating-oﬀers
game is probably the most elegant bargaining model. As in the ultimatum game,
player 1 starts by oﬀering a fraction x of the surplus to player 2. If player 2 accepts
player 1’s oﬀer, he receives x and player 1 receives 1−x. Otherwise, player 2 needs
to make a counter oﬀer in the next round, which player 1 then accepts or rejects
(sending the game to the next round). This process is repeated until one of the
players agrees or until a ﬁnite deadline is reached.
Bargaining over a single issue in an alternating fashion has been pioneered by
Ingolf St˚ ahl [121]. A taxonomy and survey of economic literature on bargaining
before 1972 is given in this reference. St˚ ahl analyzes bargaining games with a ﬁ-
nite number of alternatives. Both games of ﬁnite and of inﬁnite length are studied,
but he primarily evaluates games of a ﬁnite length. St˚ ahl uses an assumption of
“good-faith bargaining” to simplify the theoretical analysis. Good-faith bargain-
ing prevents players from increasing their demands during play. He then identiﬁes
optimal strategies for rational players with perfect information by starting at the
last stage of the game and then inductively working backwards until the beginning
of play. This procedure yields those equilibria which can be found with dynamic
programming methods.
9Note that only the Nash equilibria which result in solutions within the bargaining set are
considered. Nash equilibria in which no agreement is reached still remain [89, p.79].2.3 Game-theoretic approaches to bargaining 25
A straightforward dynamic programming approach can fail in case of imperfect
information [131, Ch. 1]. Sensible strategies can then be found by requiring that
each player’s optimal strategy for the entire game also prescribes an optimal strategy
in every subgame. As mentioned before, this concept of a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium (SPE, see Def. 18.3) is due to Selten [116,117]. Rubinstein [110] successfully
applied this equilibrium concept to identify a unique solution in his variant of the
alternating-oﬀers game. Rubinstein’s game [110] has an inﬁnite length and there
is a continuum of alternatives. To simplify the analysis, Rubinstein made several
assumptions with regard to the players’ preferences. An important diﬀerence with
St˚ ahl’s model is that time preferences are assumed to be stationary (this means that
the preferences of getting a part x of the surplus at time t over getting y at t + 1 is
independent of t).
Rubinstein analyses two speciﬁc stationary models: one in which each player has
a ﬁxed bargaining cost for each period (c1 and c2) and one in which each player has
ﬁxed discount factors (δ1 and δ2). Discount factors are used to relate the utility
of future consumption to the utility of consuming immediately. In other words,
discount factors model how impatient the player is [11, p. 202]. We provide a
formal deﬁnition of a discount factor:
Deﬁnition 25.1 Discount Factor The discount factor is used to translate ex-
pected utility or costs in any given future into present value terms.
Player i’s utility for getting a fraction x of the surplus at time t is equal to x(δi)t. If
the discount factor is smaller than 1, a deal is therefore worth less if the agreement
is reached in the future than if a deal is reached immediately.
Using stationarity and other assumptions, Rubinstein ﬁrst demonstrated that
the Nash equilibrium concept is too weak to identify a unique solution by proving
that every partitioning of the surplus can be supported as the outcome of Nash
equilibrium play. To overcome this diﬃculty, Rubinstein then applied the concept of
a SPE and proved that there exists a unique SPE in the alternating-oﬀers bargaining
model. For example, if both players have a ﬁxed discounting factor (δ1 and δ2)
the only SPE is one in which player 1 gets (1 − δ2)/(1 − δ1δ2) and player 2 the
remainder (of a surplus of size 1). Furthermore, if both players use their SPE
strategy, agreement will be reached in the ﬁrst round of the game. Notice that
Rubinstein’s proof assumes that both players have perfect information about the
other player’s preferences (i.e., their bargaining cost or discount factor). Bargaining
with imperfect information (i.e., where uncertainty plays a crucial role) is discussed
further in Section 2.3.4.
Rubinstein’s paper has been very inﬂuential in bargaining theory. At the mo-
ment, a vast body of literature exists on inﬁnite-horizon games. An overview is
given in [79,89]. Many pointers to the literature are given in these references. We
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An particularly important paper is [12]. In this paper a relation between the SPE
outcome of the alternating-oﬀers game and the Nash bargaining solution is identiﬁed
in case of weak player preferences (e.g., discount factors close to unity or small time
intervals between rounds). This establishes a link between non-cooperative and
cooperative bargaining theory and justiﬁes the use of the Nash bargaining solution
to resolve negotiation problems (at least in case of complete information).
Van Damme et al. [132] have investigated the role of a smallest monetary unit
(i.e., a ﬁnite number of alternatives) in the alternating-oﬀers game with payoﬀ dis-
counting. They show that in case of a ﬁnite number of alternatives, any partition
of the surplus can be supported as the result of a subgame-perfect equilibrium if
the time interval between successive rounds becomes very small. This means that
Rubinstein’s assumption of a continuous spectrum of bids is essential in deriving a
unique solution of the alternating-oﬀers game under these conditions.
Monotonic concession protocol
A more restricted protocol, compared to the alternating-oﬀers game, is described
in [105]. In this monotonic concession protocol the two players announce their
proposals simultaneously. If the oﬀers of both agents match or exceed the other
agent’s demand, an agreement is reached. A coin is tossed to choose one of the
oﬀers in case they are dissimilar.
If no agreement is reached, the players need to make new oﬀers in the next round.
The oﬀers need to be monotonic, that is, the players are not allowed to make oﬀers
which have a lower utility for their counter player compared to the last oﬀer. Hence,
a player can either make the same oﬀer (to stand ﬁrm) or concede. Negotiations end
if both agents stand ﬁrm in the same round. The players receive their disagreement
payoﬀs in this case. Because each round at least one of the players has to make a
concession (or a disagreement occurs), the protocol has a ﬁnite execution time if the
minimum concession per round is ﬁxed and larger than zero.
Note that in order to make a (monotonic) concession possible, a player needs
to have some knowledge about the other players’ preferences. This knowledge is
crucial when several issues are negotiated at the same time. In this case not only
the sign of the utility function, but also the relative importance of the issues becomes
important.
Rosenschein and Zlotkin discuss which kinds of strategies are stable and eﬃcient
when using this protocol (in negotiations over a single issue). A strategy pair is
eﬃcient in this case if an agreement is always reached. Stability is deﬁned using the
notion of symmetric Nash equilibrium: A strategy s constitutes a symmetric Nash
equilibrium (and is stable) if player 1 can do no better than playing s, given that
player 2 also uses s. Note that a strategy s in which both players make a concession
in the same round is not stable: one of the players could do better by standing ﬁrm.
On the other hand, a strategy where a player tosses a coin to determine whether to2.3 Game-theoretic approaches to bargaining 27
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independent implementation
Figure 2.3: Four diﬀerent bargaining procedures used in multiple-issue bargaining
[97].
concede or stand still is not eﬃcient (nor stable): a disagreement will occur with a
probability of one fourth. The interested reader is referred to [105] for more details
on the characteristics of this mechanism.
2.3.3 Bargaining over multiple issues
The above situations can be described as negotiations about how to divide a surplus.
This means that the negotiations are distributive: a gain for one player always
creates a loss for the other player. These kinds of negotiations are also referred to
as competitive [48]. When more than a single issue is involved, and players attach
diﬀerent importance to these issues, tradeoﬀs become an option and negotiations
may become integrative. The latter kind of negotiations is the main topic of this
section. Results from cooperative game theory are discussed ﬁrst, followed by a
overview of results from non-cooperative game theory.
Cooperative game theory
An additive scoring system or an additive multi-attribute utility function (see Def. 3.1)
can be used to represent the relationships or trade-oﬀs between the issues if several
issues are involved.10 However, these methods are appropriate only if the issues are
preferentially independent, that is, if the contribution of one issue is independent of
the values of the other issues.
Once the preferences are mapped, for instance onto an additive multi-attribute
utility function, the bargaining set can be determined. The main goal is again
to reach a Pareto-eﬃcient outcome (see Def. 4.3). Previously introduced solution
concepts such as the Nash bargaining solution or the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution can
be used for this purpose. Several practical considerations (concerning for example
fairness of the outcome) and some instructive real-world examples are given by Raiﬀa
in [101].
10See [101, pp.154-155] for a discussion of the diﬀerences between these methods.28 Bargaining: an overview
Non-cooperative game theory
Four diﬀerent bargaining procedures can be distinguished for multiple-issue bargain-
ing [97] (see ﬁgure 2.3). In case of global or simultaneous bargaining all issues are
negotiated at once. The second procedure is called separate bargaining. In this pro-
tocol the issues are negotiated independently. The ﬁnal two procedures fall under
the header of sequential bargaining and are distinguished by their rules of imple-
mentation. These rules specify when the players can start enjoying the beneﬁts of
the issues which have been agreed on.11 Three possibilities are considered in [35].
Here, however, we will only mention the most important two. Using the so-called
independent implementation rule, an agreement on an individual issue takes eﬀect
immediately, that is, the agreed upon issues are no longer discounted. In the simul-
taneous implementation on the other hand, the players have to wait until agreement
is reached on all issues before they can enjoy the beneﬁts of it. The time it takes
to agree on the remaining issues also inﬂuences the proﬁts gained on the already
agreed upon issues.
When bargaining is sequential an agenda needs to be determined to set the order
in which the issues will be negotiated. Agenda setting is of course only relevant
if the issues are of diﬀerent importance. Another concern is whether the players
attach the same importance to each issue or whether diﬀerent players have diﬀerent
evaluations regarding the importance of the issues. The latter is the most interesting
case since this allows for integrative negotiations. Unfortunately, however, only a
limited literature exists on this topic in game theory. Usually, either the issues are of
equal importance (as in [6]) or the players have identical preferences (as in [19]). In
[97] the assumption is made that preferences are additive over issues, implying that
the multi-issue bargaining problem is equal to the sum of the bargaining problems
over the separate issues.
One of the few papers in game theory on integrative bargaining is [35]. Fersht-
man considers sequential bargaining over two issues. He states that, when using
Rubinstein’s alternating-oﬀers protocol for each issue in a sequential order, each
player prefers an agenda in which the ﬁrst issue to bargain on is the one which is
the least important for him but the most important for his opponent. Notably, it is
shown in [35] that the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome for this problem does
not need to be Pareto-eﬃcient.
2.3.4 Bargaining with private information
Private information such as reservation values (i.e., limit values on what the players
ﬁnd acceptable), preferences amongst issues, attitudes towards risk or time prefer-
ences are often hidden from the opponent in real-life negotiations. In bargaining it
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might for example be beneﬁcial to be dishonest about one’s attitudes towards risk
in order to get a greater share of the surplus (as would be the case in Rubinstein’s
alternating-oﬀers game). Sometimes, however, a mechanism (see Def. 5.1) can be
designed which gives agents a compelling incentive to be honest to the opponent.
Such mechanisms are called incentive compatible (see Section 1.1.2, p. 6).
The Vickrey auction [136] is an example of such an incentive-compatible mech-
anism (this auction and other incentive-compatible mechanisms are discussed in
Section 2.3.5). Unfortunately, however, a suitable mechanism does not always exist.
Moreover, such mechanisms are static and mediated (e.g. by an auctioneer) [5]. In
practice, bargaining is often dynamic and involves a sequence of oﬀers and counter
oﬀers between two or more players. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse dynamic
or extensive-form bargaining games with incomplete information. As mentioned
in Section 2.2, game theory frequently assumes that the players have complete in-
formation. However, in order to analyse situations in which players are unsure of
the opponent’s type, the notion of imperfect information needs to be applied (see
Section 2.2).
Imperfect information enables us to address important issues as reputation build-
ing, signalling and self-selection mechanisms [111]. For example, the fact that players
are unsure of the other player’s type might explain the occurrence of (ineﬃcient)
delays in reaching an agreement [89, Ch. 5]. Using such ineﬃcient strategies may
be the only way to signal for instance one’s strength (an example is the outbreak of
strikes during wage bargaining situations). Any utterance which is not backed up by
actions can be considered as being cheap talk.12 Delays may therefore be required
to convey private information credible [58].
In a wage negotiation problem, for example, the union is often unsure about the
actual value of its workers for a ﬁrm. If this value is high, the ﬁrm will be more
eager to sign an agreement. In case of a low value however, the ﬁrm will behave
credible by bearing the costs of a strike [58]. A ﬁrm could try to “bluﬀ” by ignoring
a strike even in case of a high valuation, and use this strategy to signal a lower
valuation of the union workers than actually is the case. However, such a strategy
can potentially be very harmful.
An overview of bargaining with incomplete information is given in [5]. More
introductory texts on bargaining with private information can be found in [58] and
[11, Ch. 11].
12In non-cooperative games, nothing anyone says constrains its future behaviour. If a player
chooses to honour an agreement or threat that has been made, this will only be because it is
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2.3.5 One-to-many bargaining
In a one-to-many bargaining setting, one player negotiates contractual agreements
with two or more opponents. A typical example is when a seller has one or more
items for sale, and several buyers wish to purchase an item (or a bundle of items).
Auctions are the most common mechanism (see Def. 5.1) to solve the one-to-many
bargaining problem. An alternative approach, using bilateral bargaining, is dis-
cussed in Chapters 6 and 7. This section explains the most common auctions or
mechanisms and discusses optimal bidding behaviour in these auctions.
We focus here on sealed-bid auctions, where buyers submit positive bids to an
auctioneer and the auctioneer selects the winners and the amount that they have to
pay.13 Note that the amount that the winners pay in such auctions does not always
correspond to the actual bid, which will become clear below. The auction is called
sealed because a buyer’s bid is hidden from the other buyers and is only revealed to
the auctioneer. Often, the role of the auctioneer is taken by the seller.
Auctions for a single good are discussed ﬁrst, followed by auctions for more
complex cases. We assume in the following that buyers have independent valuations.
In this context, a the buyer’s valuation is the highest price that she14 is willing to
pay, such that she is indiﬀerent between paying the highest price and not obtaining
the good(s) at all (i.e., both options have equal utility). A player’s valuation is
independent if it does not depend on information available about the preferences of
other players, nor on the allocation of the goods to other players.
Single unit
Perhaps the most common sealed-bid auction for selling a single item is the ﬁrst-
price auction. In this auction, the item is awarded to the highest bidder, and she
pays the price equal to the submitted bid. We can use game theory to derive optimal
strategies for the buyers in this auction. Take for example the case where two buyers
compete for the good and have diﬀerent valuations for the good. If a buyer knows
the valuation of the other buyer, it is optimal to bid slightly above the valuation of
the other buyer if she has the highest valuation, and to bid her valuation otherwise.
This strategy constitutes a Nash equilibrium. In case the other buyer’s valuation is
not known, but is independently drawn from a distribution, the optimal response
can again be calculated (we refer the interested reader to [72, p.865] for details).
Clearly, the buyer’s bid depends on a buyer’s speculation about the valuations of
other bidders. In general, the buyer will then bid below her valuation.
An interesting alternative auction is the aforementioned Vickrey or second-price
auction [136]. In this auction the highest bidder wins as before, but pays the price
13Note that such auctions can be considered direct mechanisms (see Section 1.1.2, page 5), in
which the players are asked to submit their preferences directly.
14In the following, we use she for a buyer and he to refer to a seller.2.3 Game-theoretic approaches to bargaining 31
bid by the second-highest bidder.15 In contrast to the previous auction, the optimal
strategy in this case is to bid the true valuation for the good, irrespective of the
valuations and bids of the other buyers [27,136].16 This is in fact a dominant strategy
(see Def. 18.1). This auction is also called incentive compatible (see Section 1.1.2,
p.6) because it provides the players with the incentive to reveal their preferences
truthfully. Intuitively, this is because a buyer’s payment is independent from her
bid, and therefore she does not beneﬁt by bidding lower than her valuation. Bidding
a higher value is also not beneﬁcial since it can result in paying more than the
valuation. In fact, it appears that an auction is incentive compatible if and only
if the auction is bid-independent [44], i.e., if the bid value of a bidder i does not
determine bidder i’s payment (but only determines if she wins or not).
The Vickrey or second-price auction has several advantages compared to the ﬁrst-
price auction. First of all, since the second-price auction is incentive compatible,
calculating the optimal strategy for the buyers is straightforward. The auction is
also robust, since the choices of buyers do not depend on the behaviour of others.
Another advantage is that the second-price auction is an eﬃcient auction; eﬃcient
auctions put goods into the hands of the buyers who value them the most [27].
Eﬃciency is a very desirable property, as it maximises the total gains of trade (i.e.,
the bargaining surplus). In [27] it is shown that any incentive compatible auction is
eﬃcient. By contrast, the ﬁrst-price is not, in general, eﬃcient. In case of uncertainty
about other buyers’ valuations and thus speculating buyers, ineﬃcient outcomes can
occur (see [27] for an example). Below, we consider incentive compatible (and thus
eﬃcient) auctions for the more general case of multiple units.
Multiple units
In case multiple goods are traded, the Generalised Vickrey Auction (GVA) [133] can
be used to allocate the goods eﬃciently. Like the Vickrey auction, the GVA is also
incentive-compatible, that is, truth-telling is a dominant strategy. In this section,
we apply the GVA in case multiple (homogeneous) units of the same good are sold
(for other applications, see e.g. [133]). The GVA then works as follows.
In the initial stage, each buyer i reports a utility function ui(  x) to the auctioneer,
which may or may not be the true utility function. The vector   x speciﬁes the
number of units allocated to each buyer i.17 For this application, the utility function
expresses the amount of money a buyer is willing to spend for a given allocation   x.
The auctioneer then calculates the allocation of units   x∗ that maximises the sum of
15In case of a single bidder, this bidder gets the good for free.
16This holds assuming independent valuations, as stated before.
17For the case described here, we assume that buyers only care about the units they receive, and
not about the units received by others (which is part of the valuation independence assumption
described earlier), i.e., ui(  x) = ui(xi); there are no so-called allocative externalities [55]. We note,
however, that the GVA can also be applied to the case of allocative externalities, see e.g. [134].32 Bargaining: an overview
utilities, under the constraint that the number of allocated units equals the number
of available units. The auctioneer also calculates the allocation that maximises the
sum of utilities other than that of buyer i. This allocation is denoted by   x∗
∼i. Each
buyer i then receives the bundle according to the allocation   x∗ and has to pay the
following amount to the auctioneer:
 
j =i uj(x∗
∼i) −
 
j =i uj(x∗). In words, a buyer
pays the other buyers’ “losses” as a consequence of obtaining the bundle. Note that
since the payment of a buyer i does not depend on the utility reported by buyer i,
but only on the utilities reported by the other buyers, it follows that this mechanism
is incentive compatible. Below we show the application of this mechanism for two
examples.
Example 1 In case of a single unit, this mechanism is equivalent to the second-
price auction. We show this in the following. We assume (without loss of generality)
that a buyer’s utility equals zero if no units are allocated to this player. In case
buyer i is not the highest bidder (i.e., does not report the highest utility value for
the good), the allocation is not aﬀected by buyer i (i.e.,   x∗
∼i =   x∗), and the payment
 
j =i uj(  x∗
∼i)−
 
j =i uj(  x∗) = 0. On the other hand, if buyer i is the highest bidder,
then the second part of the equation [
 
j =i uj(  x∗)] equals zero, since nobody else
gets anything. The ﬁrst part [
 
j =i uj(  x∗
∼i)], however, equals the reported valuation
(i.e., bid) of the second-highest bidder, since this would be the (reported) valuation
of the winner if buyer i would not participate. The payment therefore equals the
reported valuation (i.e., bid) of the second-highest bidder.
Example 2 In case of N units, and if each bidder is allocated up to one unit,
the GVA mechanism reduces to an (N + 1)-price auction, i.e., where each winner
pays the price of the (N + 1)-highest bidder.18 To see this, consider ﬁrst the case
where buyer i is not a winner. As before, buyer i does not aﬀect the allocation,
and therefore pays zero. In the other case, i.e., when buyer i is one of the winners,
then
 
j =i  x∗ equals the total bids (reported valuations) of the remaining winners.
Furthermore, since the unit would go to the (N +1)-highest bidder if buyer i would
not participate (assuming there are at least N +1 participants),
 
j =i  x∗
∼i equals the
total valuation of the remaining winners of the actual allocation, plus the valuation
of the (N +1)-highest bidder. The payment is then exactly the valuation (or bid) of
the (N + 1)-highest bidder. This holds for each winner, assuming there are at least
N +1 bidders. Note that if there are less than N +1 bidders, all bidders receive the
good for free.
2.4 Computational approaches to bargaining
Simplifying assumptions frequently made in game-theoretical analyses, such as as-
sumptions of perfect rationality and common knowledge, do not need to be made
18This auction is applied in Chapter 5.2.4 Computational approaches to bargaining 33
if the behaviour of boundedly-rational negotiating agents is modelled directly, for
instance using techniques from the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence (AI). This section
provides an overview of the key research related to this thesis, where AI techniques
such as evolutionary algorithms, reinforcement learning (speciﬁcally Q-learning)
and Bayesian beliefs are applied to develop a negotiation environment consisting
of intelligent agents. In addition, we shortly review the relatively new ﬁeld of
argumentation-based negotiation. Note that the evolutionary approach is the main
focus of this thesis, and therefore the most relevant. The other techniques mentioned
are intended for the interested reader.
Using the above-mentioned techniques, agents are able to learn from experience
and adapt to changing environments. This learning aspect is essential for automated
negotiation settings (where software agents, see Section 1.1.3, bargain on behalf of
their owners), especially when the behaviour of competitors and the payoﬀs are
not known in advance. Several aspects of learning are potentially important during
the negotiation processes. First, a bargaining agent needs to have a strategy which
speciﬁes his actions during the course of play. On the basis of the agent’s experiences
in previous bargaining games, he can learn that it might be proﬁtable to adjust his
strategy in order to achieve better deals. Second, it might even be useful to update
a strategy during play. This may be the case if the agent is initially unsure about
the type of his opponent. After playing a bargaining game for a number of rounds,
the agent may form a belief about his opponent’s type and ﬁne-tune his behaviour
accordingly. Third, an agent might need to learn the preferences of his owner ﬁrst.
Here, attention is focussed on the ﬁrst two kinds of learning.
This section is organised as follows. Section 2.4.1 discusses the main related
research where bargaining agents adapt using evolutionary algorithms (EAs). Q-
learning and an application hereof for bargaining is described in Section 2.4.2. Sec-
tion 2.4.3 approaches learning during the negotiation process using Bayesian beliefs.
Section 2.4.4 considers an alternative approach where negotiation is viewed as a
dialogue game, and the parties attempt to reach consensus using argumentation.
2.4.1 The evolutionary approach
Oliver [88] was the ﬁrst to demonstrate that a system of adaptive agents can learn
eﬀective negotiation strategies using evolutionary algorithms. Computer simula-
tions of both distributive (i.e., single issue) and integrative (i.e., multiple issue)
alternating-oﬀers negotiations are presented in [88]. Binary coded strings represent
the agents’ strategies. Two parameters are encoded for each negotiation round:
a threshold which determines whether an oﬀer should be accepted or not and a
counter oﬀer in case the opponent’s oﬀer is rejected (and the deadline has not yet
been reached). These elementary strategies were then updated in successive gen-
erations by a genetic algorithm (GA). Similar models are also investigated in this34 Bargaining: an overview
thesis.
In [126], a related model was investigated. Here, a systematic comparison be-
tween game-theoretic and evolutionary bargaining models is also made, in case ne-
gotiations concern a single issue. Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis extend similar
negotiation models even further by considering multiple issues and cases that are
unwieldy to analyse mathematically.
More elaborate strategy representations are proposed in [73]. Oﬀers and counter
oﬀers are generated in this model by a linear combination of simple bargaining tactics
(time-dependent, resource-dependent, or behaviour-dependent tactics). As in [88],
the parameters of these diﬀerent negotiation tactics and their relative importance
weightings are encoded in a string of numbers. Competitions were then held between
two separate populations of agents, which were simultaneously evolved by a GA. The
time-dependent tactics are further investigated in [34] using GAs, for the case that
negotiating agents have diﬀerent time preferences.
Dworman et. al [31] studied negotiations between three players. If two players
decide to form a coalition, a surplus is created which needs to be divided among
them. The third party gets nothing. Of course, all three players want to be part of
the coalition in this case. Moreover, they also want to receive the largest share of
the bargaining surplus. Genetic programming was used in this paper to adapt the
oﬀers and to decide whether to form a coalition or not. A comparison with game
theoretic predictions and human experiments was made.
Evolutionary algorithms have recently been used not only to generate strategies
but also to design auction mechanisms (see Def. 5.1 and Section 2.3.5), notably by
Cliﬀ [24] and Phelps et al. [96]. Especially for double auctions, where analytical
solutions are typically intractable, the evolutionary approach has been successfully
applied. Double auctions allow for many buyers and many sellers to exchange goods
or services. In this type of auction, sellers and buyers submit bids (oﬀered quantity
and price) and asks (demanded quantity and price) respectively, which are then
matched by the auctioneer. The auctioneer also determines the trading price for
each match. In [96] genetic programming (GP) is used to evolve both the strategies
of the traders and the auction mechanism. In this ﬁrst endeavour towards automated
design of auction mechanisms from scratch, GP is used to determine the rule for
setting the trading price, while having a ﬁxed matching algorithm. The goal is to
optimise market eﬃciency, that is the total proﬁts of both buyers and sellers as a
fraction of the theoretical maximum, given that buyers and sellers are only concerned
about maximising their individual proﬁts. In a related approach by Cliﬀ [24], a
genetic algorithm is used to evolve both the traders and an additional parameter
that selects between a continuum of auctions.2.4 Computational approaches to bargaining 35
2.4.2 Using Q-Learning
Many learning techniques require feedback each time an action is performed. How-
ever, in many practical cases feedback is only received at the end of a (long) sequence
of actions. A good example is a game like chess: only at the end of play the players
know with certainty how well their strategy performs. In learning models like Q-
learning, agents also try to evaluate the eﬀect of intermediate actions. Q-learning
is a reinforcement learning algorithm [113, p. 528] which learns an action-value
function yielding the expected utility (see Section 1.1.1) of a given action in a given
state [113, p. 599].
This algorithm maintains a list of so-called Q-values Q(a,i), which denote the
expected utility of performing an action a at state i. The action which maximises
the expected utility is selected, and the system moves to a new state j. The Q-value
is then updated depending on the Q-value of the new state and the received reward
(if available). The following equation can be used [113, p. 613] for updating the
Q-value in case of a transition from state i to j by taking action a:
Q(a,i) ← Q(a,i) + α(R(i) + max
a′ Q(a
′,j) − Q(a,i)), (2.1)
where R(i) is the actual reward received in state i and α is the learning rate. The
value maxa′ Q(a′,j) represents the expected utility of state j. For example, if the
current state i has a relatively low expected utility and the next state j has a high
expected utility, the Q-value Q(a,i) is updated in such a way that the diﬀerence
between these states is reduced. In this way rewards which are given at the terminal
state are passed to the other states in the sequence.
As we mentioned before, selecting an action in the current state depends on
the expected utility of each action. Hence, a trade-oﬀ needs to be made between
“exploitation” and “exploration”. In other words, should an action be chosen which
has already proven itself or do we prefer to try out new actions which might produce
even better results? This question of ﬁnding an optimal exploration policy has been
studied extensively in the subﬁeld of statistical theory that deals with so-called
“bandit” problems [113, pp. 610-611].
The Q-learning approach was applied by Oliveira and Rocha [87] for the for-
mation of virtual organisations in an e-commerce environment. The idea is that in
order to satisfy some user’s need, often a combination of services is needed, which is
provided by diﬀerent companies. The agent representing the user (called the “mar-
ket agent”) negotiates with several organisation agents, after which a selection of
these organisations is made and a virtual organisation is created. The protocol used
during the negotiation phase is as follows. First, each participating organisation
generates a bid, based on previous experience, and sends this bid to the market
agent. A Q-learning technique is then used to determine which bid to make. The
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market agent. The market agent compares the bids using a multi-criteria evalua-
tion method based on qualitative measures (in which only the preference ordering
is assumed to be important). The market agent selects the organisation which ei-
ther proposes a satisfactory evaluation, or he chooses the highest evaluation when
a deadline is reached. Organisations not selected are given feedback as to which
attributes were not satisfactory. Negotiations take several rounds, and each round
an organisation is selected.
2.4.3 Using Bayesian beliefs
Bayesian beliefs are used to model an agent’s (probabilistic) knowledge of an un-
certain environment. Suppose the agent has some a priori knowledge about the
likelihood of a set of hypotheses Hi, with i = 1,...,n. Furthermore, the agent has
some conditional knowledge about the probability that an event e will occur, given
that one of the hypotheses is true. If event e then occurs, the beliefs about the
hypotheses are updated using the Bayesian update rule [148]:
P(Hi|e) =
P(Hi)P(e|Hi)
 n
k=1 P(e|Hk)P(Hk)
, (2.2)
where P(Hi|e) is the a posteriori probability of Hi and P(Hi) the a priori probability.
P(e|Hi) is the conditional probability that event e occurs given hypothesis Hi.
When agents have incomplete information about one another, it becomes impor-
tant to learn about the other agent by observing his behaviour during the negotiation
process. Bayesian beliefs are often used to make assumptions about the opponent
such as his type [64] or his reservation price [147],[148] (where the reservation price is
deﬁned here as an agent’s threshold of oﬀer acceptability). These beliefs are updated
depending on the opponent’s moves.
However, once both agents use beliefs to determine their strategies, they also
need beliefs about their opponent’s beliefs, and so on. This is known as the problem
of outguessing regress [148]. In game theory this problem is solved by having a
limited number of diﬀerent types of players. The beliefs and preferences of each
type are common knowledge, but there is uncertainty about which player is of which
type. This theory, suggested by Harsanyi, is a technique for transforming a game
of incomplete information into a game of imperfect (but complete) information (see
also Section 2.2). In reality however, the number of diﬀerent types is usually very
large, and, moreover, it is not always realistic to assume that the preferences and
beliefs of the diﬀerent types are common knowledge. In more practical applications
(such as [64] and [147]), the problem of outguessing regress is circumvented by
assuming limited reasoning capabilities. In [147], for instance, a player has beliefs
about e.g. the payoﬀ function and reservation price of the other player, but not
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2.4.4 Argumentation-based negotiation
An alternative approach to automated negotiation is the use of dialogues or ar-
gumentation to resolve conﬂicts. In recent years, this ﬁeld has received increasing
interest within the agent community [71,74,94,99,100]. We therefore relate some of
the main concepts and highlight some of the research in this ﬁeld. A more extensive
overview of the state-of-the-art on argumentation-based negotiation can be found
in [99].
Argumentation can be useful when, for example, negotiations involve several
issues and a mutually beneﬁcially situation can be achieved (as described in Sec-
tion 2.3.3). When agents have incomplete information about each others’ preferences
negotiations, ineﬃcient deals are often obtained (see Section 2.3.4). This problem
can be resolved using argumentation. The idea is that the agents are able to provide
meta-information on why they have a particular objection to a proposal. This way,
information is exchanged, but without fully disclosing each others’ preferences.
A negotiation architecture using this kind of meta-information is described in
[94]. This approach was also used in MIT’s Tˆ ete-` a-Tˆ ete system, a bilateral inte-
grative negotiation system for online shopping [71]. Agents within this framework
can: (1) make a new proposal, (2) accept the proposal of the counter agent, (3)
criticise a proposal or (4) withdraw from the negotiations. This system uses the
notion of a critique to enable agents to criticise a particular proposal. A critique
is a comment of an agent specifying which part of the proposal he dislikes. In case
of a new proposal or critique, the agent can also send additional information. For
instance, a proposal may include conditions under which it holds (e.g., I will provide
you with X if you provide me with Y).
Argumentation can also be used to inﬂuence the preferences, beliefs and/or goals
of other players. In general, preferences are assumed to be ﬁxed. In reality, how-
ever, it is often true that a player’s preferences are not completely formed or that
uncertainty exists about the environment. In that case, a player’s preferences and
beliefs can be inﬂuenced upon receipt of new information. The negotiation process
then not only consists of dividing the surplus, but also of gathering information. An
interesting approach is described in [100], where one player may inﬂuence another
player’s preferences by discussing the underlying motivations and interests behind
adopting certain (sub)goals. For example, a buyer may want to negotiate a ﬂight
ticket with a travel agent for the more fundamental goal of travelling to Paris. If
the fundamental goal is known to the travel agent, she can suggest a train ticket
as an alternative means to satisfy the same goal. Another way of inﬂuencing a
player’s behaviour is by means of persuasion, for example by using threats, rewards
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2.5 Discussion
The ﬁrst part of this chapter reviews, in broad lines, literature on bargaining from the
ﬁeld of game theory. This overview shows that game theory is a very useful tool to
analyse bargaining situations in a mathematical fashion. Such a rigorous analysis is
only tractable, however, if many details of human interaction, for instance emotions
or irrational behaviour, are abstracted away. This may undermine the capability of
game-theoretical models to explain or predict human behaviour.
This aspect may be less problematic when we consider systems in which artiﬁcial
agents interact with each other, because these agents are often designed to behave
(in good approximation) in a rational fashion. Game theory may therefore yield
fundamental insights in the design of eﬃcient negotiation protocols for automated
trading. Furthermore, given a negotiation protocol and under certain assumptions,
optimal strategies can sometimes be derived.
Nevertheless, game-theoretical assumptions like common knowledge and perfect
rationality often appear to be too strong in modelling practical situations. The issue
of common knowledge has been solved only partially in game theory by introducing
a theory for players with imperfect information. The development of game-theoretic
models for boundedly-rational players is a relatively young research direction. Our
survey shows that techniques from the ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence are potentially
very powerful in situations of incomplete information and boundedly-rational play-
ers. Learning techniques developed within the AI community can for instance be
used to adapt the agents’ behaviour in complex environments and to construct ac-
curate models of the other agents’ preferences.Part A
Fundamental aspects of bargaining
systemsChapter 3
Multi-issue bargaining by
alternating oﬀers
Automated negotiations have received increasing attention in the last years, es-
pecially from the ﬁeld of electronic trading [14,56,65,71,73,88,128]. In the near
future, an increasing use of bargaining agents in electronic market places is expected.
Ideally, these agents should not only bargain over the price of a product, but also
take into account aspects like the delivery time, quality, payment methods, return
policies, or speciﬁc product properties. In such multi-issue negotiations, the agents
should be able to negotiate outcomes that are beneﬁcial for both parties. The com-
plexity of the bargaining problem increases rapidly, however, if the number of issues
becomes larger than one. This explains the need for “intelligent” agents, which
should be capable of negotiating successfully over multiple issues at the same time.
In this chapter,1 we consider negotiations that are governed by a ﬁnite-stage
version of the Rubinstein-St˚ ahl multi-round bargaining game with alternating oﬀers
(see Section 2.3.2 and [110,121]). We investigate the computation of strategies of the
agents by evolutionary algorithms (EAs) in case negotiations involve multiple issues.
We ﬁrst assess the eﬃciency of the agreements reached by the evolutionary agents
(see Section 1.1.3). We then analyse to what extent the evolutionary outcomes
match with game-theoretic results. We study models in which time plays no role
and models in which there is a pressure to reach agreements early (because a risk
of breakdown in negotiations exists after each round).
Furthermore, we present and study a more realistic negotiation model, where
agents take into account the fairness of the obtained payoﬀ. This use of fairness
is based on the following observation. When no time pressure is present, extreme
divisions of the payoﬀ occur in the computational experiments, due to a powerful
1The results in this chapter have are published as [42]: E.H. Gerding, D.D.B. van Bragt, and
J.A. La Poutr´ e. Multi-issue negotiation processes by evolutionary simulation: Validation and
social extensions. Computational Economics, 22:39–63, 2003.
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‘take-it-or-leave-it’ position for one of the negotiating agents in the last round of the
negotiation. Although such extreme outcomes are in agreement with game-theoretic
results, they are usually not observed in real-life situations, where social norms such
as fairness play an important role [13,67,107,141]. We therefore introduce a fairness
norm and incorporate this in the agents’ behaviour. We perform computational
experiments with various fairness settings, and show that, depending on the actual
settings, “fair” deals indeed evolve.
A number of related paper demonstrate that, using an EA, artiﬁcial agents can
learn eﬀective negotiation strategies [34,73,88,126] (see also Section 2.4.1). In [126],
a systematic comparison between game-theoretic and evolutionary bargaining mod-
els is made, in case negotiations concern a single issue. In [34] single-issue negotia-
tions are also studied using a genetic algorithm, when agents can select between a
number of pre-speciﬁed strategies. The multi-issue problem is considered in [73,88].
The main contribution in this chapter lies in the validation of the evolutionary
model for multi-issue negotiations with possible breakdown, using game-theoretic
subgame-perfect equilibrium (see Def. 18.3), and the introduction of a fairness norm
in such negotiations. Especially the latter is a ﬁrst attempt to study complex bar-
gaining situations which are more likely to occur in practical settings. A rigorous
game-theoretic analysis is typically much more involved or may even be intractable
under these conditions.
The chapter is organised as follows. The alternating-oﬀers negotiation protocol
for multiple issues is described in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 gives an outline of the
evolutionary simulation environment and how the strategies of the agents are rep-
resented. A comparison of the computational results with game-theoretic results is
presented in Section 3.3. The extension with fairness is the topic of Section 3.4.
Section 3.5 summarises the main results and concludes.
3.1 Description of the bargaining game
We consider negotiations that are governed by a ﬁnite-stage version of the Rubinstein-
St˚ ahl multi-round bargaining game with alternating oﬀers (see Section 2.3.2 for
details). During the negotiation process, the agents exchange oﬀers and counter
oﬀers in an alternating fashion at discrete time steps (rounds). In the following, the
agent starting the negotiations is called “agent 1”, whereas his opponent is called
“agent 2”.
Bargaining takes place over m issues simultaneously, where m is the total number
of issues. We assume that mutual gains are possible for each issue by reaching an
agreement, i.e., that a positive bargaining surplus is available (see also Section 1.1.2)
for each issue. We further assume (without loss of generality) that the total bar-
gaining surplus available per issue is equal to unity. We express an oﬀer as a vector
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gaining surplus for issue i if the oﬀer is accepted. Agent 2 then receives 1 − oi for
issue i. The index i ranges from 1 to m. Note that an oﬀer always speciﬁes the
share obtained by agent 1.
The agents evaluate multi-issue oﬀers using an additive multi-attribute utility
function (see Def. 3.1 and [73,88,101]). Agent 1’s utility function is   w1     oj(r) =
 m
i=1 wi
1   oi
j(r), where j = 1 if the oﬀer is proposed by agent 1 and j = 2 otherwise.
Agent 2’s utility function is   w2   [  1 −   oj(r)]. Here,   wj is a vector containing agent
j’s weights wi
j for each issue i. The weights are normalised and larger than zero,
i.e.,
 m
i=1 wi
j = 1 and wi
j ≥ 0. Because we assume that 0 ≤ oi
j(r) ≤ 1 for all i, the
utilities are real numbers in [0,1].
As stated above, agent 1 makes the initial oﬀer. If agent 2 accepts this oﬀer,
an agreement is reached and the negotiations stop. Otherwise, play continues to
the next round with a certain continuation probability p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1). When a
negotiation is broken oﬀ prematurely, both agents receive a utility of zero.
If negotiations proceed to the next round, agent 2 needs to propose a counter
oﬀer, which agent 1 can then either accept or refuse. This process of alternating
bidding continues for a limited number of n rounds. When this deadline is reached
without an agreement, the negotiations end in a disagreement, and both players
receive nothing.
3.2 The evolutionary system
We use an EA to evolve the negotiation strategies of the agents. Implementation
details of the EA are discussed in Section 1.2.3. Each strategy in the EA is associated
with either an agent of type 1 (i.e., initiating the negotiation) or of type 2. The
strategies of competing agents evolve in separate populations2: the strategies of the
agents of type 1 evolve in population 1, and of type 2 in population 2. This way,
the EA populations co-evolve since the performance of a strategy depends on the
strategies in the opponent’s population. An overview of the evolutionary system
with separate populations for the strategies of the two agent types is depicted in
Figure 3.1.
The ﬁtness of the parents is determined by negotiation between the agents in
the two parental populations (as shown in Fig. 3.1). Each agent negotiates with all
agents in the population of the opponent. The utility functions are the same for
agents within the same population (i.e., the weight settings are equal). The average
utility obtained in all negotiations is an agent’s ﬁtness value. The ﬁtness of the
2It is also possible to use a single population with strategies for both agent types on a single
chromosome. The outcomes, however, are then aﬀected by so-called hitchhiking [75], where rela-
tively poor genes are selected because other genes on the chromosome yield a good performance.44 Multi-issue bargaining by alternating oﬀers
Figure 3.1: Iteration loop of the evolutionary algorithm where strategies for com-
peting agents evolve in separate populations.
EA Parental population size ( ) 25
Parameters Oﬀspring population size (λ) 25
Selection scheme (  + λ)-ES
Mutation model self-adaptive
Initial standard deviations (σi(0)) 0.1
Minimum standard deviation (ǫσ) 0.025
Negotiation Number of issues (m) 2
parameters Number of rounds (n) 10
Weights of agents in population 1 (   w1) (0.7,0.3)T
Weights of agents in population 2 (   w2) (0.3,0.7)T
Table 3.1: Default settings of the evolutionary system.
new oﬀspring is evaluated by negotiation with the parental agents.3 A social or
economic interpretation of this parent-oﬀspring interaction is that new agents can
only be evaluated by competing against existing or “proven” strategies.
3.2.1 Representation of the strategies
An agent’s strategy speciﬁes the oﬀers and counter oﬀers proposed during the process
of negotiation. In a game-theoretic context, a strategy is a plan which speciﬁes an
action for each history [11]. In our model, the agent’s strategy speciﬁes the oﬀers
  oj(r) and thresholds tj(r) for each round r in the negotiation process for agents
j ∈ {1,2}.
The threshold determines whether an oﬀer of the other party is accepted or
3In an alternative model, not only the parental agents are used as opponents, but also the
newly-formed oﬀspring. Similar dynamics have been observed in this alternative model.3.3 Validation and interpretation of the evolutionary experiments 45
Agent 1   o1(1) t1(2)   o1(3) t1(4) ...
Agent 2 t2(1)   o2(2) t2(3)   o2(4) ...
Figure 3.2: The strategies for agent j ∈ {1,2} specify a sequence of oﬀers   oj(r) and
thresholds tj(r) for rounds r ∈ {1,2,...,n} of the negotiation.
rejected: If the value of the oﬀer (see below) falls below the threshold the oﬀer is
refused; otherwise an agreement is reached.4 This strategy representation is depicted
in Fig. 3.2. Notice that in each round, the strategy of an agent speciﬁes either an
oﬀer or a threshold, depending on whether the agent proposes or receives an oﬀer
in that round. Note that in odd rounds, agent 1 makes an oﬀer and agent 2 either
accepts or rejects, and visa versa in even rounds.
The strategy, consisting of oﬀers and thresholds, is encoded on the chromosome
using real values in the unit interval (one oﬀer or threshold for each negotiation
round). We use xi to denote the (real) value at location i of the chromosome. The
agents’ strategies are initialised at the beginning of each EA run by drawing random
numbers in the unit interval (from a ﬂat distribution).
3.3 Validation and interpretation of the evolu-
tionary experiments
Experimental results obtained with the evolutionary system are presented in this
section. All relevant settings of the evolutionary system are listed in Table 3.1
(further explanation is provided in Section 1.2.3). A comparison with game-theoretic
results is made to validate the evolutionary approach. Section 3.3.1 addresses the
evolution of eﬃcient negotiation results. Section 3.3.2 further analyses the results
and compares the experimental results with predictions from game theory. In the
following, we refer to the agents in the evolutionary system as evolutionary agents
(see Section 1.1.3).
3.3.1 Eﬃciency
First, we investigate the experimental results w.r.t. disagreements. Without break-
down (p = 1), disagreements can only occur when the deadline is reached. The
experiments show that the percentage of disagreements is then very small (around
0.1% after 1000 generations if n = 10). With a risk of breakdown of 30% (p = 0.7),
4A similar approach was used in [88,126].46 Multi-issue bargaining by alternating oﬀers
Figure 3.3: Agreements reached by the evolutionary agents at (a) the start of a
typical EA run and (b) after 100 generations. The negotiation settings are p = 0.7
and n = 10. Each agreement is indicated by a point in these two-dimensional spaces.
The Pareto-eﬃcient frontier is indicated with a solid line. In point S [at (0.7,0.7)]
both agents obtain the maximum share for their most important issue, and receive
nothing for the other issue.3.3 Validation and interpretation of the evolutionary experiments 47
this percentage is between 1% and 10%. Timing is now important for eﬃciency.
The evolutionary agents avoid disagreements by reaching agreements early: after
1000 generations, approximately 75% is reached in the ﬁrst round.
Next, we study the eﬃciency of the agreements reached in the experiments. The
agreements are depicted in Fig. 3.3. This ﬁgure shows the utilities for both agents
of the deals reached. Also depicted in Fig. 3.3 is the so-called “Pareto-eﬃcient
frontier”. An agreement is located on the Pareto-eﬃcient frontier when an increase
of utility for one agent necessarily results in a decrease of utility for the other agent.
Agreements can therefore never be located above the Pareto-eﬃcient frontier. A
special point is the symmetric point S [at (0.7,0.7)], where both agents obtain the
maximum share of the issue they value the most, and receive nothing of the less
important issue.
Figure 3.3 shows that initially, many agreements are located far from the Pareto-
eﬃcient frontier. After 100 generations, however, the agreements are chieﬂy Pareto-
eﬃcient. We note that, even in the long run, the agents keep exploring the search
space, resulting in a continuing moving “cloud” of agreements along the frontier.
Conclusion. Results in this section thus show that the evolutionary agents reach
eﬃcient agreements, viz. on the Pareto-eﬃcient frontier, and that disagreements are
avoided. The next section studies the actual outcomes more closely, using results
from game theory as a benchmark.
3.3.2 Further Analysis
The computational results are analysed in more detail in this section and compared
with game-theoretic results, and in particular the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
predictions (see Def. 18.3). Rubinstein and (much earlier) St˚ ahl applied this notion
to the alternating-oﬀers bargaining game [110,121]. Our experimental setup diﬀers
in two respects from their model, however. First, the agents bargain over multiple
issues instead of a single issue. Second, the evolutionary agents are “myopic”: they
do not apply any explicit rationality principles in the negotiation process, nor do they
maintain any history. Actually, they only experience the proﬁt of their interactions
with other agents. The SPE behaviour of rational agents with complete information
will nevertheless serve as a useful theoretical benchmark. The equations for deriving
the SPE outcomes in case of multiple issues are presented in Appendix 1.
We distinguish between three classes of experiments w.r.t. the breakdown prob-
ability: (1) no risk of breakdown (p = 1), (2) a low breakdown probability (0.8 ≤
p < 1.0) and (3) a high breakdown probability (p < 0.8). For each of these classes
we consider the role of n on the outcomes.
We found that in our experiments, when p = 1, in the long run almost all
agreements are delayed until the last round (about 80% after 1000 generations).
Furthermore, the last oﬀering agent makes a take-it-or-leave-it deal and demands48 Multi-issue bargaining by alternating oﬀers
almost the entire surplus (on each issue), which is accepted by the opponent. This
extreme division of the surplus agrees with game-theory (see Appendix 1.1); it is
rational for the responder to accept any positive amount in the last round. Note,
however, that rational agents are indiﬀerent about the actual round in which the
agreement is reached. The deadline-approaching behaviour in our experiments cor-
responds better to “real-world” behaviour [108], however.
The EA results and SPE outcomes for diﬀerent values of n (game length) are
compared in Fig 3.4a. To guide the eye, the SPE outcomes for successive values of n
are connected. Notice that the ﬁtness of agents in population 1 converges to unity if
n is odd, and to zero if n is even (the opposite holds for the agents in population 2).
Figure 3.4b shows the results for p = 0.95. Note that the partitioning becomes less
extreme with a low breakdown probability compared to no breakdown. This holds
for both SPE outcomes and EA results, although the eﬀect is much stronger in
the evolutionary system (see Fig. 3.4b). These diﬀerences with SPE are due to the
myopic properties of the agents in the EA. The evolutionary agents do not reason
backwards from the deadline (as in SPE), since most agreements are reached in the
ﬁrst few rounds (if p < 1). As a result, the deadline is not perceived accurately by the
evolving agents. In fact, the game length is strongly overestimated. Furthermore,
in SPE all agreements are reached without delay (see [126]). The EA, on the other
hand, also continues to explore other strategies, which results in a remaining small
number of disagreements (see Section 3.3.1).
As p becomes smaller, the inﬂuence of the game length on the SPE outcome also
decreases (see [126]). Instead, the ﬁrst-mover advantage becomes more important.
Therefore, if p becomes suﬃciently small (e.g., p < 0.8), the computational results
automatically show a much better match with SPE outcomes than if p is large: the
match is almost perfect, although a small number of disagreements occur due to a
continuing exploration of new strategies. This is clearly visible in Figure 3.5, which
shows long-term results for n = 5 and diﬀerent breakdown settings p.
Interestingly, in the limit of n → ∞, game theory predicts that the agents in
population 1 have a ﬁtness of ≈ 0.71 when p = 0.95, whereas the agents in popu-
lation 2 have a ﬁtness of ≈ 0.68. This corresponds to a point in the vicinity of the
symmetric point S, indicated in Fig. 3.3. The results reported in Fig. 3.4b show that
the behaviour of the agents corresponds much better to an inﬁnite-horizon model
than the ﬁnite-horizon model for n ≥ 5 (see Fig. 3.4b). The same behaviour was
observed for other EA settings (e.g., larger population size) and other negotiation
situations (e.g., other weight settings).
We also studied the performance of the EA in case the number of issues m is
increased to 8.5 We observe that, for p = 1, the long-term outcomes of the EA
5The 8-dimensional weight vector for agents in population 1 is set to
1
3.9(0.7,0.3,0.5,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,1.0)T and equal to 1
3.9(0.3,0.7,0.5,1.0,0.5,0.5,0.2,0.2)T for
agents in population 2. These settings are such that they contain both “competitive” issues (e.g.,3.3 Validation and interpretation of the evolutionary experiments 49
Figure 3.4: Comparison of the long-term evolutionary results with SPE results for
(a) p = 1 (time indiﬀerence) and (b) p = 0.95. The error bars indicate the standard
deviations across 25 runs.50 Multi-issue bargaining by alternating oﬀers
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Figure 3.5: Average long-term results using 2 issues for diﬀerent values of p, where
n = 5.
are unstable and do not converge to the extreme partitioning. When we increase
the population size for the EA from 25 to 100 agents,6 the extreme partitioning
reappears. Results are shown in Figure 3.6. Thus, for more complicated bargaining
problems, the EA parameters must be adjusted. For m = 8 and p < 1, similar
observations are found as reported in Section 3.3.2 (like Fig. 3.4) when using the
adjusted population size.
Conclusion. Game-theoretic (SPE) results appear to be a very useful benchmark
to investigate the results of the evolutionary simulations. In computational simula-
tions without a risk of breakdown (case 1), agreements are predominantly reached
in the ﬁnal round. This deadline eﬀect is consistent with human behaviour [108].
Furthermore, the last agent in turn successfully exploits his advantage and claims
a take-it-or-leave-it deal (as in SPE). In case of a small risk of breakdown (case 2),
the deadline is not accurately perceived by the evolving agents, and the last-mover
advantage is smaller than predicted by game theory. In fact, if the ﬁnite game be-
comes long enough, results match the SPE outcomes for the inﬁnite-horizon game.
With a high risk of breakdown (case 3), however, this deviation from SPE becomes
negligible. Finally, it appears to be important to adjust the EA parameter settings
(e.g., by increasing population sizes) for more complex bargaining problems.
issue 3) and issues where compromises can be made (e.g., issue 8).
6To avoid a (quadratic) increase in the number of ﬁtness evaluations, each agent negotiates
with 25 (random) opponents.3.4 Social extension: fairness 51
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Figure 3.6: Average long-term results using 8 issues for diﬀerent values of p, where
n = 5. These results are obtained using a population size of 100.
3.4 Social extension: fairness
We extend the agent model within our evolutionary system in this section to study
the inﬂuence of “fairness”, an important aspect of real-life bargaining situations.
The motivation and description of this fairness model is given in Section 3.4.1. In
the fairness model studied in Section 3.4.2 the evolving agents only take the fairness
of a proposed deal into account when the deadline is reached. Section 3.4.3 presents
results obtained when agents perform a “fairness check” in each round. Section 3.4.4
further analyses the model in Section 3.4.3 for a simple case.
3.4.1 Motivation and description: the fairness model
Game-theoretic models for rational agents often predict the occurrence of very asym-
metric outcomes for the two parties. We showed in Section 3.3.2 (see Fig. 3.4a) that
such “unfair” behaviour can also emerge in a system of evolving agents, in partic-
ular when p = 1 or n is small (see Fig. 3.4). Large discrepancies between human
behaviour in laboratory experiments and game-theoretic outcomes are found, how-
ever, both for ultimatum (a single round) and multi-stage (several rounds) games
[13,25,67,107,109,141]. A possible explanation for the occurrence of these discrep-
ancies between theory and practice is the strong inﬂuence of social or cultural norms
on the individual decision-making process. In [107, p. 264] and [50], for example, it
is argued that responders tend to reject unfair or “insultingly low” proposals. There-3.4 Social extension: fairness 53
Figure 3.8: Mean ﬁtness when fairness functions 0-5 are applied at the deadline.
in case of no fairness check (function 0). However, the agents in population 1 still
reach a relatively high ﬁtness (utility) level. Fair agreements evolve, on the other
hand, when the agents in population 2 use function 2 (a case with average fairness).
In this case the mean long-term ﬁtness is approximately equal to 0.7 for all agents
(most agreements are thus located close to the symmetric point S in Fig. 3.3).
When stronger fairness functions (e.g., functions 3 through 5) are used by the
agents the roles reverse, and the agents in population 2 reach a higher ﬁtness level
than their opponents in population 1 (see Fig. 3.8). Because of the strong fairness
check, many last-round agreements are rejected in this case and agents in popula-
tion 2 can demand a larger share of the surplus in the round before last. As a result,
the deadline is eﬀectively reached one round earlier. This eﬀect indeed occurs in our
experiments.
Conclusion. Our results show that fair outcomes can evolve in an evolutionary
system with a fairness model in the last round. However, there is a rather large
sensitivity to the actual fairness function that is used by the evolved agents; an
“average” fairness function yields symmetric results, whereas more extreme fairness
functions yield more asymmetric outcomes.
3.4.3 Fairness check in each round
This section studies the second fairness model, in which the responding agent re-
evaluates all potential agreements. The EA settings are the same as in the previous
section.
The results in Fig. 3.9 for fairness functions 1 are similar to the previous case54 Multi-issue bargaining by alternating oﬀers
Figure 3.9: Mean ﬁtness when fairness functions 0-5 are applied each round.
(see Fig. 3.8). However, when fairness functions 2 through 5 are used, the agents in
both populations reach almost identical ﬁtness levels. Most agreements now occur
in the vicinity of point S in Fig. 3.3. Note that the agents have no explicit knowledge
about the location of this point, and that this knowledge is also not incorporated
within the fairness functions. We also observe that agreements are now reached in
diﬀerent rounds, whereas in earlier experiments without fairness most agreements
occur at the very end of the game.
Fig. 3.9 thus shows that the agents’ long-term behaviour is much less sensitive
to the shape of the fairness function: the various “stronger” fairness functions all
yield similar results. Figure 3.9 however indicates that when the agents use fairness
function 5, the mean ﬁtness of both agents decreases. This is due to the increasing
number of disagreements which are a result of the strong fairness check.
We furthermore studied a 2-issue negotiation problem with an asymmetric Pareto-
eﬃcient frontier, as shown in Fig. 3.10. In this case, agent 1 values both issues equally
important, whereas agent 2 has diﬀerent valuations for each issue (his weights are
0.2 and 0.8 for issues 1 and 2 respectively). If each agent obtains the whole surplus
on his most important issue, agent 1 obtains 0.5, whereas agent 2 gets 0.8. This
outcome corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution (NBS), see Section 2.3.1. The
symmetric point (S), on the other hand, is located at ( 8
13, 8
13).9
Both solutions can be considered to be fair outcomes in diﬀerent ways: the ﬁrst
solution maximises the product of the agents’ utilities and also splits the surplus
equally, whereas in the second case equal utility levels are obtained for both agents
9This outcome corresponds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, see Section 2.3.1.3.4 Social extension: fairness 55
Figure 3.10: Resulting agreements in a single generation when the Pareto-eﬃcient
frontier is asymmetric and fairness function 4 is used.
(see [101, Ch. 16] for a related discussion). In the computational results, we observe
that, when fairness functions 2-5 are applied, the agreements are divided and are
usually concentrated in two separate clusters (“clouds”), see Fig. 3.10. The issue
of the choice of and distribution over multiple “fair” agreement points seems an
important issue for further research, both in a computational setting as well as in
experimental economics.
We also experimented with diﬀerent weight vectors and with m > 2. A general
ﬁnding is that extreme outcomes do not occur in the evolutionary process if the
agents apply a fairness check.
Conclusion. We have shown that fair agreements can evolve if fairness is evalu-
ated each round, even with strong fairness norms: the fairness of the deals is much
more stable w.r.t. the actual choice of the fairness function. Of course, the number
of actual agreements drops if a very strong fairness function is used, resulting in a
lower ﬁtness for both parties. In case of two-issue negotiations with a symmetric
Pareto-eﬃcient frontier, most agreements are reached in the vicinity of the symmet-
ric point. In the asymmetric case, fair solutions can also be obtained. The solutions
are then distributed over various possible outcomes, which can all be considered fair
in diﬀerent ways.
In the following, we ﬁrst derive the game-theoretic subgame-perfect equilibrium
for a relatively simple game (with only a single issue and using fairness function 4),
and then compare the results with evolutionary outcomes for this game.56 Multi-issue bargaining by alternating oﬀers
Payoﬀ agent 1 Payoﬀ agent 2
SPE 0.419 0.391
EA 0.391 (±0.022) 0.412 (±0.014)
Table 3.2: Comparison of the agents’ payoﬀs in the EA with SPE results.
Round Oﬀer Oﬀer Threshold Threshold
(SPE) (EA) (SPE) (EA)
1 0.609 0.58 ± 0.06 0.391 0.23 ± 0.21
2 0.375 0.39 ± 0.07 0.250 0.14 ± 0.13
3 0.500 0.48 ± 0.09 0.000 0.13 ± 0.13
Table 3.3: Comparison of the evolved strategies with game-theoretic (SPE) results
for each round.
3.4.4 Validation and strategy analysis
Although our incorporation of fairness aspects makes a game-theoretic analysis much
more complicated, SPE strategies can again be derived for a very simple version: the
game with only a single issue (m = 1) and fairness function 4. These settings were
chosen because of mathematical feasibility. The general equations are presented in
Appendix 2.1. A derivation for m = 1, n = 3, p = 1, and fairness function 4 is given
in Appendix 2.2.
Table 3.2 shows both the SPE results and the payoﬀs obtained by the evolving
agents (in the long run) in the a with m = 1, n = 3, p = 1, and with the (rather
strong) fairness function 4. Note that since m = 1, an agent’s payoﬀ equals the share
obtained for issue 1. Results for the EA are obtained after 300 generations (averaged
over 25 runs). Notice that the SPE payoﬀs are in good agreement with the outcome
of the evolutionary experiments. However, in SPE agent 1’s payoﬀ is slightly larger
than agent 2’s payoﬀ. In the EA this is reversed, although Table 3.2 shows that
diﬀerences between theory and experiment are very small. We will further analyse
the evolving strategies below.
Table 3.3 compares the oﬀers of the evolving agents (for each round) with SPE
results, showing a good match. From Table 3.3, it can be derived that agreements
are reached in all rounds, with some emphasis on the ﬁrst round.10
Table 3.3 also shows the acceptance thresholds (the thresholds are calculated
based on the payoﬀ which an agent expects to receive if he rejects the current oﬀer,
see Appendix 2). Because the thresholds in rounds 2 and 3 are much lower than the
obtained utility, the thresholds in these rounds are not really relevant in SPE. This
explains the large variance of the thresholds in the EA and why these thresholds can
10Acceptance rates are approximately 39%, 22%, 20% in SPE in rounds 1-3, and 36±4%, 25±3%,
20 ± 2% for the EA in rounds 1-3.3.4 Social extension: fairness 57
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Figure 3.11: Average threshold values of the agent strategies in the EA in the ﬁrst
round.
deviate from SPE predictions in these rounds. In round 1, the threshold is important
in SPE and inﬂuences the oﬀer made. The experiments show a much lower average
threshold value than the SPE (see Table 3.3). Nevertheless, the thresholds inﬂuences
the oﬀers made in the EA due to a high variance of the threshold values. We analyse
this more closely.
Figure 3.11 shows the evolution of the threshold value for the ﬁrst round for a
single experiment. The indicate the variance in the population. Notice that this
variance and the volatility of the mean threshold is rather high. This forces the
oﬀers in population 1 to be similar as in SPE.
In order to obtain an even better match with SPE results, we reduced the occur-
rence of frequent peaks by using a decreasing mutation step-size in the EA (instead
of self-adaptive mutation step-sizes, see Section 1.2.3). With this approach, the
mutation step sizes σi are gradually decreased in the course of evolution.11
At the beginning of each EA run, σi is set to 0.1 for all i (as before, see Table 3.1)
and then exponentially decrease until σi = 0.01 after 1000 generations. This pro-
cedure indeed reduces the ﬂuctuations in the threshold values and the oﬀers in the
long run. Results for experiments with this EA setting appear to be in excellent
agreement with SPE results, see Table 3.4. We found no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the new
mutation scheme on the evolutionary outcomes for m = 2, however. We suspect that
this is due to the integrative nature of the negotiation problem, where the results
obtained are already beneﬁcial for both parties.
Conclusion. This relatively simple bargaining situation shows a good match
11A similar approach was applied in [3] for a genetic algorithm.58 Multi-issue bargaining by alternating oﬀers
Payoﬀ agent 1 Payoﬀ agent 2
SPE 0.419 0.391
EA with decreasing σi 0.416 ± 0.012 0.395 ± 0.009
Table 3.4: Comparison of the evolutionary agents’ payoﬀs after 1000 generations
(using exponentially decreasing mutation step-sizes) with SPE results
between theoretical (SPE) and experimental results. Furthermore, when fairness
norms are applied, the outcome of the negotiation process comes to depend on the
actual round in which an agreement is ﬁnally reached, while thresholds play an
important role in some of the rounds. We also showed that EA parameters can be
ﬁne-tuned for a more stable situation if needed. This rendered an excellent match
with the SPE for m = 1.
3.5 Concluding remarks
We have investigated a system for negotiations, in which agents learn eﬀective nego-
tiation strategies using evolutionary algorithms (EAs). Negotiations are governed by
a ﬁnite-horizon version of the alternating-oﬀers game. Several issues are negotiated
simultaneously. Both negotiations with and without a risk of breakdown have been
studied. Our approach facilitates the study of cases for which a rigorous mathemat-
ical approach is unwieldy or even intractable. We presented computational results
for several diﬃcult bargaining problems in this chapter.
We ﬁrst validated the long-term evolutionary behaviour using the game-theoretic
concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). When no risk of breakdown exists,
the last agent in turn proposes a take-it-or-leave-it deal in the last round and de-
mands most of the surplus for each issue. This extreme division is consistent with
SPE predictions. When a risk of breakdown exists, most agreements in the EA are
reached in the ﬁrst round. If the ﬁnite game becomes long enough, the deadline is
therefore no longer perceived by the evolutionary agents and results actually match
SPE predictions for the inﬁnite-horizon game.
We also modelled and studied the concept of “fairness”, where a responding agent
carries out a fairness check before an agreement is deﬁnitely accepted. This fairness
check was modelled in two ways: a responding agent considers fairness only at the
deadline or all the time, for any potential agreement. In both cases, fair outcomes
can be obtained but the outcomes in the second case are much less sensitive to
the actual choice of the fairness function. In case of an asymmetric bargaining
situation (where the players have asymmetric preferences), multiple outcomes then
exist which can be considered “fair” in diﬀerent ways. We also found a good match
between the EA results and game-theoretic SPE predictions for a simple bargaining
game (concerning a single issue).3.5 Concluding remarks 59
An interesting line of research is to further explore the notion of fairness and to
compare the computational outcomes with results from experimental studies with
human subjects. Of particular interest is the study of asymmetric multi-issue bar-
gaining situations, where more than one outcome can be considered “fair”. This
raises several new research questions for experimental economics as well as compu-
tational sciences.Chapter 4
Bargaining with multiple
opportunities
In the advent of ubiquitous application of agent technology, bargaining agents are
expected to play an essential role in electronic market places. The agents in a
competitive market are self-interested and can be equipped with the ability to au-
tonomously search for products and services and negotiate the terms of an agree-
ment. In this chapter,1 we focus on strategic aspects of bilateral bargaining within
a market-like setting.
We use the one-shot ultimatum game as the basic bargaining procedure for our
model, a well-known approach within the ﬁeld of game theory. In this game (see
also Section 2.3.2), two players, a proposer and a responder, negotiate about the
division of a bargaining surplus (see Section 1.1.2). The proposer makes an oﬀer
and the responder can only choose to accept or reject this oﬀer. The ultimatum
game has been extensively researched, both theoretically and by experiments using
human subjects [67,90,107].
The ultimatum game models a negotiation between an isolated pair of players. In
a market setting, however, an agent’s behaviour can change if future opportunities
are taken into account. This chapter introduces a natural extension of the basic
ultimatum game in which fall-back opportunities are explicitly modelled. Both the
proposing and the responding agents have several bargaining opportunities with
diﬀerent opponents before their ﬁnal payoﬀ is determined. In this way a market
place is modelled where several sellers and buyers are available.
The game is further extended to allow several issues to be negotiated simulta-
neously, as in the previous chapter; not only the price, but also other important
1This chapter is based on [38]: E.H. Gerding and J.A. La Poutr´ e. Bargaining with posterior
opportunities: An evolutionary social simulation. In M. Gallegati, A. Kirman, and M. Marsili,
editors, The Complex Dynamics of Economic Interaction, Springer Lecture Notes in Economics
and Mathematical Systems (LNEMS), Vol. 531, pages 241–256. Springer-Verlag, 2004.
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attributes such as delivery time, package deals, warranty, and other product-related
aspects can be taken into account. This can reduce the competitive nature of the
game since trade-oﬀs can be made to obtain win-win solutions. Furthermore, we
study the impact of search costs if an oﬀer is refused and a new opponent needs to
be found. In addition, we consider the case where uncertainty exists about future
opportunities and a new opponent cannot always be found.
An important aspect within this setting is the information available to the agents
about their opponents. We distinguish between the complete information case,
where an agent’s current number of future bargaining opportunities is common
knowledge, and the incomplete information case, where this information is known
to the protagonist but hidden from the opponent. The complete information case
can be approached theoretically using game theoretic subgame-perfect equilibrium
(see Def. 18.3) given reasonable assumptions. The subgame-perfect results show an
extreme split of the surplus, similar to the ultimatum game: the proposer claims
the entire surplus, and the responder accepts this deal.
The incomplete information case, on the other hand, seems much more diﬃcult
to analyse theoretically. We therefore apply an evolutionary simulation as described
in Section 1.2 to investigate this setting. We also compare the evolutionary and
the theoretical approach in the complete information case. The evolutionary out-
comes show a good match with the game-theoretic results. Moreover, the simulation
shows that results diﬀer signiﬁcantly if information about the opponent’s future bar-
gaining opportunities is not available: if the number of bargaining opportunities is
suﬃciently high, the responder now obtains the largest share.
The outcomes in the incomplete information case, however, also depend on the
existence of positive search costs. Search costs stimulate agents to reach agreements
early and discourage both players to exploit the additional opportunities. In the
evolutionary simulation, the agreements are then similar to the one-shot ultimatum
game. A similar eﬀect is observed if bargaining is terminated with a small probability
because no new opponent can be found.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.1 the bargaining game with
multiple bargaining opportunities is described. Section 4.2 provides a game-theoretic
analysis of the game in case of complete information. Section 4.3 outlines the evolu-
tionary simulation and Section 4.4 discusses the obtained results from the simulation.
Lastly, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.1 Description of the bargaining game
The modelled market consists of buyers and sellers who exchange a single good
through bilateral negotiations. At each bargaining opportunity, an ultimatum-like
game is played, where the proposer makes an oﬀer and the responder can reject or64 Bargaining with multiple opportunities
opportunities his bargaining game ends and he obtains the disagreement payoﬀ.
The buyer, on the other hand, can continue bargaining when matched with another
opponent, seller 2. In the example this opponent with γs = 2 oﬀers (0.6,0.6). The
buyer now accepts and the bargaining game ends for both agents.
Note that even though the agents initially have equal bargaining opportunities,
the matched agents can have diﬀerent bargaining states. Having agents with dif-
ferent states is an important aspect of the market game, particularly when agents
are unaware of their opponent’s remaining opportunities. We assume that, once an
oﬀer is rejected, agents cannot go back on a previous oﬀer.3 We also assume that
there are an equal number of buyers and sellers in the market. This in contrast to
the work in e.g. [89], where markets are studied with unequal number of buyers and
sellers.
4.2 Game-theoretical approach
This section considers the game-theoretic subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the
above game where the agents’ bargaining states are common knowledge. A game-
theoretical analysis seems to be very diﬃcult if the agents have incomplete infor-
mation of their opponent’s bargaining state. We will, however, drop the complete
information assumption in the evolutionary approach (Section 4.3). In the follow-
ing analysis we assume all agents of a speciﬁc type (i.e., buyer or seller) apply the
same negotiation strategy. This assumption is reasonable since the preferences are
identical for a given type.
In case of a single opportunity, the bargaining game is reduced to the ultimatum
game. The ultimatum game has a unique SPE where the seller (here the proposer)
claims the total share for each issue, and the buyer (the responder) accepts this take-
it-or-leave-it deal [90]. This result can be obtained by applying backward induction.
Intuitively, a rational buyer will accept any positive amount, which is always better
than obtaining the zero payoﬀ in case of a disagreement. The SPE is precisely the
point where the buyer is indiﬀerent between accepting and refusing.
We argue that the game with multiple bargaining opportunities and complete
information has an SPE with the same outcome as the ultimatum game: the seller
obtains the entire share, and the buyer receives the disagreement payoﬀ, which is
set to zero.4 Consider a buyer with γb = 1, i.e. with a ﬁnal bargaining opportunity
remaining. The buyer will then accept any positive amount oﬀered by the seller.
An anticipating seller will then claim the entire share, as in the ultimatum game,
independent of γs. In SPE, the buyer’s payoﬀ for γb = 1 therefore equals zero. Note
that this only holds if the seller is informed about the buyer’s bargaining state.
3Agents are said to have no recall [149].
4This holds for continuous divisions of the surplus.4.3 Evolutionary approach 65
If γb = 2, the buyer has two bargaining opportunities. Using the above, we can
replace the payoﬀ for refusing the seller’s oﬀer when γb = 2 by the disagreement
payoﬀ. The situation for γb = 2 is now equal to γb = 1: the buyer is indiﬀerent
between accepting and refusing a value of zero and in SPE the buyer accepts this
deal, independent of γs. By backward induction the same holds for γb = n.
We note that, because the agents are indiﬀerent to the bargaining state in which
the agreement is reached, actually several subgame-perfect equilibria can exist. In
all cases, however, the divisions are the same. Note furthermore that the above
argument only holds if the seller is informed about the buyer’s number of remain-
ing bargaining opportunities. If this information is not available, a game-theoretic
analysis seems much more diﬃcult. An evolutionary simulation, however, is very
apt to analyse the case of incomplete information. We analyse both the completely
informed and the uninformed case in Section 4.4. First, the evolutionary system is
described in detail.
4.3 Evolutionary approach
We use an evolutionary algorithm to evolve the strategies of the agents. The evolu-
tionary simulation is depicted in Figure 4.2. The evolutionary algorithm is based on
the implementation described in Section 1.2.3. As in Chapter 3, each strategy in the
EA corresponds to an agent of a certain type (buyer or seller), and we use separate
populations to evolve the strategies of the two types of agents. The way in which
the ﬁtness of the agents is determined, however, diﬀers from the approach described
in Chapter 3. In the previous model, each agent was evaluated against all agents in
the opponent’s population. In this case, however, all agents together constitute a
market-like setting, where buyers and sellers can bargain several times with diﬀer-
ent opponents before their ﬁnal ﬁtness is determined. Also because the interactions
determine the bargaining states of the agents, another approach is required here.
The ﬁtness of the agents is determined as follows. The parental and oﬀspring
populations are ﬁrst combined to form a group of sellers and a group of buyers. The
agents are then evaluated by a sequence of pair-wise matches. For each match, two
agents are randomly selected (with replacement) and play the one-shot game. An
agent obtains a payoﬀ in case an agreement is reached or the disagreement payoﬀ
(which is zero) if no more opportunities are available for this agent. If an agent still
has opportunities remaining, his ﬁtness remains undetermined. Note that, since both
agents can be in diﬀerent bargaining states, the consequences of a disagreement may
be diﬀerent for the individual agents. Because an outcome depends on many random
factors, each strategy is evaluated a number of times and the ﬁtness is the average
of r payoﬀ values. The parameter r is called the evaluation frequency. This way the
ﬁtness becomes a more accurate measure of the expected payoﬀ. The bargaining
games continue until all agents have obtained at least r payoﬀ values.66 Bargaining with multiple opportunities
Figure 4.2: Iteration loop of the evolutionary algorithm.
Since both buyers and sellers start with the same bargaining state, in the ﬁrst
periods the opponent’s bargaining states do not represent an ongoing bargaining
society. To prevent so-called initiatory eﬀects and to model an on-going bargaining
society, a strategy’s ﬁtness is only measured after the ﬁrst payoﬀ is determined. A
strategy is thus evaluated at least r + 1 times. Furthermore, we model a market
situation where the number of agents remains constant over time, also called a
steady-state market in [89]. Therefore, once the ﬁtness of a strategy has been
established, the strategy can still be selected to play again but its ﬁtness is no longer
aﬀected by the outcome. The bargaining games are continued until the ﬁtness for
each strategy has been established.
4.3.1 Strategy Encoding
The strategy, encoded on the chromosome, speciﬁes either an oﬀer or a threshold
for each bargaining state, depending on the type of the agent (i.e., sellers only have
oﬀers and buyers only have thresholds). The threshold determines whether an oﬀer
of the opponent is accepted or rejected: if the utility falls below the threshold the
oﬀer is refused; otherwise an agreement is reached. A similar representation was used
in Chapter 3 for the alternating-oﬀers game, although in that game all strategies
contain both oﬀers and thresholds.
We distinguish between the complete information setting and the incomplete
information setting (see Section 4.1). The strategy representation depends on this
setting and is schematically depicted in Figures 4.3 and 4.4 for the complete and
incomplete information case respectively. In the incomplete information case (Fig-
ure 4.4), an oﬀer or threshold is speciﬁed for each bargaining states of the agent. In
case of complete information (Figure 4.3), an oﬀer or threshold is also conditional
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Seller   o(1|1)   o(2|1) ...   o(n|1)
Strategy   o(1|2)   o(2|2) ...   o(n|2)
... ... ... ...
  o(1|n)   o(2|n) ...   o(n|n)
Buyer t(1|1) t(2|1) ... t(n|1)
Strategy t(1|2) t(2|2) ... t(n|2)
... ... ... ...
t(1|n) t(2|n) ... t(n|n)
Figure 4.3: The strategies of a seller and a buyer for the market game with com-
plete information about the opponent’s bargaining state. The oﬀers   o(γs|γb) and
thresholds t(γb|γs) are conditional on the bargaining state of the opponent, where
γs,γb ∈ {1,...,n}.
Seller Strategy   o(1)   o(2) ...   o(n)
Buyer Strategy t(1) t(2) ... t(n)
Figure 4.4: The strategies of a seller and a buyer for the market game, where the
players are uninformed about the opponent’s bargaining state. An oﬀer   o(γs) or
threshold t(γb) is only determined by an agent’s own bargaining state, since more
information is not available.
4.3.2 Mutation Operator
Although several mutation models were tried, the mutation model with exponential
decay showed a closest match with game-theoretic benchmark cases. We therefore
only report the results using the exponential decay model. This mutation operator
is explained in Section 1.2.3.
4.4 Evolutionary simulation results
The results are organised as follows. First, the game with complete information
is studied in Subsection 4.4.1 and the results are compared to the game-theoretic
(SPE) predictions. Subsection 4.4.2 studies the incomplete information case. Sub-
section 4.4.3 introduces a measure of competitiveness for multi-issue negotiations
and compares results for diﬀerent levels of integrative negotiations. Finally, in Sub-
section 4.4.4 considers the eﬀects of ﬁxed search costs in the market game and68 Bargaining with multiple opportunities
Parental population size ( ) 30
Oﬀspring population size (λ) 30
Initial standard deviations (σ) 0.1
Mutation model exponential decay
Standard deviation half-life (t) 400
Number of generations 4000
Number of runs per experiment 30
Strategy evaluation frequency (r) 20
Table 4.1: Default settings of the evolutionary simulation.
uncertainty about future opportunities.
4.4.1 Game-Theoretic Validation
This section considers a competitive (i.e., single-issue) scenario with complete in-
formation of the agents’ bargaining opportunities and compares the evolutionary
algorithm (EA) outcomes to SPE predictions. Default parameter settings for the
EA are shown in Table 4.1. Note that because of random ﬂuctuations, the EA
results are averaged over 30 runs using the same settings.
In SPE the share of the buyers is zero and the sellers obtain the whole surplus
in case the initial number of bargaining opportunities of the players is ﬁnite, and
the bargaining state of the opponent is common knowledge (see also Section 4.2).
Figure 4.5 shows the EA outcomes for diﬀerent values of n (initial bargaining op-
portunities). The results indicate an almost perfect match between evolutionary
outcomes after 4000 generations and game-theoretic outcomes, particularly when n
is small.
For larger values of n we ﬁnd that, using the same EA parameter settings, the
evolutionary outcomes become somewhat less extreme. See also Figure 4.6, which
shows the long-term EA outcomes (after 4000 generations) for n up to 10. This
is because as n becomes larger, the complexity of the problem increases due to a
larger search space, making learning by an EA more diﬃcult. However, a better
match for larger values of n also appears by adjusting EA parameters, such as the
evaluation frequency and the population size, to handle the increased complexity.
Details on tuning the EA are not treated here. Instead, we refer the interested reader
to previous research [126], in which diﬀerent EA settings are systematically studied
for an alternating-oﬀers bargaining game. Henceforth, we present only experiments
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Figure 4.5: Development of the mean ﬁtness (averaged over 30 runs) for complete
information setting with varying initial number of bargaining opportunities.
Figure 4.6: Results after 4000 generations (averaged over 30 runs) in case of complete
information.70 Bargaining with multiple opportunities
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Figure 4.7: Results after 4000 generations (averaged over 30 runs) for incomplete
information settings with various n. The error bars indicate the standard deviation
of the averaged results.
4.4.2 Incomplete Information
We now examine the results when the agents do not know their opponent’s bargain-
ing states; the agents only know their own bargaining states. Although no explicit
information is available, the agents implicitly learn the distribution of the bargaining
states in the opponent’s population. This distribution is endogenously determined
by the strategies of the agents. The strategies, in turn, adapt to the distribution
of the bargaining states. This complex interaction is one reason why theoretical
analysis is diﬃcult. An EA, on the other hand, is well suited to ﬁnd outcomes that
emerge from such local interactions.
Results produced after 4000 generations of the EA for the incomplete information
case are shown in Figure 4.7, for diﬀerent values of n (the initial number of bargaining
opportunities). These results are averaged over 30 runs. The error bars indicate
the standard deviation. Whereas in the complete information case the seller obtains
almost the entire surplus, the responder (i.e., buyer) has the best bargaining position
in the incomplete information case (see Figure 4.7). This holds as long as the initial
number of bargaining opportunities are suﬃciently large (i.e., ≥ 5). Note that these
results are obtained even though the buyers’ and sellers’ initial settings are equal.
The results can be explained as follows. If the buyer is in her ﬁnal state, she will
accept any deal (as in the ultimatum game). In other states, however, the buyer
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state. Because he does not know the buyer’s bargaining state, he can no longer
anticipate the buyer’s behaviour. In order to prevent a disagreement, the sellers
will then concede in the last bargaining state. The expected payoﬀ in case of a
disagreement and the oﬀers in earlier bargaining states will then also decrease. After
many generations, the simulation converges to an outcome where the seller concedes
almost his entire surplus in each bargaining state. We also observe that the seller
concedes slightly less if he has more bargaining opportunities remaining, resulting
in less extreme deals if n becomes large, as shown in Figure 4.7.
In the incomplete information setting the ﬁrst-mover (here the seller), has no
information about his opponent. The responder, on the other hand, can make a
relatively more informative decision based on the seller’s oﬀer. Whereas in the ul-
timatum game the proposer seems to dominate the outcome, a more competitive
setting allows the responder to obtain a considerable advantage. This result, how-
ever, holds only if the number of bargaining opportunities is ﬁnite and equal for
both players. Furthermore, the players incur no costs for refusing a deal. As we will
show in Section 4.4.4, even slight costs completely change these results.
When the number of initial bargaining opportunities is set higher than three, a
sudden transition in the long-term outcomes can be observed in Figure 4.7: up to
n = 3, the seller obtains almost all, whereas the buyer obtains the largest share if
n > 3. By increasing n, the number of possible states increases, making the buyer’s
behaviour less predictable for the seller. The value for which the transition occurs
depends on game parameters such as r and the competitiveness of the negotiation.
The latter will be discussed further in the next section.
4.4.3 Integrative Negotiations
An advantage of bilateral negotiation is the ability to negotiate complex contracts
with several issues. When mutually beneﬁcial solutions are available, negotiations
are called integrative (see Section 2.3.3). We consider integrative two-issue negoti-
ations in this section and introduce the notion of competitiveness. We show that
the information in the integrative case has a very similar impact as in the compet-
itive case. Due to increased complexity, however, the evolutionary results are less
extreme when the number of bargaining opportunities is large.
The utility of an oﬀer is an additive, weighted function of the share obtained
for each issue (see also Section 4.1). The weights for sellers and buyers for the two
issues are   ws = (0.5 − α,0.5 + α) and   wb = (0.5 + α,0.5 − α)T respectively, where
α ∈ [0.0,0.5] is the so-called degree of competitiveness. When the parameter α is set
equal to 0, negotiations are purely competitive; if α = 0.5 there is no competition
at all. Note that the maximum social welfare, i.e. the maximum total utility that a
seller and a buyer can achieve together equals 2 (0.5+α), where each agent obtains
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Figure 4.8: Mean long-term outcomes for two-issue negotiations and α = 0.2.
Results for α = 0.2 are visualised in Figure 4.8. The results show that, as in the
competitive case, a transition occurs to a buyer-dominated outcome for suﬃciently
large n and incomplete information. We ﬁnd, however, that this transition already
occurs when n = 2 (see Figure 4.8). Only two bargaining opportunities are needed
to obtain an advantage for the responder, as supposed to four in the single-issue
game (Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.8 also shows a less extreme split compared to competitive negotiations,
particularly for large n. This occurs ﬁrstly since the strategy search space is in-
creased (a value for each issue needs to be learned), making learning more diﬃcult.
Moreover, the win-win possibilities are fully exploited: if one of the agents slightly
concedes, the other agent can obtain a relatively large gain by negotiating a Pareto-
eﬃcient deal. As shown in Figure 4.9, this eﬀect becomes stronger as α increases.
In the extreme case, where α = 0.5, both agents can obtain the full surplus without
any concession.
Note that the EA parameters are ﬁxed for the various game settings. As we
mentioned in Section 4.4.1 we can adjust the parameters to handle more complex
bargaining settings as a result of a larger n and an increased number of issues. By
increasing the population size and adjusting other parameters of the EA, we obtain
results which are closer to game-theoretic predictions.4.4 Evolutionary simulation results 73
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Figure 4.9: Mean long-term outcomes for n = 5 and diﬀerent values for the com-
petitiveness (α).
4.4.4 Search Costs and Premature Termination
We further extend the bargaining game in two ways. First, we introduce search or
negotiation costs each time an oﬀer is refused and agents engage in a new negotiation.
Subsequently, we consider the case where there exists uncertainty about whether a
new bargaining opponent can be found. Whereas we have assumed until now that
the number of bargaining opportunities remains ﬁxed, there can be external factors
which inﬂuence the number of opportunities (e.g., if a seller has in the meanwhile
sold the good to another buyer). This is modelled as a probability that negotiations
terminate prematurely, i.e., before the ﬁnal number of bargaining opportunities is
completely exhausted.
Search costs can represent the amount of money, time, or eﬀort that an agent
may incur for ﬁnding a new opponent. It is shown theoretically that if buyers have
search costs, the sellers charge monopolistic prices in equilibrium [22, Ch.7]. We
consider the impact of search costs on the bargaining game where both buyers and
sellers have equal search costs β. The ﬁnal utility is reduced by ﬁxed search costs β
for each new bargaining opportunity. Only the ﬁrst bargaining opportunity has no
costs.
Evolutionary outcomes for the complete and incomplete information settings
with diﬀerent search costs are depicted in Fig 4.10. Negotiations are competitive
and buyers and sellers each have 5 initial bargaining opportunities. Search costs seem74 Bargaining with multiple opportunities
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Figure 4.10: Mean long-term results as a function of the search costs (β) for n = 5.
to have little impact on the ﬁtness in the complete information case; variations are
not statistically relevant. Although the ﬁtness does not change, the actual behaviour
of the agents does: most agreements are now reached immediately. Without search
costs, agreements reached are distributed over the various bargaining states.
In the incomplete information case, on the other hand, even small search costs
have a drastic impact on the ﬁtness of the agents, see Figure 4.10. The sellers claim
almost the entire share even if search costs are very small (e.g. 0.01) and equal for
both agents. Results are robust for diﬀerent settings of the EA. These outcomes are
consistent with economic theory, which states that prices become monopolistic even
if search costs are inﬁnitely small.
As in the complete information case, both buyers and sellers are stimulated to
reach agreements early in case of search costs. The ﬁnal opportunity of the seller
is therefore almost never reached, removing the advantage for the buyer. The game
changes from a game with incomplete information, to a game where almost all
players complete a deal in their ﬁrst bargaining opportunity. Now the seller can
again claim the entire surplus as in the one-shot game.
Similar outcomes are observed when bargaining for a buyer and/or a seller is
discontinued with a certain probability after each disagreement.5 Figure 4.11 shows
the long-term outcomes for diﬀerent probabilities of premature termination after
each bargaining opportunity. The probability is set equal for buyers and sellers, and
5This is analogous to discount factors or a probability of break down in case of multi-round
bargaining, as used in e.g. Chapter 3.4.5 Concluding remarks 75
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Figure 4.11: Long-term ﬁtness values for n = 5 and incomplete information, when
negotiations are discontinued with a certain probability after each disagreement.
for each bargaining opportunity, but drawn independently. As with search costs,
the seller obtains the largest share if the probability is suﬃciently high.
Note that the eﬀect of premature termination is less extreme, however. This
is because search costs also aﬀect the utility if an agreement is not reached, pro-
viding an additional incentive to reach agreements (otherwise, a negative utility is
obtained). In case of premature termination, on the other hand, an agent is indiﬀer-
ent between termination after the ﬁrst bargaining opportunity and a disagreement
in the last bargaining opportunity.
4.5 Concluding remarks
We study the evolutionary dynamics of a market-like game in this chapter, where a
seller sells a single good and has several opportunities to do so. At the same time,
a buyer wishes to buy an item by trying several sellers. The terms of an agreement
are negotiated using an ultimatum-like game, where the seller proposes an oﬀer and
the buyer can choose to accept or reject the oﬀer. The game is extended to allow
for multiple opportunities for both the seller and the buyer if the deal is rejected.
This way a competitive market is modelled. We furthermore investigate multi-issue
integrative negotiations and the eﬀects of search costs and premature termination if
a disagreement occurs.
The game-theoretic outcome using subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) for the76 Bargaining with multiple opportunities
one-shot ultimatum game predicts an extreme split of the surplus: the seller obtains
the whole surplus whereas the buyer obtains her disagreement payoﬀ. We extend
the analysis for multiple bargaining opportunities with complete information of the
opponent’s bargaining state and ﬁnd an equivalent outcome. A theoretical analysis
seems to be very diﬃcult, however, if the bargaining states of the agents are not
common knowledge. An evolutionary simulation, on the other hand, is very well
suited to investigate such games with incomplete information.
We ﬁrst compare the evolutionary results with the game-theoretical outcomes for
the game with complete information to validate the evolutionary approach. If the
initial number of bargaining opportunities is small, a very good match is found. In
larger games or when the negotiations become less competitive, the EA shows some-
what deviating outcomes due to larger search space and the limited computational
capacity of the EA. We note that we mainly report experiments using uniform EA
settings in this paper. However, adjusting EA settings appear to improve results
even further for more complex games.
The evolutionary simulation shows a large impact of the additional bargaining
opportunities if the agents have no information on their opponent’s number of future
opportunities. Whereas in the complete information game the seller dominates the
market, the buyer is better oﬀ in the incomplete information setting, as long as the
number of bargaining opportunities is suﬃciently high. By increasing the initial
number of bargaining opportunities a sudden transition is observed where the buyer
obtains the largest share instead of the seller. This occurs because the seller can
then no longer anticipate the buyer’s response and gives in to avoid a disagreement.
Similar outcomes are found for two-issue integrative negotiations. At the same
time, integrative negotiations produce less extreme evolutionary outcomes, both in
the game with complete and incomplete information, particularly if the number
of initial bargaining opportunities is large. This mainly occurs since the space of
possible deals increases. Moreover, the agents ﬁnd win-win situations which beneﬁt
one agent without aﬀecting the payoﬀ obtained by the opponent.
An integrative setting also already aﬀects small games with incomplete informa-
tion: we ﬁnd that for certain settings, a transition from a seller to a buyer dominated
payoﬀ occurs even in case both agents merely have two initial bargaining opportu-
nities, whereas in the competitive case more bargaining opportunities are needed to
achieve the same result.
We also study the eﬀect of search or negotiation costs in case a negotiation fails
and the agent needs to ﬁnd a new opponent. Search costs induce players to reach an
agreement in the very ﬁrst bargaining opportunity. This changes an incomplete in-
formation game into an ultimatum-like game with only a single bargaining opportu-
nity. Even very small search costs result in an extreme split where the seller obtains
almost the entire share, similar to the ultimatum game outcome. This is consistent
with economic theory which states that even inﬁnitely small search costs produce4.5 Concluding remarks 77
monopolistic prices. The outcomes are similar but less extreme if search costs are
replaced by a probability that bargaining is discontinued after a disagreement. This
models the situation where uncertainty exists about future opportunities.
In this chapter we have shown that evolutionary simulations are extremely use-
ful to investigate negotiations with incomplete information, which are unwieldy to
analyse theoretically. Using evolutionary algorithms, we can simulate complex in-
teractions involving a large number of agents, as is the case in bargaining with
multiple opportunities. It is interesting to further reﬁne the model to speciﬁc real-
world settings, where for instance agents have incomplete information about their
own future number of bargaining opportunities. Another interesting extension is
allowing agents to return to previously encountered opponents.Part B
Bargaining systems for business
applicationsChapter 5
Competitive market-based
allocation of consumer attention
space
In this chapter,1 we consider an e-business application of automated negotiation
using software agents. We present a framework for a distributed Competitive
Attention-space System, CASy, to allocate the scarce resource that is consumer
attention via the techniques of dynamic market-based control [20,23,43] and adap-
tive software agents (see see Section 1.1.3 and [47,60,144]). In the example of
an electronic shopping mall, CASy recommends shops to a consumer: the task of
matching a consumer to a set of suitable shops is delegated to the individual shops,
each of which evaluates the information that is available about the consumer and
his or her interests (the consumer’s interests and other information which the con-
sumer is willing to provide; e.g. keywords, product queries, and available parts of a
proﬁle). Based on this information and on their domain knowledge, shops can make
a monetary bid in an auction where a limited amount of consumer attention space,
or banners, for the particular consumer is sold.
To facilitate CASy, the system is designed as a multi-agent system (see Sec-
tion 1.1.3) where each shop is represented by a software agent that executes the
task of bidding for the attention of each individual consumer. The use of learning
software agents allows shops to rapidly adapt their bidding strategy such that they
only bid for consumers that are likely to be interested in their oﬀerings. Further-
1The results of this chapter have been published in [17]: S.M. Bohte, E.H. Gerding, and J.A. La
Poutr´ e. Market-based recommendation: Agents that compete for consumer attention. ACM
Transactions on Internet Technology, Special Issue on Machine Learning in the Internet, August
2004 (to appear). A shorter version appeared as [16]: S. M. Bohte, E. H. Gerding, and H. La Poutr´ e.
Competitive market-based allocation of consumer attention space. In M. Wellman, editor, Pro-
ceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-01), pages 202–206. The ACM
Press, 2001.
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more, eﬃcient bidding for each customer is only feasible when automated: hence
the use of software agents. These agents allow a shop to process a large number of
small transactions, and enable them to make a deliberated bid for every customer
entering the shopping mall.
In CASy, shops react to consumer behaviour and to behaviours of other shops,
yielding various interdependencies in the commercial eﬀects related to being dis-
played together with competitors. For various basic and simple models for on-line
consumers, shops, and proﬁles, we demonstrate the feasibility of our system, i.e.,
that proper matchings of consumers with shops are achieved, and that shops can
learn their niche in the market, even in the case of such interdependencies. Es-
pecially, to validate the economical concept of the market mechanism underlying
CASy, we develop an evolutionary system for bidding supplier agents. In this ap-
proach, the agent system is investigated like an (adaptive) economic market, as in
agent-based computational economics (ACE) (see also Section 1.2, and Chapters 3
and 4).
Furthermore, in this chapter we reﬂect on the merits of the system, and assess
the advantages and issues that need further attention, from both the technological
and the economical point of view. In [17] we extend this work and also develop
adaptive software agents that learn bidding strategies based on neural networks and
strategy exploration heuristics.
We note that the mechanism we describe is not limited to the example of the
electronic shopping mall, but can easily be extended to other domains where (pre)
selection of possibilities has to be guided, like banners on more general websites,
attention spaces on mobile devices, or other types of marketplaces.
This chapter is organised as follows. First, Section 5.1 motivates the decen-
tralised, agent-based approach for allocating attention space, and discusses related
approaches. In Section 5.2, the design of CASy is presented. The evolutionary
simulation is explained in Section 5.3, whereas Section 5.4 contains the results.
Section 5.5 reﬂects on practical implementation issues such as privacy and the com-
munication overhead of the mechanism. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes.
5.1 Motivation and related research
Before describing CASy in more detail, we ﬁrst elaborate on the merits of such a
system, and the motivation for using software agents. Also, we discuss related work.
In Section 5.1.1 we compare the decentralised approach with the more commonly
used centralised approach. In Section 5.1.2 we comment on the use of software
agents. Section 5.1.3 gives an overview of related work.5.1 Motivation and related research 83
5.1.1 Centralised vs. decentralised recommendation
With the advent of electronic marketplaces, scale limitations as encountered in the
brick-and-mortar world no longer apply: the supply side of the market is no longer
restricted by geographical considerations or lack of physical (shelf) space. At the
same time, novel problems are encountered, like how consumers can ﬁnd their way
in a large marketplace where very many suppliers oﬀer their products.
To this end, a mechanism provided by a trusted third party is desired to propose
relevant shops and products to a consumer in e.g. a virtual shopping mall. A central
ﬁltering scheme is a feasible solution for several diﬀerent business areas. For such
an approach, knowledge on both the user and of the shops, as well as knowledge on
the product domain needs to be stored in a central location in order to determine
appropriate matches. This approach is used in recommender systems like Amazon
and eBay [114] to recommend goods on speciﬁc domains such as books and CD’s,
and in shopbots or pricebots [46], as for instance BargainFinder [66]. Keyword
proﬁling is also a popular method for ranking online sites in search engines. This
amounts to contracts for charging monetary amounts for increased visibility, given
speciﬁc keyword entries, e.g. [52–54].
A central or personal ﬁltering system works well in the case of suitable and well-
demarcated domains, as for instance for a book and music store. However, for a large
heterogeneous marketplace with many participating shops and consumers, several
complexity diﬃculties arise. This is due to the amount of relevant information that
has to be tracked and processed by the ﬁltering mechanism in the form of relevant up-
to-date knowledge of e.g.: the consumer’s interest in diﬀerent product domains and
shop categories; the shops’ products, ways of doing business, and business interest;
and ontologies and domain knowledge for various product categories. Also, the
weighing of multiple issues like service, quality, price, and product diversity (add-
ons and customisation of products) can be important.
Besides the computational complexity problems for information processing, this
requires the transfer of business information of shops towards the central system as a
trusted third party. Such a practice encounters many objections by businesses, even
if only product catalogues are concerned [78,135]. In addition, a central mechanism
still needs to make decisions about what to display in which order to a consumer, in
a way that is reasonable to all parties: all the suppliers and consumers. A fair and
general ’ of interests (utilities) of diﬀerent market parties is usually not possible,
however, and concepts like Pareto-eﬃciency (see Def. 4.3) are used instead.
Thus, central ﬁltering mechanisms may suﬀer from increasing (computational)
complexity as well as serious objections and obstructions from commercial parties
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5.1.2 Use of adaptive software agents
We believe that the system as presented is the natural evolution of auction-based
allocation systems like those currently employed by internet companies like Google
(for sponsored keywords, [52]) and Overture (for banner targeting, [53]). Whereas
these pre-cursor systems rely on the human factor to set essentially static prices
for particular goods, the use of software agents in our system in principle allows a
market-party to assess the value of each individual prospect, if desired at a very
detailed level, as well as take into account real-time business-related domain knowl-
edge and strategies. The implementation of adaptivity into the software agents
allows the “market” for consumer attention to function more eﬃciently, where the
targeting of potential prospects can be more precise, and changing buyer behaviour
can be tracked and followed. As such, agent-assisted recommendation in compet-
itive markets represents the next logical step for current auction-based allocation
systems.
5.1.3 Related research
Our work relates to the large body of research concerning market-based control [20,
23,43]. This paradigm is essentially about controlling complex systems using a
(distributed) market mechanisms for allocating scarce resources. A large number
of applications exist such as the allocation of computational resources [23,43], load
balancing and climate control [145]. Our work applies the paradigm of market-
based control to generating recommendations in a distributed fashion using software
agents.
Related to our approach for generating recommendations is a prototype called
MATE [91] (Multi-Agent Trading Environment) that performs market-matching us-
ing agent technology. In [91], merchant agents receive the proﬁle of the consumer,
and each suggests one or more products to a personal consumer agent. The per-
sonal consumer agent then ﬁlters the appropriate products and ranks the remaining
products according to the customer’s preferences. In this approach, selection is
done on the consumer side, and signiﬁcant knowledge on a product domain should
be incorporated in the personal consumer agent, being a task of a central party to
provide.
A more recent approach by Wei et al. [142,143] has a number of characteristics
similar to CASy; they also apply a central auctioneer to shortlist the recommenda-
tions based on bids made by information providers (called recommending agents).
In their approach, a reward agent determines the reward or feedback for the rec-
ommending agents based on the quality of the recommendations as perceived by
the user. The rule used to calculate the reward is shown to be Pareto-eﬃcient (i.e.,
maximise the social welfare) [142]. Based on this feedback, the bidding (recom-
mending) agents update their strategy using heuristic rules. The bidding strategy5.2 The design of CASy 85
proposed here, on the other hand, is more general and adapted by machine learning
algorithms.2 Also, the feedback is directly obtained via the consumers, and it is up
to the supplier agent to determine the value of this feedback.
5.2 The design of CASy
In this section, we present the framework of CASy (Competitive Attention-space
System) for matching consumers with relevant suppliers in the case of an electronic
shopping mall. We note that the framework we describe is not limited to the ex-
ample of the electronic shopping mall, but can easily be extended to other domains
where (pre) selection of possibilities has to be guided, like banners on more general
websites, attention spaces on mobile devices, or other types of marketplaces. Instead
of addressing to the case of “shops” only, we henceforth mainly use the more general
term “supplier” to refer to the suppliers of goods or services.
Figure 5.1: Advertisements are shown in the form of banners. The banner list is
tailored towards a consumer’s characteristics.
When a consumer enters a shopping mall, he3 expresses his interest for certain
products and selects the business sector of his interest. The information about
his interest, possibly augmented by additional knowledge, is passed on to potential
suppliers in the sector. The suppliers subsequently compete against each other in
an auction by placing bids to “purchase” one of a limited number of entries of
attention space for this speciﬁc consumer. Finally, the consumer is shown the list of
winning suppliers, using for instance banner advertisements. An example is depicted
in ﬁgure 5.1.
Software agents (see Section 1.1.3)) are used to facilitate the ﬁne grain of inter-
action, bidding, and selection in CASy. For our mechanism, we have software agents
for the suppliers and for the enabling intermediary: the mall manager. The model
2We discuss results using evolutionary algorithms in this chapter. For an approach using neural
networks, see [17].
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Figure 5.2: Components of the shopping mall and their interactions.
of the electronic shopping mall is depicted in ﬁgure 5.2, showing both the software
agents and the actual economic players in the shopping mall: the consumers and the
suppliers. The participants within the shopping mall and their roles are discussed
in more detail in the sections that follow.
5.2.1 Mall manager agent
The Mall Manager Agent (MMA) acts as an intermediary between consumers and
supplier agents. The task of the MMA is to facilitate bidding and information dis-
semination processes by providing the auctions and additional customer proﬁling
services to the suppliers. Given privacy concerns, the consumer proﬁle will not
automatically be communicated in full to the suppliers, as e.g. described in Sub-
section 5.2.2. Information on the consumers could be stored within the MMA for
revisiting consumers, leaving open consumers who wish to remain anonymous. The
MMA applies the auction: it collects the bids of the supplier agents, selects the
winners, charges the selected suppliers, and enables their display. In Section 5.2.4
we address the auction in more detail.
5.2.2 Consumers
In the model of ﬁgure 5.2, the consumer directly communicates its interest and
preferences to the MMA, e.g. via a web page. Note, however, that the assistance
of a personal software agent for the consumer is conceivable. Preferences include
the product that is being searched after and various values for the attributes of the
product. The MMA can also consider information on a consumer’s proﬁle. The
consumer proﬁle consists of more generic information on the consumer. This could5.2 The design of CASy 87
include regular personal information like general interests, previous acquisitions, as
well as age or zip code; but also general sales-related information like style or the
interest in issues as price, quality, and service. The consumer can either be queried
directly for this information, or the MMA can derive the information from previous
interactions. The consumer can restrict or disable the dissemination of his proﬁle
information. E.g., distribution of such information can be limited to for speciﬁc or
anonymised parts, or to general sales-related information that is derived from the
private proﬁle.
5.2.3 Suppliers and supplier agents
Each supplier “owns” an agent that acts on the supplier’s behalf, called a supplier
agent. The main task of a supplier agent is to eﬀectively purchase attention space.
The agent will do this by bidding on attention spaces that are to be displayed to
consumers it deems interesting, thus maximizing the supplier’s proﬁts. To this end,
it has to evaluate (information about) consumers. The valuation of a consumer by a
supplier agent is closely linked to its bidding strategy: the bid should not outweigh
the expected proﬁt (if the supplier is to break even) or percentage thereof. This task
can be complicated: the variety of consumers can be great, and the competitive
environment can change rapidly. Also, the supplier’s conception of the targeted
audience may deviate from its actual audience.
The agent can learn this targeting by for instance using the push-back informa-
tion from individual customers, e.g. the knowledge whether or not its advertisement
was selected by the customer (click-through), subsequent buying actions, or, to be
provided by the mall manager, (selected) click-stream information (e.g. time spent
on pages, mouse actions). Additionally, the agent can use supplier-speciﬁc knowl-
edge and (adaptive) rules for accurate targeting.
Along with a strategy for bidding on customers, a supplier agent is also equipped
with knowledge about the supplier. Such knowledge can contain amongst others
relevant business information on the supplier that is needed for the matching process.
This information should determine the supplier’s conception of its “niche” in the
market, and hence the type of preferred consumer. Typical business information
could be the products carried and the intended audience. Furthermore, the goals
and limitations of the supplier can be taken into account, such as the current quantity
of a certain product in stock or the service level.
5.2.4 Auctions
In this Section we address the auctions protocol and the payment procedure of the
MMA. A payment procedure speciﬁes what should be charged and when. See also
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Auction protocol
The actual choice of the auction protocol can depend on many factors. We focus
on the single-bid sealed auction, being a communication-eﬃcient auction. With this
procedure, each supplier submits a single sealed bid for a particular consumer. The
MMA allocates the available positions to the highest bidders, where the ﬁrst position
is allocated to the highest bidder, the second position to the second highest bidder,
and so on. In some environments the ranking is not important, whereas in other
cases the proﬁts for the supplier depend on the position obtained. For this reason,
the choice of payment scheme matters, and is discussed below. Note that, since the
MMA executes the auction for each arriving consumer, suppliers losing an auction
could increase their bid in the next auction for a similar consumer.
Payment procedure
Several diﬀerent payment schemes are possible for various auction procedures. In
the Vickrey auction, the winner pays the price of the second-highest bid (see also
Section 2.3.5). This is a prominent and widely-used auction type, which has been
shown to be eﬃcient for independent valuations of the item [27,133,136]. The
auction is also robust, since revealing ones true preferences is the dominant strategy
in case of independent valuations.
For the case where multiple banners are shown concurrently, we apply an ex-
tension of the Vickrey auction where winners pay the (N+1) price, where N is the
number of items (here banners). This is an instance of the generalised Vickrey
auction, which has the same auction characteristics as above (see Section 2.3.5 for
details).
Note that in such a setup, the same price is charged to the winners of a banner
placement. The auction is only theoretically guaranteed to work well if the sold
goods (the attention spaces) are assumed to be identical, an assumption that is
dependent on the way a customer chooses from a list of alternative oﬀerings. In the
simulations, we investigate models of customer behaviour where this assumption
is valid, as well as a model where it does not hold. In the latter case, we also
investigate another payment scheme, the so-called next-price auction. Here, each
winner pays the price of the next-highest bidder. Such more complicated auctions
are notoriously hard to theoretically demonstrate optimal behaviour for, and we use
the ACE methods (as discussed later) to show that in the simulations this auction
does work eﬃciently in the case where the valuation of an attention space depends
on the position it has on the list and when the highest position is the most valuable
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5.2.5 Eﬀectiveness and feasibility
Although the typical business information for the supplier agent can contain many
variables that relate to those in a consumer proﬁle, these cannot be matched directly.
Rather, the supplier must ﬁnd and improve its actual niche in the market, especially
in the ﬁne-grained advertisement mechanism of CASy. Similar observations hold
even more for the valuation of a consumer.
The need for accurate valuation and targeting is especially pronounced when
consumers are signiﬁcantly contested by competing suppliers. We illustrate this
by the case of a very expensive department store: consumers arriving in a fancy
car are a priori as likely to buy at the store as consumers arriving in a middle-
class car. However, when a cheaper department store exists across the street, this
competition changes the behaviour of the latter consumers much more than of the
former. Similarly, in CASy the valuation of an advertisement space depends on the
selection of and competition between suppliers.
An N+1 auction mechanism is theoretically eﬃcient in case of fully rational
agents and independent valuation of the items. However, if consumer purchases are
like consumer models 2 and 3 (see also Section 5.3.2), the valuation of advertisement
space also depends on the selection and competition between various suppliers. It is
then unclear whether an eﬃcient allocation of the attention space will emerge, i.e., a
correct match between consumers and suppliers with the largest appearing interests
for being displayed together.
In the following, we will show via evolutionary simulation as in the ﬁeld of agent-
based computational economics (ACE, [123]) that the market mechanism is indeed
eﬀective and results in an eﬃcient allocation. Furthermore, supplier agents learn to
properly evaluate their environment and thereby locate their niche in the market.
5.3 Evolutionary simulation model of CASy
In this section, we model the electronic shopping mall for an evolutionary simulation
as in ACE, based on Section 5.2. The goal of the simulation is to assess the feasibility
of the market mechanism of CASy (see Section 5.2.5). To this end, we will make some
additional assumptions and simpliﬁcations, which enables us to study, measure, and
visualise the emerging behaviour of CASy (results are given in Section 5.4).
5.3.1 Mall manager agent
The MMA has in the simulation 3 banner advertisements to dispatch (see also
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5.3.2 Consumer models
We abstract away from any interpretation of the proﬁles. Proﬁles are represented
by a vector of real values. In the simulations, the consumers are classiﬁed by a one
or two dimensional vector with entries in a [0...1] range. The proﬁle can reﬂect a
consumer’s interests such as price segment, taste, or quality, or any combination of
characteristics projected on 1 or 2 dimensions. We thus model a class of consumers
for some given category of products. In the simulation of CASy, several consumers
with diﬀerent proﬁles arrive and are contested by the suppliers in CASy.
The “buying” behaviour or feedback of the consumers is also simulated. This
enables the supplier agents to learn the proper bidding strategy. We ﬁrst model
the purchasing behaviour of a single consumer for one isolated supplier, and then
extend the buyer behaviour to models with several displayed suppliers.
Buying behaviour model for one consumer and one supplier
For each supplier i, the expected gross monopolistic proﬁts E πi(c)  is its average
gross proﬁts for a possible purchase following the observation of a consumer of its
advertisement, while no other supplier is shown. We take
E πi(c)  =  iPi(c),
where Pi(c) denotes the monopolistic purchase probability for consumer proﬁle c
and  i is a constant value related to the supplier’s average proﬁt when a purchase
is made. Note that both  i and Pi(c) are taken as an externally imposed model for
interaction and are initially not known or available to the supplier.
In the simulation each supplier is given a centre of attraction ai, where Pi(c) is
maximised. We used two types of purchase probability functions Pi in the experi-
ments: (1) linear functions, where the Pi is proportional to the Euclidean distance
d(c,ai) in the following way:
Pi(c) = 1 − δd(c,ai),
and (2) Gaussian functions with the highest point corresponding to the centre of
attraction. The width of the Gaussian curve is then set by parameter σi. For
simplicity the maximal monopolistic purchase probability is set constant to 1. This
value can be chosen lower, but is chosen for maximal discrimination between various
advanced behaviour models (see Subsection 5.3.2).
Buying behaviour models for several displayed suppliers
As the consumer is presented with a selection of winning ”Consumer Attention
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eﬀect, this stochastic behaviour can be modelled as meaning that a single presen-
tation of banners results in an amount p of products being sold: how much and at
which recommended supplier (the buying behaviour) is formalised in the Customer
Buying Behaviour Models. Here, we present several Customer Buying Behaviour
Models, as the behaviour of consumers shopping for a speciﬁc product may be dif-
ferent for diﬀerent product areas or diﬀerent consumer populations.
We modelled three classes of consumer behaviour:
1. Independent visits with several purchases. In this model (see ﬁgure 5.3), the
consumer visits all displayed suppliers, and can buy products at several sup-
pliers (e.g. CDs).
2. Independent visits with one expected purchase. In this model (see ﬁgure 5.4), a
consumer visits all displayed suppliers and then buys on average one product
in total (e.g. a computer).
3. Search-till-found behaviour. In this model (see ﬁgure 5.5), the consumer visits
the suppliers in sequential order from top to bottom, until he ﬁnds a supplier
with the proper product, which he buys (e.g. a raisin bread).
The consumer behaviour in these models is stochastic: whether a product is
purchased by consumer c at a certain supplier j depends on a probability value Qj(c).
The monopolistic purchase probabilities Pi(c) are the basic parameters, determining
these probability values Qj(c) as shown in ﬁgures 5.3 to 5.5. The expected gross
proﬁts E ρj(c)  for supplier j is then given by
E ρj(c)  =  jQj(c).
Notice that in the models of ﬁgure 5.4 and 5.5, the probability that an item is sold
at one supplier depends on the monopolistic purchase probabilities of its competitors
within the list. Importantly, for the third model, the actual position of a supplier
on the list inﬂuences the expected average proceeds, meaning that the individual
banners are no longer identical. We will address this issue, and a solution, in detail
in Section 5.4.5.
5.3.3 Supplier models
We will denote by gross proﬁt the proﬁt that a supplier earns on a product, before the
cost of advertisement is taken into account (but after accounting for all other costs),
and by net proﬁt the proﬁt after deduction of all costs, including advertisement cost.
The goal of a supplier is to maximise net proﬁts, and therefore a supplier tries
to sell as many items as possible at the lowest possible advertising costs. The net
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Figure 5.3: Consumer model of independent visits with several purchases, where Pi =
Pi(c).
Figure 5.4: Consumer model of independent visits with up to one purchase, where Pi =
Pi(c).
Figure 5.5: Consumer model with search-till-found behaviour, where Pi = Pi(c).5.3 Evolutionary simulation model of CASy 93
the simulation have no initial knowledge of their own actual niche or payoﬀ function
in the market (see Section 5.2.5).
A bidding strategy speciﬁes the monetary bid for each possible consumer proﬁle.
Given the feedback in the form of actual payoﬀ from visiting consumers, a supplier
agent adapts its bidding strategy and thereby indirectly learns the consumer be-
haviour and its competitive environment determined by other supplier agents. Note
that these two factors are interrelated (see also Section 5.3.2). The strategy of the
agent is learned using an evolutionary algorithm (EA). The EA is explained below.
5.3.4 Evolutionary simulation of supplier agents
We simulate the adaptive behaviour of the supplier agents using an evolutionary
simulation like in the ﬁeld of agent-based computational economics (ACE) [1,42,123,
127,130,138] and similar to the implementation used in previous chapters. Unlike
the previous implementations, however, the strategies of each supplier agent evolves
independently in a separate population. This is because each supplier agent is of a
diﬀerent type (i.e., has a diﬀerent centre of attraction) and therefore targets diﬀerent
consumers.
We proceed as follows. Each supplier agent is represented by an evolving pop-
ulation of strategies. These strategies are evaluated and evolved according to the
amount of proﬁt they earn in a CASy simulation. In such a CASy simulation, a
number of consumers arrive, supplier strategies bid for each of these, and the win-
ners get the expected payoﬀs as described in Section 5.3.2. The strategies that are
evolved after repeating this process many times, show the emerging behaviour of
the suppliers. Hence, the process of evolution ﬁnds eﬀective strategies for a CASy
simulation.
An evolutionary algorithm (EA) as described in Section 1.2 is used to adapt the
strategies of the supplier agents. The ﬁtness function and the strategy representation
are explained below. For further implementation details, see Section 1.2.3.
Fitness evaluation
The ﬁtness of a strategy is equal to the average proﬁts obtained. The actual proﬁt
naturally depends on the context, i.e. the proﬁles of the visiting consumers and
the bidding strategies used by the opponents (viz. the competing shops). The
populations therefore co-evolve. In order to obtain an adequate indication of the
performance, the ﬁtness measure is based on several trials with diﬀerent opponent
strategies. The ﬁtness of the opponent strategies is determined concurrently.
We now give a more detailed description of the steps used to determine the ﬁtness
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1. For each of the suppliers combine the oﬀspring and parent population into a
single larger population. We now have m populations, one for each supplier.
2. Reset all previously made proﬁts.
3. Select randomly a single strategy from each population. These bidding strate-
gies are used by the suppliers in the competition. If the competitor is set to
random (as in Section 5.4.2), however, the strategies are evaluated against
random bidding strategies.
4. Let a number of consumers with diﬀerent proﬁles visit the shopping mall in a
sequential order. We use a ﬁxed set of consumers that are evenly distributed
over the proﬁle space (this reduces stochastic variation in measuring the per-
formance of the strategies).
5. For each consumer the supplier obtains feedback on the obtained proﬁts. When
a consumer visits the mall the following steps determine the proﬁts:
(a) Each supplier bids on the consumer using the selected strategy and given
the consumer’s proﬁle. The strategy is basically a function which maps
the consumer proﬁle to a bid. Below, the details on the strategy repre-
sentation are described.
(b) The mall manager agent (MMA) selects the winners and determines the
advertising costs, as described in Section 5.2.4. Only suppliers who bid
higher than zero will participate in the negotiation.
(c) The MMA shows the list of selected suppliers to the consumer, who de-
cides how much to buy. The purchase amount is determined by the con-
sumer proﬁle and consumer behaviour models described in Sections 5.3.2.
6. The total proﬁts (purchases minus advertising costs) for each strategy are then
stored for later reference.
7. If the proﬁts of a strategy have been determined a pre-set, ﬁxed number of
trials (and the strategy has thus been tested against diﬀerent opponent strate-
gies), this strategy is removed from the population.
8. The process is repeated from step 2 until all the populations are empty.
9. The ﬁtness for each strategy then equals the average proﬁt obtained in each
of the trials.5.3 Evolutionary simulation model of CASy 95
bid value
consumer profile 0 1
Figure 5.6: Examples of two bidding strategies as learned by co-evolution. The
bidding strategy determines the bid value for any consumer proﬁle. The top ﬁgure
shows a strategy for a one-dimensional consumer proﬁle, whereas the bottom ﬁgure
shows a strategy for a two-dimensional consumer proﬁle
Bidding Strategy Representation
In general terms, a supplier’s bidding strategy is a function which returns a bid value
given the consumer proﬁle. Within the set-up of the simulation the proﬁle has either
one or two dimensions. In case of a single dimension, the strategy is represented using
a piece-wise linear function that returns the bid given a value along the consumer-
proﬁle axis. For a two-dimensional consumer proﬁle, the strategy is represented
by triangular planes. Examples of a bidding strategy for a one-dimensional and
two-dimensional consumer proﬁle are given in Fig. 5.6 The piece-wise linear bidding
strategies are encoded on the chromosome as follows. In case of a one-dimensional
proﬁle, the chromosome contains (x,y) coordinates for each of the deﬁning points
(the number of deﬁning points is a parameter in the simulation), where x is the
consumer proﬁle and y the bidding value. The bidding values for the edges of the
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for a given consumer proﬁle is then calculated by interpolation between two points
neighbouring of the consumer proﬁle on each side.
For a two-dimensional consumer proﬁle, the strategy is represented by triangular
planes. The strategy is constructed using Delaunay triangulation of the (three-
dimensional) deﬁning points. The bidding value is then determined by interpolation
between the three vertexes of the triangle containing the given consumer proﬁle.
5.3.5 Measure for proper selection of suppliers
The selection procedure in an auction should ultimately lead to an appropriate
selection of suppliers for consumers. We start from the economic point of view of
optimizing the revenue of the collection of shops in the shopping mall as a whole.
Consider the n suppliers with the largest expected payoﬀs for a given consumer.
We measure the proportion of properly selected n suppliers as the fraction of these
n suppliers that are present in the actual list of 3 displays shown to the consumer.
From the consumer point of view, we can interpret the expenditures of a con-
sumer at a supplier as a measure for his interest in the supplier. In case that the
ratio between expenditures and payoﬀ within a certain business sector is similar
for the suppliers in that sector, the above measure is related to both the consumer
interests as well as the supplier interests.
5.4 Results
We performed a number of experiments in the e-shopping-mall simulation outlined
in Section 5.3. The results are given and discussed in this Section.
5.4.1 Simulation settings
Table 5.1 shows the parameters and their values which are varied for diﬀerent sim-
ulation runs. For a description of the mall parameters refer to Section 5.3. For
a description EA parameters, see Section 1.2. Two of the parameters are further
explained below.
• Expected gross monopolistic proﬁt functions (E π ). The E π -functions are
explained in Section 5.3.2. The applied settings are speciﬁed in table 5.2.
Figure 5.7 shows the functions “set2” for 8 diﬀerent suppliers and a one-
dimensional consumer proﬁle. The functions deﬁned in “set3” have diﬀerent
 i and δ combinations for each supplier;  i varies between 0.5 and 1.0, and δ
between 1.0 and 2.0.
• Number of deﬁning points. A supplier has to obtain a bidding function on the
space of consumer proﬁles. The function that is learned is an interpolation5.4 Results 97
Parameter Value
EA Parental population size ( ) 25
Parameters Oﬀspring population size (λ) 25
Selection scheme (  + λ)-ES
Mutation model self-adaptive
Initial standard deviations (σi(0)) 0.1
Minimum standard deviation (ǫσ) 0.025
Mall Number of suppliers 8
Parameters Number of banner spaces (N) 3
Maximum bid value 1.5
Consumer behaviour model 1 / 2 / 3
Expected gross monopolistic proﬁt (E π ) set1 / set2/ set3
Proﬁle dimensionality 1 or 2
Number of deﬁning points 8 (1-D,), 16 (2-D)
Number of consumers 50 (1-D), 100 (2-D)
Table 5.1: Default settings of the simulations.
E π  function name Type  i δ σ
Set1 Linear 1.0 2.0 -
Set2 Gaussian 1.0 - 0.2
Set3 Linear variable variable -
Table 5.2: Consumer purchase functions and their general settings.
function, based on a number of deﬁning points. For the one-dimensional case,
this results in a piecewise linear function; for the two-dimensional case, we
obtain the function values by triangularisation of the proﬁle surface.
5.4.2 Single advertisement model
In this subsection, we illustrate the use and evolution of the bidding function for a
supplier for a very simple setting, where the optimal bidding strategy is known from
auction theory.
The setting contains a single store competing against a random opponent for the
case of one banner. The random player bids any random value between 0 and 1.5.
Since a Vickrey (second-price) auction is used, it is a well-known dominant strategy
for the supplier to bid its true valuation (i.e. the expected gross proﬁt) [136]; any
lower bid risks a missed proﬁt-opportunity, whereas a higher bid might result in
direct loss. The dominant strategy maximises the supplier’s net proﬁt, regardless
of the opponent’s behaviour. Thus, the store should learn the proﬁt function as98 Competitive market-based allocation of consumer attention space
Figure 5.7: Expected gross monopolistic proﬁts at the diﬀerent stores for “set2”
function settings.
the bidding function. The results for experiments on this setting show that this
happens indeed. Typical, good results are shown in ﬁgure 5.8, where E π  is a
Gaussian (recall that piecewise linear functions are used).
5.4.3 Consumer model 1: independent visits with several
purchases
This consumer model assumes that expected purchases at each supplier can be
modelled by the same function as in the single banner case (see Subsection 5.3.2).
The results are shown in ﬁgure 5.9. Matching accuracy is measured in several
ways. We display the proportion of properly selected n suppliers for 3 banners and
n = 3,2,1 (see Subsection 5.3.5). The reason for including n = 2,1 as well is
that the evolutionary system has some degree of stochasticity, and thus small errors
occurring frequently can have larger inﬂuence on individual outcomes (although
relatively little impact on the payoﬀ obtained). Results using these two measures
show an almost perfect match. The results after 500 generations of the EA are
summarised in table 5.3.
5.4.4 Consumer model 2: one expected purchase
It is more diﬃcult to get a stable system in this situation, since the expected amount
purchased at a supplier (and therefore the valuation of a banner space) depends on
which other stores are selected as well. Nevertheless, the simulation does stabilise,
and the results are comparable to the previous consumer model. See table 5.3.5.4 Results 99
Figure 5.8: Example of a bidding strategy as employed by the supplier after co-
evolution no longer increased the proﬁts obtained. Results are shown for a single
supplier competing against random supplier. Also shown is the dominant bidding
strategy.
Consumer model E π  n = 3 n = 2 n = 1
Regular auction settings
1 set1 0.95 ± 0.01 0.99 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00
set2 0.96 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00
set3 0.92 ± 0.01 0.98 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00
2 set1 0.94 ± 0.01 0.99 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00
set2 0.95 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00
set3 0.90 ± 0.01 0.97 ± 0.01 0.99 ± 0.00
3 set1 0.73 ± 0.03 0.76 ± 0.07 0.79 ± 0.09
set2 0.83 ± 0.05 0.89 ± 0.06 0.92 ± 0.05
set3 0.75 ± 0.02 0.89 ± 0.02 0.97 ± 0.01
Next-price auction
3 set1 0.79 ± 0.03 0.92 ± 0.03 0.97 ± 0.02
set2 0.75 ± 0.03 0.92 ± 0.02 0.98 ± 0.01
set3 0.83 ± 0.02 0.95 ± 0.02 0.99 ± 0.00
Table 5.3: Matching results for consumer models 1 through 3. Results denote pro-
portions of properly selected n suppliers for 3 banners and n = 3,2,1. Averages
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Figure 5.9: Matching results for consumers with independent purchases and E π 
is set to “set2”.
5.4.5 Consumer model 3: search-till-found
In this model, it is not only important for the stores to be in the list, but also to take
into account the position on the list (and the other stores above him). Table 5.3
shows that it is indeed more diﬃcult for the stores to ﬁnd a good matching, in
particular when using “set1”. This occurs since all relevant suppliers prefer the very
top advertisement space and are willing to bid above their valuation (because of the
N + 1-price auction their payment remains relatively low). As a result, the bids
reach their limit value (even when this is set to 2.5).
Therefore, we have applied another auction payment procedure as well: each
of the winning stores pays the price oﬀered by the next following highest bidder,
the so-called next-price auction. This procedure appears to improve the matching,
giving comparable results to other consumer models (see table 5.3). Note that a
store who obtains the ﬁrst banner position now pays more than the other stores.
This is also reasonable, since the ﬁrst position is actually more valuable.
We want to remark that we have chosen the maximal purchase probability to 1
(see Subsection 5.3.2) to have maximum diﬀerence between this consumer model and
the previous ones. When this value is lower, results will become more comparable
to the other models also for the regular auction setting.
5.4.6 Two-dimensional proﬁle
We now consider the two-dimensional case, where each consumer proﬁle corresponds
to a position within a square. The types of proﬁt functions are similar to the previous5.4 Results 101
Consumer model E π  n = 3 n = 2 n = 1
1 set1 0.95 ± 0.01 0.99 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00
set2 0.90 ± 0.02 0.97 ± 0.01 0.99 ± 0.01
set3 0.93 ± 0.01 0.98 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00
2 set1 0.94 ± 0.01 0.98 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00
set2 0.92 ± 0.01 0.98 ± 0.00 1.00 ± 0.00
set3 0.93 ± 0.01 0.98 ± 0.00 0.99 ± 0.00
3 set1 0.85 ± 0.01 0.93 ± 0.01 0.97 ± 0.01
set2 0.75 ± 0.02 0.89 ± 0.02 0.97 ± 0.01
set3 0.82 ± 0.02 0.91 ± 0.02 0.94 ± 0.02
Table 5.4: Matching results for consumers with two-dimensional proﬁles. See also
table 5.3 for comparison.
Figure 5.10: Expected gross monopolistic proﬁts E π  for “set2” function settings
and a 2-dimensional consumer proﬁle.
case, extended for two dimensions. An example is shown in ﬁgure 5.10.
The matching results are comparable, but slightly less accurate than for one
dimension, see table 5.4. These can be explained through the more diﬃcult learning
problem (more deﬁning points are needed for the search function), and thus the
settings of the evolutionary algorithms could be further optimised for more accurate
learning results in this case.
Specialisation
Interestingly, the suppliers indeed ﬁnd a niche in the market in case of competition.
This becomes clear in ﬁgure 5.11, which shows the intersection of a supplier’s bidding
strategy for two diﬀerent consumer models, viz. 1 and 2. For consumer model 1,102 Competitive market-based allocation of consumer attention space
Figure 5.11: Contours of the average evolved strategy at level 0.5 of a supplier 1 at
generation 500 for consumer models 1 (left) and 2 (right) using “set2”. The points
indicate the centres of attraction of the suppliers’ Gaussian curves.
a supplier’s payoﬀ is independent of the other suppliers displayed. In the second
consumer model, however, the payoﬀ is shared amongst the displayed suppliers. In
the latter model the payoﬀ thus depends on the competition. We ﬁnd that this gives
supplier an incentive to locate niches in the market, and bid more in places where
less competition is present. In ﬁgure 5.11, the depicted supplier clearly expands
its market to the upper right, and reduces its bids in the lower left region, where
competition is relatively greater.
Supplier payoﬀ
The above results mainly focus on the proportion of proper selection. We now
brieﬂy discuss the supplier payoﬀs, i.e. the net proﬁts (see Section 5.3.3). Firstly,
we ﬁnd that in all experiments suppliers obtain positive accumulative payoﬀ in
the long run. The strategies emerged are thus individually rational (see Def. 4.2).
Secondly, a supplier’s payoﬀ depends both on its function settings E π  and on
the amount of competition. The latter is shown in ﬁgure 5.12, which displays the
accumulated payoﬀ of the suppliers for consumer model 2 and “set2”. The more
isolated suppliers, in particular suppliers 4, 6, and 7, obtain a larger payoﬀ than
those with much competition (see also ﬁgure 5.11). This is due to the diﬀerence in
advertisement costs. Note that this is in accordance with economics theory: in case
of large competition, the net proﬁt of competing suppliers is close to zero.
5.4.7 Conclusions
The experiments show that a proper selection of suppliers emerges with very good
to perfect matches. In case consumer model 3 is applicable, a next-price auction
mechanism further improves the results. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that all experiments
show positive supplier payoﬀs. Finally, we observe that shops ﬁnd their customers5.5 Evaluation and further research 103
Figure 5.12: The average accumulated payoﬀ for each supplier using “set2” and
consumer model 2.
and their niche in the market via CASy.
5.5 Evaluation and further research
5.5.1 Reﬂections
We can identify a number of commercial and technological advantages of CASy. In
CASy, proper matching does not have to be performed or enabled by a third party.
This signiﬁcantly reduces the combinatorial complexity as compared to centrally
processing all product ontologies and information about consumers and shops. Fur-
thermore, shops have substantial autonomy and can thus incorporate local domain
knowledge and momentary business considerations in their bidding strategies and
thus in the ultimate matching process. Especially, they do not have to reveal sen-
sitive business information to a third party, and can take more sales aspects into
account: not only product pricing, but also service level, quality, product diver-
sity, or customisation of products. The system also enables them to quickly adapt
to market dynamics or their own internal situation (out-of-stock, discount periods,
promotion). Note that the relevance of the shop for the consumer is still expressed
via the monetary bidding procedure. The mechanism is also a form of dynamic
pricing of attention space.
There is much debate about whether or not advances in Information Technology
(IT) will increasingly make intermediaries within markets redundant (disintermedia-
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of new value-added services that become possible (reintermediation) [21]). The re-
sults in this chapter can be taken either way: on the one hand, we can conceive the
basic auction functionality performed by the MMA to be part of the customer agent,
replacing the matching function previously performed by central ﬁltering mecha-
nisms. Alternatively, we noted that there are many possible value-added services
regarding user-proﬁle enhancement that could be performed by a central shopping
mall intermediary. This conclusion is in line with recent arguments regarding the
eﬀects of current agent technology on the disintermediation/reintermedation debate
[86].
The proceeds the electronic shopping mall can derive from the matching mech-
anism (through the auctions) can be used to facilitate additional intermediation
services to both customers and shops (e.g. micro payments, 24x7 intermediation).
Oﬀering an eﬀective matching mechanism adds considerable value to the customer
experience, and can thus be expected to be an important selling point for the elec-
tronic shopping mall, and entice suppliers to participate in the mechanism. It will
be interesting to investigate the exact economic conditions – such as at which price
the suppliers are no longer prepared to follow the customers – for this to be relevant,
but we leave that for future research here.
Some points need attention when further implementing CASy. In CASy, infor-
mation about a consumer is (partially) communicated to suppliers. At the same
time however, the consumer’s privacy requirements must be respected. We will not
extensively address this here, but just mention some approaches: having the con-
sumer decide what information he allows to be communicated, restricting the types
of communicated information in general, or conversion of personal information to
more sales-related properties. The latter could include restricting the proﬁle to at-
tributes of the desired product (instead of the customer), like “expensive vs. cheap”,
“ultra trendy vs. conservative” etc.... Such attributes could in principle even be
queried from the customer. As argued in [63], no uniform solution for privacy de-
mands exist, rather “privacy will have to be dynamically tailored to each individual
user’s needs” and requirements.
There remains the issue whether a central entity like the shopping mall would
be willing to convey individual user related proﬁle information. Google for instance
currently considers its click stream information a business secret. In the setup
we introduced here, however, the proceeds that the intermediary obtains from the
ongoing auctions, and possibly for additional advanced IT services, will be a strong
incentive for the intermediary to consider what parts of the proﬁle information are
allowed to be disseminated by its clients (here, the suppliers). Note that when the
intermediary charges a (ﬁxed) price for customer proﬁle information services, such
information would constitute a sunk cost for each seller, and reduce the available
funds for placing advertisements, resulting in lower bids. Since such cost will reduce
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market-based selection mechanism itself is not aﬀected by such additional cost.
We remark that once individual shops receive customer (related) proﬁles, they
have the tools developed in information intensive personalised marketing research at
their disposal for determining how interested they are in each individual customer:
i.e. interactive marketing, database marketing, micromarketing and one-to-one mar-
keting [15,49,76,77,95]; in [118] these slightly diﬀerent approaches are considered
in more detail. The information ﬁltering mechanism we describe here is then the
gate controlling the ﬂood of ﬁnely targeted business interests.
Another point concerns the communication between suppliers and shopping mall,
which is increased because of the bidding process and the communication of con-
sumer proﬁles to the suppliers. However, the communication in the mall is linear
in the number of customers, and also in the number of participating shops, and the
size of the consumer proﬁle. The latter is also typically very small, e.g. up to 100
bytes. In a prototype implementation on a single PC, a single market comprising of
100 learning shop-agents was easily able to sustain 100 customers per second, and
still continuously update the internal state of the agents (the learning mechanism)
[122].
To scale to even larger settings, the market can be divided into a number of
segments, with each market handled by diﬀerent agents. The proﬁle then only
needs to be transmitted to agents within a particular market segments, reducing the
overall communication. We pursued this approach in a distributed prototype of the
electronic shopping mall ([122]). In the extended agent architecture of the prototype
diﬀerent market segments are handled by sub agents (which can run on diﬀerent
machines). In all, we do not perceive the somewhat increased communication as
a signiﬁcant problem, but rather as an issue that can easily be addressed in the
process of framework-engineering if necessary.
5.5.2 Open problems and future research
We investigated the concept of CASy for several basic models. The results we de-
scribe here show that the market-based approach yields excellent buyer-seller match-
ing given adaptation of the bids made by the sellers. The ACE simulations have
been carried out to demonstrate feasibility and learnability of the concept, as these
simulations showed eﬀective matching for diﬀerent auction types and consumer be-
haviour models. It is also interesting to investigate how software agents can be
developed for more advanced settings: one such example would be the extension
of the simulations to a dynamical market, with sellers changing their proﬁles, or
sellers entering and leaving the market. For ACE feasibility and learnability stud-
ies, methods that can deal with such dynamic environments are only just starting
to emerge. As we demonstrated that the steady state version of the problem per-
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problem would also be learnable, but the eﬀectiveness is then rather dependent on
the speed and quality of the machine learning techniques employed by the shop
agents as well as the actually chosen models for the dynamic environment. E.g.,
for methods such as neural networks (see [17]), the introduction of dynamics into
the market will mean that additional complexity in terms of eﬀective (commercial)
exploration/exploitation strategies has to be introduced. At this point we leave the
investigation of dynamisation of the system as an interesting problem for future
research.
Other points that need to be addressed in future work should be concerned
with taking account of the role of (local) ontologies, of marketing and data-mining
techniques, and of partial consumer information. Furthermore, in this work, we
placed an emphasis on the N+1-price auction with single sealed bids. Other types of
auctions could be further investigated, for example addressing the possible feedback
given on bids of other participants (e.g. multi-round auctions) or to address the
revenue of the mall manager.
From the consumer’s point of view, we have interpreted the expenditures of a
consumer at a shop as a measure for his interest in the shop. CASy gives priority to
suppliers with the largest expected payoﬀs for a given consumer. This thus leads to
optimisation of the revenue of the collection of shops in the shopping mall as a whole.
In the case that within a certain business sector, the ratio between expenditures and
payoﬀ is similar for the suppliers in the sector, this means that CASy completely
reacts on the interest of an individual consumer. However, across diﬀerent sectors,
there may be diﬀerences or anomalies, leaving the extension of CASy with additional
(monetary) correction mechanisms to avoid such anomalies as an interesting open
problem. This is part of our future work.
Finally, our system CASy is complementary to existing recommendation systems.
It is important to know in what way these together could be used as part of a broader
system. Also, which application areas are more suited for the existing recommender
systems, and which for the CASy system.
5.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we present a competitive distributed system, CASy, for allocating
consumer attention space (Section 5.2). By evolutionary simulation as in agent-
based computational economics (ACE), we show the conceptual feasibility of the
system (Sections 5.3 and 5.4). We modelled the various parts in the system in a
basic and simple way suitable for analysis, visualisation, and comparison, and show
that proper matchings emerged while suppliers can learn their niche in the market.
Finally, we reﬂect on the advantages, opportunities, and further open problems
concerning the proposed system (Section 5.5).Chapter 6
Automated bargaining and
bundling of information goods
Personalisation of information goods becomes more and more a key component of a
successful electronic business strategy [2]. The challenge is to develop systems that
can deliver a high level of personalisation combined with, whenever possible, a high
adaptability to changing circumstances. In this chapter,1 we introduce a system
which can attain these properties through the manner in which it sells information
goods.
We consider a novel approach in this chapter, where bundles of information
goods, such as news articles, stock quotes, music, and video clips are sold through
automated negotiation. Bundling of information goods has many potential beneﬁts
including complementarities among the bundle components, and sorting consumers
according to their valuation (see [9] and the references therein). The advantage of the
developed system is that it allows for a high degree of ﬂexibility in the price, quality,
and content of the oﬀered bundles. The price, quality, and content of the delivered
goods may, for example, diﬀer based on daily dynamics and personal interest of
buyers of information goods.
The system as developed is also capable of taking into account business related
constraints. More speciﬁcally, it tries to ensure that customers perceive the bar-
gaining outcomes as being “fair” by having customers end up with equivalent oﬀers
whenever that seems fair. This is important for customer satisfaction and acceptance
of the system by customers. Partly because of this fairness constraint the actual
bargaining process is not really one-to-one bargaining between seller and customer
but instead is one-to-many (i.e., between seller and customers).
In the developed system, autonomous “software agents” perform (part of) the
1This chapter is based on [120]: K. Somefun, E.H. Gerding, S. Bohte, and J.A. La Poutr´ e. Au-
tomated negotiation and bundling of information goods. In Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce
V, Springer Lecture Notes in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (LNAI). Springer-Verlag, Berlin, to appear.
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negotiation on behalf of the users of the system. A seller (or information provider)
agent negotiates with several buyer (or customer) agents simultaneously in a bilateral
fashion, using an alternating oﬀers protocol like in Chapter 3. The agents are capable
of negotiating about several issues simultaneously, such as the price and the quality
of the oﬀered goods. Chapter 3 showed that, using such a bilateral negotiation
protocol, eﬃcient outcomes can be achieved after a process of learning from several
negotiations. In this chapter, we introduce strategies that are capable of ﬁnding
eﬃcient solutions within a single negotiation (i.e., real-time).
To enable eﬃcient and real-time multi-issue bargaining outcomes, we decompose
the bargaining strategies into concession strategies and Pareto-search strategies.
The concession strategy determines the desired utility level during the bargaining
process, whereas the Pareto search strategy looks for Pareto-eﬃcient (see Def. 4.3)
outcomes that maximise win-win opportunities for a given a desired utility level.
Together these strategies produce oﬀers and counter oﬀers for the agents. An im-
portant contribution of this chapter lies in the actual development of Pareto search
methods that result in eﬃcient solutions while, at the same time, bargainers make
concessions using a variety of concession strategies. To that end, we introduce
the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF method: two Pareto search methods. We show
through computer experiments that the respective use of these two Pareto search
methods by the two bargainers, combined with various concession strategies, re-
sults in very eﬃcient bargaining outcomes (i.e., these outcomes closely approximate
Pareto-eﬃcient bargaining solutions). We obtain these results without assuming any
a priori knowledge of other player, nor experience from previous bargaining games.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, we introduce a
system for selling bundles of news articles through bargaining in Section 6.1. Section
6.2 discusses the buyer and seller agent in more detail and presents bargaining
strategies for multi-issue negotiations. In Section 6.3 we investigate the Pareto-
eﬃciency of the introduced bargaining approach through computer experiments. As
we only consider the Pareto-eﬃciency of the deals reached in this chapter, we do not
simulate the entire system as developed, but rather restrict attention to bargaining
with a single buyer. Experiments using one-to-many bargaining are investigated in
the next chapter. Related approaches such as auctions are discussed in Section 6.4.
In Section 6.5 we revisit our approach and conclusions follow in Section 6.6.
6.1 A system for selling information goods
The goal is to develop a system for the sales of bundles of news items where buyers
bargain over the pricing, quality, and content of the bundles. The negotiated con-
tract applies to a ﬁxed time interval, which is typically a short period of time, e.g.
a single day. The bundle content deﬁnes which news categories the bundle contains.
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low and high quality-of-service categories. If a category with low quality of service
is selected, a buyer receives only the news headlines for this category. A buyer can,
however, after reading the headline, decide to purchase the entire article. In that
case, a variable price is paid. Alternatively, the buyer can opt for a high quality of
service category, in which case the buyer obtains all the articles without additional
(variable) costs. In the following, we simply use quality to refer to the quality of
service.
The buyer negotiates about the variable price, the content, and the quality of
the categories in the bundle. At the same time, a buyer negotiates a ﬁxed price
which is an upfront payment for the bundle as selected. Clearly, a high quality
category is likely to result in a higher ﬁxed price than a low quality category. Both
buyer and seller have private preferences regarding such trade-oﬀs between issues.
Diﬀerences in preferences allows for the possibility of win-win outcomes (see also
Chapter 3). The agents in the system can ﬁnd these win-win outcomes using Pareto-
search strategies, without having to fully disclose their preferences.
The value customers attach to news items may ﬂuctuate heavily due to daily dy-
namics. Moreover, there may be wide diﬀerences in personal interests of customers.
The advantage of the developed system is that it allows for a high degree of ﬂexibil-
ity in the price, quality, and content of the oﬀered bundles. The price, quality and
content of the delivered goods may, for example, diﬀer based on daily dynamics and
personal interest of customers.
The system as developed is also capable of taking into account business related
constraints. More speciﬁcally, it tries to ensure that buyers perceive the bargaining
outcomes as being “fair” by having buyers end up with equivalent deals whenever
that seems fair. Due to the notion of fairness, negotiations are no longer independent
and bilateral, but are in fact one-to-many from the perspective of the seller. Fairness
and the way in which it aﬀects the seller’s bargaining strategy is discussed in more
detail in Section 6.1.2. We ﬁrst continue, however, by describing the bargaining
aspect of the system in Section 6.1.1. The bargaining protocol used is explained in
Section 6.1.3.
6.1.1 Bargaining using software agents
Within the system, autonomous software agents (see Section 1.1.3) perform (part
of) the negotiation on behalf of the seller and the buyers. A buyer agent is a software
agent owned by the buyer, and a seller agent is owned by the seller. Buyers and
seller instruct their agent through a user interface (UI). Figure 6.1 depicts, at a
high abstraction level, the bargaining process between a buyer and the seller. There
are roughly three possibilities for implementing the starting time of the negotiation
process: buyers can negotiate a contract before, after, or during the time that the
news becomes available. The system is set up in such a way that all three possibilities110 Automated bargaining and bundling of information goods
Figure 6.1: The bilateral bargaining process between a seller and a buyer using
software agents.
can be implemented.
Given a desired bundle content, a buyer agent can negotiate with the seller
agent about the ﬁxed price, variable price, and the quality for each category. The
negotiated contracts apply to bundles of news items which become available during
a predeﬁned and ﬁxed time interval (e.g., a day). The value buyers attach to news
items may ﬂuctuate heavily due to daily dynamics. Moreover, there may be wide
diﬀerences in personal interests of buyers. The advantage of the developed system
is that it allows for a high degree of ﬂexibility. The price, quality, and content of
the delivered goods may, for example, diﬀer based on daily dynamics and personal
interest of buyers.
6.1.2 Fairness and one-to-many bargaining
Potentially, bargaining can lead to unsatisﬁed buyers if buyers perceive the outcomes
of the negotiations as unfair. This can occur when, for instance, two buyers obtain
similar goods at the same time but end up paying very diﬀerent amounts. Fairness
of negotiation outcomes is important for customer satisfaction, which in turn may
be important for a business’ long term proﬁtability. The seller agent can prevent
unfair outcomes by incorporating a notion of fairness, whereby buyers are treated
in a similar fashion. This notion of fairness also implies that any information that
is revealed about buyers during negotiation or by using the system in general, is not
used to their disadvantage in relation to other buyers. This is also essential in order
for buyers to accept the system and delegate responsibilities to software agents.
In the system, the following notion of fairness is incorporated into the bargaining
strategy of the seller agent: within a limited time frame, the seller agent maintains
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content. To deﬁne fairness more formally, suppose a buyer reaches a deal at time td.
We say that this deal is fair, relative to a ﬁxed interval ∆ > 0, whenever there exist
a start time ts, with td ∈ [ts,ts +∆], such that the seller2 is indiﬀerent between any
other deal reached within the interval [ts,ts + ∆].
Whenever price is the only negotiable issue, the notion of fairness simply implies
that all buyers interested in the identical bundle content end up paying the same
price for this bundle, given that the deals are reached within a given time frame.
This notion of fairness corresponds to the notion of envy-freeness in auctions [44],
adapted to the more continuous setting of bilateral bargaining. In our case, however,
negotiations concern several issues, in which case the expected utility level is used
rather than the price. Note that the values for the various issues, such as ﬁxed
and variable price, can still vary for diﬀerent buyers, since buyers can have diverse
interests. This is an essential aspect of personalisation which needs to be preserved.
Fairness, however, ensures that the seller’s expected utility for these diﬀerent deals
is identical.
Because of the fairness imposed on the seller strategy, the bargaining process
between the seller and an individual buyer can also aﬀect other negotiations which
occur concurrently. Fairness limits the bargaining options of the seller. Therefore,
bargaining between a seller and a buyer is not really bilateral, but is in fact one-
to-many. Note that this holds only from the perspective of the seller. The buyers
can normally not observe the negotiation processes with other buyers, and therefore
perceive the negotiations to be bilateral.
We note that besides fairness, also other business side-constraints may be imple-
mented. The actual way in which side-constraints, such as fairness, are implemented
may be important because it can alter the strategic behaviour of buyers as well as
the seller.
6.1.3 Bargaining protocol
The seller agent negotiates with many buyer agents simultaneously by alternating
oﬀers and counter oﬀers. An oﬀer speciﬁes the ﬁxed price, the variable price (uniform
for all low quality categories), the bundle content, and the desired quality for each
category separately. Formally, an oﬀer is described by the tuple < pf,pv,  b,  q >,
where pf is the ﬁxed price, pv is the variable price. Furthermore,   b ∈ {0,1}k is a
binary array describing the bundle content, where bi = 1 if category 1 ≤ i ≤ k is
selected, and bi = 0 otherwise, and   q ∈ {0,1}k describes the quality settings for each
category, where qi = 0 if a selected category is of low quality, and qi = 1 if category
i if of high quality.
2Note that since the preferences of the buyers are hidden, fairness is deﬁned from the perspective
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Attached to an oﬀer are also preconditions which specify until when the oﬀer
is valid. If the oﬀer is accepted within that time, the proposing agent is bound to
the conditions speciﬁed in the oﬀer. Otherwise, the oﬀer expires. We call the oﬀer
combined with the preconditions a proposal. A bargainer can accept, reject, or place
a counter proposal. The bargaining process continues until an agreement is reached
or one of the bargainers terminates the process. Figure 6.2 depicts the alternating
oﬀer bargaining protocol.
Figure 6.2: The bilateral bargaining protocol.
To accelerate the negotiation process, we allow concurrent negotiation threads
for the same bundle content with diﬀerent quality settings. The buyer can therefore
submit several oﬀers at the same time. In order to discern between threads, each
thread must have a diﬀerent combination of quality settings for the selected cate-
gories. The seller can only respond by varying the ﬁxed and variable price. The
thread in which the agreement is reached ﬁrst determines the prices and quality
settings for the desired categories. Figure 6.3 depicts the one-to-many bargaining
process and the possibility of parallel negotiation threads between a buyer and the
seller.
Using the above protocol, oﬀers submitted by the buyers could violate the notion
of fairness if these oﬀers are immediately accepted by the seller. To provide a seller
with the opportunity to ensure fairness (as deﬁned in Section 6.1.2), the bargaining
protocol allows for post-agreement negotiation: the bargainer who accepted the
oﬀer can propose a post-agreement oﬀer which the other party either accepts or
rejects.3 In case of an acceptance, the original oﬀer is replaced by the post-agreement
oﬀer. The process terminates after the post-agreement oﬀer is proposed and is then
either accepted or rejected. Post-agreement negotiation can be used by the seller
to adjust the oﬀers in favour of the buyers, such that fairness is ensured within the
3Post-agreement negotiation is a common approach in the single negotiation text literature [32].6.2 Agents and bargaining strategies 113
Figure 6.3: One-to-many bargaining with parallel threads.
deﬁned time interval. Note that, in case of multiple issues, the seller can produce
a more favourable oﬀer by conceding on one or more issues. Although the buyer’s
preferences are private and unknown to the seller, this approach assumes that a
buyer always prefers a lower (ﬁxed or variable) price or a better quality.
6.2 Agents and bargaining strategies
In this Section we discuss the seller agent and buyer agent in greater detail. Addi-
tionally, we introduce bargaining strategies that generate good (i.e., closely approx-
imate Pareto-eﬃcient) multi-issue bargaining outcomes.
6.2.1 Seller agent
The seller agent’s bargaining behaviour is based on the agent’s so-called aspiration
level, which we deﬁne as follows:
Deﬁnition 113.1 Aspiration Level An aspiration level of an agent refers to an
agent’s desired expected utility level.
Unlike common usage in the literature (where aspiration level is used as a point
of reference), the aspiration level is used here as the minimum expected utility the
agent is willing to accept at a certain point in time. If the expected utility of an oﬀer
received by the buyer exceeds the aspiration level, the oﬀer is accepted, otherwise the
oﬀer is rejected. Whenever the seller agent makes a (counter) proposal, the oﬀer’s
expected utility is set in a way as to match the aspiration level. The aspiration
level can change during the process of negotiation. The aspiration is adjusted using114 Automated bargaining and bundling of information goods
the concession strategy, whereas the generation of an oﬀer (given a ﬁxed aspiration
levels) is achieved by the Pareto-search strategy. These strategies are considered
more closely in Section 6.2.3. In this Section, we specify the seller agent’s measure
of expected utility. The seller’s expected utility us for an oﬀer < pf,pv,  b,  q > is
deﬁned as follows:
us(< pf,pv,  b,  q >) = pf + pv
k  
i=1
e
i
sb
i(1 − q
i), (6.1)
where the components ei
s of vector   es denote the seller agent’s expectation about
the number of articles an average buyer will read for the duration of the contract,
speciﬁed for each category 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Note that bi(1 − qi) equals 1 if category i is
selected and is of low quality, and 0 otherwise. Therefore,
 k
i=1 ei
sbi(1−qi) indicates
the expected total number of articles an average buyer will read in the selected low-
quality categories (and for which the buyer pays an additional pv per article). The
seller agent can estimate   es based on, for example, aggregate sales data.
Due to the notion of fairness, the seller agent cannot apply diﬀerent aspiration
levels for diﬀerent buyers in case of identical bundles (within the deﬁned time inter-
val). Consequently, the seller agent must use the same measure of expected utility
in diﬀerent (simultaneous) negotiations. A seller agent is therefore not allowed to
use knowledge of individual buyers, such as their past reading behaviour, to directly
discriminate between buyer agents in the negotiations. In other words, the seller
agent must use the same values for   es in negotiations with diﬀerent buyers (within
the deﬁned time interval). We note, however, that the components ei
s of   es need
not be constants, but can be functions as well. In the experiments described in Sec-
tion 6.3, for example, the expected number of articles read is a declining function
of the variable price pv. This incorporates the likely assumption that buyers who
prefer a high variable price, will purchase less additional articles on average than
buyers with a low variable price. This can be used to indirectly discriminate between
buyers, without violating the notion of fairness. We defer further discussion on the
topic of price discrimination until Section 6.5.
6.2.2 Buyer agent
The buyer agent acts on behalf of the buyer. The buyer can indicate her preferences
by specifying, for each information category she is interested in, the amount of
articles she expects to read. The buyer can furthermore select between several
negotiation strategies to be used by the agent and specify a maximum budget bmax
for the given bundle content and number of articles. The budget provides the agent
with a mandate for the negotiation; the total expected costs for the selected bundle
should not exceed bmax. The value bmax can also be interpreted as the buyer’s worth
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Similar to the seller agent, the buyer agent’s bargaining behaviour is based on a
desired level of expected utility or aspiration level. Given an oﬀer < pf,pv,  b,  q >,
the buyer agent’s expected utility ub in case of an agreement is deﬁned as follows:
ub(< pf,pv,  b,  q >) = bmax − [pf + pv
k  
i=1
e
i
bb
i(1 − q
i)], (6.2)
where the components ei
b of the vector   eb describe the buyer’s expectations regarding
the number of articles she will read, speciﬁed for each category. In case of a dis-
agreement, the buyer agent’s utility equals zero. Note that the part of Equation 6.2
in squared brackets is identical to seller’s expected utility (see Equation 6.1), except
that ei
s is replaced by ei
b.
As mentioned Section 6.1.3, the negotiation protocol allows for multiple negotia-
tion threads for the same bundle content. Given a bundle content with k categories,
in principle 2k threads are possible (by varying the selected quality of each category).
The buyer agent, however, selects only a limited number of combinations based on
the buyer’s preferences, to reduce the amount of communication. In the current
system the buyer agent initiates k +1 threads. In the ﬁrst thread the quality for all
categories is set to low. In the second thread, only the quality for the category with
the highest expected articles read is set to high. In the third thread, this is done for
the two categories with the ﬁrst and second highest expected articles read, and so
on. Within a thread, a ﬁxed price and a variable price are negotiated.
6.2.3 Decomposing the bargaining strategy
The buyer agents and seller agent are endowed with various bargaining strategies
that can bargain over multiple issues. We decompose bargaining strategies into
concession strategies and Pareto search strategies. Concession strategies determine
what the aspiration level of an oﬀer will be at any decision point. Pareto search
strategies determine, given the current aspiration level, and given a particular history
of oﬀers and counter oﬀers, the actual (multi-dimensional) oﬀer, i.e., the ﬁxed price
pf and the variable price pv. Note that the quality settings are ﬁxed for a particular
negotiation thread. As a result, the Pareto-search strategy in this case is only
concerned with continuous issues. In terms of a multi-dimensional utility function,
a (counter) oﬀer entails both a movement of the so-called iso-utility curve and a
movement along the iso-utility curve. Given a speciﬁed utility level, an iso-utility
curve connects all (pf,pv) points which generate that utility (see Figure 6.4 for an
example). Concession strategies determine the movement of an iso-utility curve;
Pareto search strategies determine the movement along an iso-utility curve.
Pareto search strategies aim at reaching agreement as soon as the respective
concession strategy allows it. Therefore, it may be good for both parties to use such
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From a system design perspective, Pareto eﬃciency of the negotiated bundle is
desirable since it maximises win-win opportunities.
In Section 6.2.4 we introduce a particular class of Pareto search strategies. The
experiments in Section 6.3 show that if the seller agent uses this Pareto search algo-
rithm and buyer agents use a similar Pareto search algorithm, then the bargaining
outcome will closely approximate a Pareto-eﬃcient solution given a wide variety of
concession strategies.
In the system the seller agent uses an instance of the Pareto search algorithms
combined with a concession strategy. Although a buyer is free to select other bar-
gaining strategies, the system is set up such that it is actually in the best interest of
buyers to have their agents use Pareto search strategies combined with a concession
strategy. We elaborate on this issue in the discussion in Section 6.5.
6.2.4 Orthogonal strategy and DF
Both buyer agent and seller agent may use what we call an orthogonal strategy as
the Pareto-search strategy. This strategy is probably best explained through an
example. Suppose, the buyer (with whom the seller bargains over the combination
of pf and pv) places the tth oﬀer < pf(t),pv(t) > (since the remaining attributes   b
and   q remain ﬁxed, we omit these attributes in the following). Moreover, the seller’s
concession strategy dictates an aspiration level of u′
s(t + 1): i.e., the (counter) oﬀer
should have an expected utility of u′
s(t + 1). Based on this information, the seller’s
orthogonal strategy determines a counter oﬀer < pf(t + 1),pv(t + 1) >, such that
us(< pf(t+1),pv(t+1) >) = u′
s(t+1) and the point (pf(t+1),pv(t+1)) lies closest,
measured in Euclidean distance, to the point (pf(t),pv(t)). Figure 6.4 provides a
graphical example of the orthogonal strategy. In this Figure, function fs denotes
the seller’s iso-utility curve at time t + 1, containing all points (pf,pv) such that
us(< pf,pv >) = u′
s(t + 1).
The use of the orthogonal strategy by both parties results in a mapping f from
a bargainer’s aspiration level at t to the aspiration level at t + 2. Given convex
preferences (cf. [72]) and ﬁxed aspiration levels the mapping f can be shown to
satisfy the Lipschitz condition ||f(x)−f(y)|| ≤ ||x−y|| for all x and y in the domain
of f.4 Thus, given ﬁxed aspiration levels and convex preferences, the orthogonal
strategy does imply that consecutive oﬀers do not diverge. Figure 6.5 illustrates
the use of the orthogonal strategy by both parties for the case of tangent iso-utility
curves. It draws a sequence of two oﬀers and counter oﬀers with convex preferences
and a ﬁxed aspiration level. The ﬁgure illustrates, for instance, how the buyer’s
oﬀer at time t = 1 is transformed into an oﬀer at time t = 3 (where the aspiration
4The proof is a straightforward application of convex analysis (cf. [140]) given that without loss
of generality we can assume that the preferences are bounded. That is, negative and extremely
high < pf(t),pv(t) > combinations can be discarded, without loss of generality.6.2 Agents and bargaining strategies 117
Figure 6.4: Example of the orthogonal strategy, where fs denotes the seller agent’s
iso-utility curve.
Figure 6.5: Sequence of two oﬀers and counter oﬀers with ﬁxed aspiration levels and
convex preferences, where < p∗
f,p∗
v > denotes a Pareto-eﬃcient oﬀer. Here, fs and
fb denote the iso-utility of the seller and buyer agent respectively.
level remains constant, i.e., u′
b(1) = u′
b(3)).
The use of just the orthogonal strategy by both parties may lead to very slow
convergence to Pareto-eﬃcient bargaining outcomes. To speed up the convergence
process we can add an amplifying mechanism to the orthogonal strategy. As the
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Henceforth, we will call this strategy the orthogonal-DF.
The derivative follower (DF) is a local search algorithm (cf. [61]). It adjust the
variable price pv returned by the orthogonal strategy by either subtracting or adding
δ to it depending on the result of the previous two adjustments, where δ is called
the step-size of the DF. Consequently, also the ﬁxed price pf changes because the
adjusted oﬀer still needs to generate the same expected utility level (speciﬁed by the
concession strategy). The diﬀerence between ADF and DF is that the step-size δ
becomes adaptive [26,129]. We use the ADF proposed by [129]. Intuitively, the idea
is to increment the step-size relatively far away from a Pareto-eﬃcient solution and
decrement it in the vicinity of a Pareto-eﬃcient solution. Consequently, a quicker
and more accurate search of the solution space becomes possible. Algorithm 1 (on
page 119) speciﬁes the orthogonal-DF in greater detail and ﬁgure 6.6 illustrates the
use of the orthogonal-DF by the seller (where the buyer uses the orthogonal strategy
only).
Figure 6.6: Sequence of two oﬀers and counter oﬀers with ﬁxed aspiration levels
where the seller uses the orthogonal-DF and the buyer only uses the orthogonal
strategy.
6.3 Experimental setup and results
The previous sections outlined the general system for selling bundles of news items
to several buyers through negotiation. As discussed in Section 6.2.3, negotiation
essentially consists of two strategic aspects: the concession of the agents and the
Pareto search method. In this section we focus on the latter aspect of the nego-
tiations. By means of computer experiments we investigate the eﬀectiveness and6.3 Experimental setup and results 119
Algorithm 1 The orthogonal-DF strategy
The following is given: (a) the opponent’s last and before-last oﬀer: O1 =<
pf(t),pv(t) > and O2 =< pf(t − 2),pv(t − 2) > respectively, (b) an agent’s utility
function u(< pf,pv >) and aspiration level u′(t+1) at time t+1, (c) the step-size δ,
and (d) the search direction sdr ∈ {−1,+1}. Based on this information the agent’s
orthogonal-DF computes the next counter oﬀer O =< pf(t + 1),pv(t + 1) > by
executing the following procedure:
1. Use the orthogonal strategy to compute O′
1 =< p′
f(t),p′
v(t) > and O′
2 =<
p′
f(t − 2),p′
v(t − 2) >, i.e., the points on the iso-utility curve with expected
utility u′(t + 1) that lie closest to O1 and O2, respectively.
2. Compute d1 and d2, the distance of the opponent’s last two oﬀers, i.e., d1 =
||O1 − O′
1|| and d2 = ||O2 − O′
2||, where ||   || denotes Euclidian distance.
3. Update sdr: whenever d1 > d2 the orthogonal-DF “turns”, i.e., sdr = −1   sdr,
otherwise sdr = sdr.
4. Update δ: decrease δ whenever the orthogonal-DF turns. For a number of
periods directly after a turn δ is not increased, and otherwise δ is increased
(cf. [129] for the details).
5. Compute the counter oﬀer O =< pf(t + 1),pv(t + 1) >: set pv(t + 1) =
p′
v(t) + δ   sdr. Next, calculate pf(t + 1) such that (pf(t + 1),pv(t + 1)) lies on
the iso-utility curve, i.e., u(< pf(t + 1),pv(t + 1) >) = u′(t + 1).120 Automated bargaining and bundling of information goods
robustness of the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF approach, to ﬁnd Pareto-eﬃcient
solutions for a wide variety of settings. We evaluate the robustness of the search
strategy by experimenting with various concession strategies on the buyer side.
Although the system enables buyers to initiate several concurrent negotiation
threads, within a thread the Pareto search strategy operates independently from
the other threads. For researching the eﬃciency and robustness of Pareto search
strategies it therefore suﬃces to consider only a single negotiation thread in the
experiments. Furthermore, the bundle content in the experimental setup consists of
a single category with a low quality of service. The experimental results generalise
to negotiations involving multiple categories: only the shape of the iso-utility curves
is aﬀected by the number of categories. In the experiments the shape is varied using
diﬀerent parameter settings.
A general speciﬁcation of the buyer agents and the seller agent was provided in
Section 6.2. Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 describe the agent settings which are speciﬁ-
cally used within the experimental setup. In particular the agents’ preferences and
concession strategies are speciﬁed in detail in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 respectively.
The experimental results are discussed in Section 6.3.3.
6.3.1 Agent preference settings
We simulate the negotiation with a variety of buyer and seller preferences, expressed
by the agents’ expected utility functions (see also Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.1). In the
experiments we consider only a single low-quality category. The number of articles
eb (we omit the index for clarity in the following) the buyer expects to read is
assumed to be a constant, set randomly between 1 and 20 at the beginning of an
experiment. The buyer agent’s expected utility therefore reduces to ub(< (pf,pv) >
) = bmax − (pf + pv   eb). Note that this results in a linear iso-utility curve in the
(pf,pv) plane (see e.g. Fig. 6.5). Furthermore, since the purpose is to demonstrate
the eﬃciency of the ﬁnal deals reached, we set the buyer agent’s mandate bmax for
the bundle such that an agreement is always reached.
The expected utility for the seller agent is based on es, the expected number
of articles that the buyers will read on average in the (low-quality) category. In
contrast to the buyer agent, the expectation is not a constant but a function of the
variable price pv. It is assumed that buyers who are willing to pay a high variable
price are expected to read less than buyers with a low variable price (i.e. we assume
the law of demand holds cf. [72]). In the experiments we use the linear function
es(pv) = b − a   pv with b = 20 and a set randomly between 0.03 and 0.07 at the
beginning of an experiment. Note that the seller agent’s iso-utility curve is now
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6.3.2 Concession strategies
The buyers and the seller can each select their own concession strategies. Although
a seller agent’s concession in the main system can depend on the behaviour of all
buyers (i.e., one-to-many), in the experiments the seller agent’s strategy is simply to
decrease the desired utility level or aspiration level with a ﬁxed amount each round
(more advanced strategies are considered in Chapter 7). The initial aspiration level
is randomly varied. Note that the number of buyers and their behaviour does not
aﬀect the seller’s concession when this strategy is used.
On the buyer side, on the other hand, we implemented four classes of concession
strategies to investigate the robustness of the Pareto search strategy:
1. Hardhead. The buyer agent does not concede when this strategy is used; the
aspiration level remains the same during the negotiations.
2. Fixed. A ﬁxed amount c in utility is conceded each round.
3. Fraction. The buyer agent concedes the fraction γ of the diﬀerence between the
current desired expected utility level and the expected utility of the opponent’s
last oﬀer.
4. Tit-for-tat. This strategy mimics the concession behaviour of the opponent,
based on subjective (expected) utility improvement. If the expected utility of
the seller agent’s oﬀers increases, the same amount is conceded by the buyer
agent. Note that the concession is based on an increment in expected utility
perceived by the buyer agent. The seller agent’s actual concession is shielded
from the buyer agent, as an improvement could also occur when the seller
agent moves along his iso-utility curve. Furthermore, note that the perceived
expected utility improvement could also be negative. To make the concession
behaviour less chaotic, however, no negative concessions are made by the buyer
agent.
6.3.3 Results
The seller agent and the buyer agent in the experiments negotiate in an alternating
fashion until an agreement is reached. The eﬃciency of the agreement is then
evaluated based on the distance of the ﬁnal oﬀer from a Pareto-eﬃcient solution. We
measure an oﬀer’s distance from a Pareto-eﬃcient solution as the maximum possible
expected utility improvement for the buyer if a Pareto-eﬃcient oﬀer was made, all
else remaining equal. This is achieved by moving the buyer’s iso-utility curve until
the obtained deal is Pareto-eﬃcient.
To evaluate the quality of the results we compare the outcomes using various
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Pareto-search strategy
Concession strategy Random Orthogonal/DF DF/DF
hardhead 18.92 (±23.56) 8.03 (±11.44) 18.63 (±32.81)
ﬁxed (c = 20) 26.52 (±34.49) 10.43 (±17.34) 28.82 (±46.71)
ﬁxed (c = 40) 38.91 (±49.72) 16.21 (±23.84) 44.29 (±69.76)
ﬁxed (c = 80) 42.12 (±56.88) 25.61 (±38.72) 48.84 (±72.12)
fraction (γ = 0.025) 30.26 (±38.37) 10.07 (±15.03) 32.25 (±52.81)
fraction (γ = 0.05) 31.53 (±40.00) 11.52 (±16.16) 28.52 (±52.13)
fraction (γ = 0.1) 37.81 (±48.82) 16.91 (±30.80) 26.28 (±42.20)
tit-for-tat 72.78 (±121.35) 59.60 (±113.27) 56.64 (±116.82)
Table 6.1: Average distance from Pareto-eﬃcient solution for various buyer con-
cession strategies (rows) and buyer/seller search strategies (columns). Results are
averaged over 500 experiments with random parameter settings. Standard devia-
tions are indicated between brackets. Best results (see column Orthogonal/DF) are
obtained if the buyer and seller agents use orthogonal search, and the seller agent’s
search is ampliﬁed with a derivative follower.
an overview of the results. The row labelled Random contains the outcomes when
both seller and buyer agents use a random search strategy. This strategy selects
a random point on the iso-utility curve.5 The distance of the ﬁnal oﬀer (from the
closest Pareto-eﬃcient solution), when random search is used, lies between 1 and 3
percent of the total costs.
Although the ineﬃciency with random search is only small compared to the to-
tal costs, even better results are obtained when one bargainer (typically the buyer
agent) uses orthogonal search and the other (the seller agent) uses orthogonal-DF
(i.e., orthogonal search combined with a derivative follower). The results are shown
in the column labelled Orthogonal/DF of Table 6.1. The improvements are con-
siderable. The distance of the ﬁnal oﬀer as a percentage of total costs lies then, for
almost all concession strategies, between 0 and 1. Only for the tit-for-tat strategy
the distance lies around 1.8 percent. Notice that the Orthogonal/Orthogonal-DF
strategy combination is also robust, as best results are obtained using this strategy,
relatively independent of the concession strategy selected by the buyer agent.
Table 6.1 also shows the results if both buyer and seller agents use orthogonal-
DF search (column DF/DF). These results are very similar to random, however.
The derivative follower relies on a consistent response from the opponent to signal
the right direction. If both use a derivative follower, this signal is distorted.
Notice that the average distance depends on the concession strategy used by the
buyer. Although in individual cases Pareto-eﬃcient agreements (with zero distance)
are reached using the orthogonal/DF search, the average distance consistently shows
5Only the downward sloping part of the seller agent’s iso-utility curve is used.6.4 Related approaches 123
some (usually slight) ineﬃciencies, even when the buyer makes no concessions (i.e.,
the hardhead strategy). The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the DF accelerates
ﬁnding the eﬃcient solution by making, at times, large steps on the iso-utility curve.
At a certain point the algorithm passed the Pareto-eﬃcient point, and then turns.
This way the oﬀers keep oscillating around the optimal point. If the concessions are
suﬃciently large, an agreement can be reached at a point which is less than optimal.
Secondly, the direction and step-size of the DF are based on changes in the
Euclidean distance between the seller and buyer oﬀers through time. The distance
can be inﬂuenced by both concessions and movements along the iso-utility curve.
As the opponent’s iso-utility curve is unknown, the agents are unable to distinguish
between the two. This can mislead the DF whenever concessions are very large.
Two possible solutions are to make either small concessions, or have intervals with
no concessions allowing the search algorithm to ﬁnd the best deal.
Particularly tit-for-tat results in a relatively high ineﬃciency, because of the
reasons described above. Recall that tit-for-tat uses a subjective measure of the
opponent’s concessions. In practice, the perceived utility increments are sometimes
quite large, resulting in bursts of very large concessions. If this occurs near the
agreement point this can result in ineﬃcient outcomes.
To conclude, the orthogonal/DF strategy clearly outperforms other combinations
of search strategies in the experiments. Ineﬃciencies still occur, especially if the
concessions are large. A trade-oﬀ therefore exists between reaching an agreement fast
(by making large concessions) and reaching an eﬃcient agreement. Since concessions
appear to inﬂuence the Pareto-eﬃciency of the outcomes, it is essential that a Pareto-
search strategy is evaluated together with a concession strategy.
6.4 Related approaches
In this section some related approaches for multi-issue negotiations are discussed.
6.4.1 Fuzzy similarity criteria
Related to our work, in [33] a heuristic approach for ﬁnding win-win trade-oﬀs
between issues is introduced. Contracts which are similar to the opponent’s oﬀer
are selected based on fuzzy similarity criteria, and given a desired utility level.
They use fuzzy similarity criteria because most of the considered issues take on very
limited discrete values. Based on these similarity criteria, an iterative hill-climbing
algorithm is used to ﬁnd the most similar oﬀer. This hill-climbing algorithm is
limited, however, to linearly additive utility functions.
By contrast, we consider negotiation over continuous issues (or issues that can
take on many values). For this problem domain, Euclidean distance is a more natural
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techniques (from ﬁelds such as convex analysis) are immediately at our disposal.
Moreover, implementing the similarity criterion entails a straightforward application
of standard techniques from numerical analysis. The orthogonal search method
ﬁnds, from the collection of oﬀers that have the desired utility level, the oﬀer closest
to the opponents last oﬀer, measured in Euclidean distance. Unlike the heuristics
developed in [33], our approach is not restricted to linearly additive utility functions.
A possible limitation of any search method using only a distance method to
determine the counter oﬀer, such as the orthogonal search method and the fuzzy
similarity criteria described in [33], is that the rate of convergence depends to a large
extent on the bargainers’ preferences. As we found in our experiments, convergence
rate is indeed often very slow (i.e., when both agents use the orthogonal strategy).
Therefore, we ampliﬁed the search using a derivative follower, which can converge
quickly to a Pareto-eﬃcient solution. Slow rate of convergence is especially a problem
whenever software agents are not a priori restricted but can search for clever trade-
oﬀs and at the same time make concessions (as is the case in our experiments). If the
search method is too slow, very little improvement in the eﬃciency can be realised
before a deal is closed. The developed orthogonal-DF, however, is suﬃciently fast
and consequently can also work very well in conjunction with concessions.
6.4.2 Intermediaries
In the literature the diﬃculties with bargainers simultaneously making concessions
and searching for clever trade oﬀs is generally avoided by assuming an intermedi-
ary [32,62,68,101]. The mediator is inspired by the idea of a single negotiation text
(SNT). SNT is a mediation device suggested by Roger Fisher [36]. During negotia-
tion, the mediator ﬁrst devises and proposes a deal (SNT-1) for the two bargainers
to consider. The mediator is not trying to promote the ﬁrst proposal, rather, it is
meant to serve as an initial, single negotiation text; a version to be criticised by both
parties and then modiﬁed in an iterative manner. Modiﬁcations to the SNT-1 will
be made by the mediator based on the criticisms from the two sides. Thus, both
parties need to reveal (aspects of) their preferences to the mediator, hence trust
becomes an important issue. Furthermore, additional costs are often involved with
a mediator.
The orthogonal-DF method is somewhat related to the work of Ehtamo et al. [32].
They develop the method of improving directions which is a mathematical formali-
sation of the SNT method (with a mediator). In essence it is a multi-criteria decision
making gradient search method. Given a SNT, bargainers give their most preferred
direction of the next SNT which is just the gradient. The mediator then uses some
relatively straightforward procedure to determine the jointly improving direction
which is then used to determine the next SNT. The orthogonal-DF also searches for
such a jointly improving direction, but without the use of a mediator, however.6.5 Discussion 125
6.4.3 Auctions
Another approach increasingly used to automate one-to-many negotiations is through
auctions. Although our system has characteristics similar to those of auctions,
bundling and negotiation of information goods have distinct properties which im-
pede the use of current available auction designs. Mainly, information goods have
negligible incremental reproduction and distribution costs [18]. The supply of goods
can therefore be virtually unlimited. Auctions, however, are more suitable when
resources are scarce.
Furthermore, information goods can be easily packaged in a wide variety of
conﬁgurations, resulting in multi-dimensional products and pricing schemes. Per-
sonalisation of information goods then becomes a key component of a successful
electronic business strategy [2]. As illustrated in this chapter, and in Chapters 3
and 4, a bilateral approach can be naturally used to perform multi-issue negotia-
tions. Traditionally, auctions have focused on price as the single dimension of the
negotiation. Although multi-attribute auctions have recently received increasing at-
tention [28,93], the agents are usually required to reveal their complete preferences.
Moreover, the focus is on obtaining Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes and proﬁts are usually
not considered. In case of unlimited supply, however, such auctions may fail to pro-
vide suﬃcient proﬁt for the seller. Because of the disentanglement of the concession
and Pareto-search strategies, the proﬁts can be regulated by the concession strategy
(this issue will be further addressed in the next chapter).
A seller may also have business-related considerations for preferring a bilateral
bargaining approach. For example, the bilateral bargaining protocol allows for much
ﬂexibility and can be easily applied in case of continuous sales. Using bargaining,
new buyers can enter the negotiation at any given time, and buyers can obtain the
good at any time by simply accepting a seller’s counter oﬀer.
6.5 Discussion
6.5.1 The system revisited
Although the focus of this chapter is the problem of selling bundles of news items,
other types of (information) goods can also be sold through the developed system.
A key question for extending the use of the system to other application areas is,
however, if buyers and (to a lesser degree) sellers are willing to have software agents
automate the actual bargaining. A prerequisite would be that the traded goods have
a relatively low value and transactions are conducted frequently. Consequently, the
risks are low and an agent has many opportunities to learn from past experience
and gradually improve performance. Note that the negotiation procedure of the
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Depending on the particular application of the system, it may be desirable for the
buyer to rely more or less on the assistant of the software agent.
An additional important aspect of the relevance to other application areas is the
potential beneﬁt of using such a system. The developed system appears particular
suitable for selling complex goods with a high degree of personalisation and relatively
rapidly changing preferences (as is the case with the news items). More speciﬁcally,
within the system personalisation entails discriminating between buyers based on
the bundle price and the quality of service. Second-degree price discrimination is
the economic term for this type of personalisation.
In second-degree price discrimination the price depends on the quantity and/or
quality of the purchased good. The distinguishing aspect of second-degree price
discrimination is that buyers can self-select the best purchase. Traditionally, buyers
are oﬀered a menu of price combinations. The work of [18,59] discusses algorithms
which, given a particular pricing scheme, learn the best price combinations on-line.
They conclude that (especially in a dynamic environment) complex schemes are
generally not the most proﬁtable due to the need of more learning.
The distinguishing aspect of the developed system is that instead of having ex-
plicit pricing schemes, buyers can bargain for the most appropriate bundle/price
combination. This can result in a similar (or even higher) degree of discrimina-
tion between buyers as with explicit complex pricing schemes. In the absence of
an explicit structure the seller is, however, more ﬂexible in the degree to which she
discriminates. The seller does not have to a priori limit the complexity of the pricing
scheme. Whenever bundles of (information) goods are being oﬀered, an additional
advantage is that, by initiating the negotiation process, buyers can explicitly ex-
press their interest in a particular bundle of goods. This may facilitate the process
of oﬀering buyers the appropriate bundles (and consequently it may facilitate the
indirect discrimination between buyers).
6.5.2 Bargaining and Pareto eﬃciency
In the system the seller agent uses the orthogonal-DF as the Pareto search strat-
egy combined with a concession strategy. The concession strategy determines the
next concession relatively independently of the ongoing bargaining process with a
particular buyer. The idea is that, on the one hand, bargaining with a particular
buyer should lead to ﬁnding the best possible deal for both parties, given the seller’s
desired expected utility level. That is, the bargaining outcome should closely ap-
proximate a Pareto-eﬃcient solution. On the other hand, the one-to-many aspect
of the bargaining process (i.e., bargaining with more than one buyer) should guide
the updating of the concession strategy. Thus the seller uses the disentanglement
of the bargaining strategy (in a concession and Pareto search strategy) to distin-
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process.
The experiments in Section 6.3 show that if a buyer agent uses an orthogonal
strategy as the Pareto-eﬃcient search strategy then the bargaining outcomes will
closely approximate a Pareto-eﬃcient solution. The experiments are conducted for
a variety of (buyer) concession strategies, buyer preferences, and seller preferences.
Based on the experimental results we can conclude that any other strategy choice
of a buyer will probably result in less eﬃcient outcomes. Moreover, such a strategy
will not inﬂuence the concession strategy of the seller (due to the independence
of the concession strategy). Consequently, any alternative bargaining strategy of
the buyer is probably at most as good as the orthogonal strategy combined with a
concession strategy that mimics the concessions of the alternative strategy. Thus,
given the seller’s choice of the orthogonal-DF combined with a relatively independent
concession strategy, it is in a buyer’s best interest to choose the orthogonal search
strategy combined with a concession strategy. Moreover, this choice results in (a
close approximation of) a Pareto-eﬃcient solution.
6.6 Concluding remarks
We introduce a novel system for selling bundles of news items in this chapter.
Through the system, buyers bargain over the price and quality of the delivered
goods with the seller. The advantage of the developed system is that it allows for
a high degree of ﬂexibility in the price, quality, and content of the oﬀered bundles.
The price, quality, and content of the delivered goods may, for example, diﬀer based
on daily dynamics and personal interest of buyers.
The system as developed here can take into account business related side-constraints,
such as “fairness” of the bargaining outcomes. Fairness ensures that buyers with
similar preferences are treated in the same fashion. Because of fairness, the actual
bargaining process between seller and buyers is not really bilateral, but is in fact
one-to-many since the bargaining process with one buyer can have an impact on a
simultaneous bargaining process with another buyer.
Autonomous software agents perform (part of) the negotiation on behalf of the
users of the system. To enable eﬃcient negotiation through these agents we decom-
pose the bargaining strategies into concession strategies and Pareto-search strategies.
Moreover, we introduce the orthogonal and orthogonal-DF strategy: two Pareto
search strategies. We show through computer experiments that the respective use
of these two Pareto search strategies by the two bargainers will result in very eﬃcient
bargaining outcomes. Furthermore, the system is set up such that it is actually in the
best interest of the buyer to have their agent adhere to this approach of decomposing
the bargaining strategy into a concession strategy and Pareto search strategy.Chapter 7
Bargaining strategies for
one-to-many bargaining
Through the use of autonomous agents a business can obtain ﬂexibility in prices and
goods, and distinguish between diﬀerent groups of buyers based on their preferences.
The previous chapter showed how personalisation of goods in the context of infor-
mation goods can be achieved using automated negotiation. In this chapter,1 we
focus on the (expected) utility obtained by a seller agent and how diﬀerent groups
of buyers can be targeted having diﬀerent valuations for obtaining the goods. We
consider agent strategies for a one-to-many bargaining setting, where a seller agent
negotiates, as before, with many buyer agents simultaneously in a bilateral fashion.
We focus on domains where the supply of goods is ﬂexible and new goods can be
reproduced quickly, at relatively low costs. Such characteristics apply not only to
information goods, but may also apply to other retail markets. As in the previous
chapter, the strategies also take into account a notion fairness that is important
for maintaining customer satisfaction and acceptance of the system by customers.
Fairness ensures that buyers are treated in a similar fashion and is comparable to
the notion of envy-freeness in auctions [44] (see Section 6.1.2 for further details).
In many cases, auctions can be used to eﬀectively organise one-to-many bar-
gaining. Depending on the setting, auctions can provide buyers with the incentive
to reveal their preferences truthfully, and to allocate the goods eﬃciently (see also
Section 2.3.5). For various situations, however, auctions may not be the preferred
protocol for bargainers. In situations of, for example, virtually unlimited supply,
multiple issues, and/or continuous sale the appropriate auction protocol becomes,
1This chapter is based on [40]: E.H. Gerding, K. Somefun, and J.A. La Poutr´ e. Bilateral
bargaining in a one-to-many bargaining setting. Technical Report, CWI, Amsterdam, to appear.
A shorter version has been accepted for publication as [39]: E.H. Gerding, K. Somefun, and J.A. La
Poutr´ e. Bilateral bargaining in a one-to-many bargaining setting. In Proceedings of the 3rd
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems (AAMAS2004),
New York City, New York. IEEE Computer Society Press, 2004.
129130 Bargaining strategies for one-to-many bargaining
at best, much more complex. Consequently, businesses may opt for the intuitive
and ﬂexible bilateral bargaining protocol, where the seller agent negotiates bilater-
ally with one or more buyers simultaneously by exchanging oﬀers and counter oﬀers.
These motivations are more closely considered in Section 6.4.3 of the previous chap-
ter.
Only little work has been done to study actual strategies for one-to-many bar-
gaining. A few related papers study concurrent bilateral negotiations within a one-
to-many setting [85,98]. In these papers, a framework is described where a buyer
negotiates with several sellers simultaneously to ﬁnd a single best deal. This diﬀers
from our setting, however, since the seller in our system can come to an agreement
with many buyers as we assume that supply is ﬂexible. The various negotiations in
our case are nevertheless related mainly through the notion of fairness.
For the case of virtually unlimited supply, as for information goods, we present
a number of one-to-many bargaining strategies for the seller in this chapter, that
take into consideration the notion of fairness. In particular, we introduce auction-
inspired strategies that achieve good results. We compare the performance of the
bargaining strategies using an evolutionary simulation, especially for the case of
impatient buyers. These experiments show that the auction-inspired strategies are
able to extract almost all the bargaining surplus, given suﬃcient time pressure of
the buyers. The auction-inspired strategies beneﬁt from the fact that the setting is
one-to-many, even though bargaining occurs in a bilateral fashion.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 7.1 we discusses the bargain-
ing setup and the strategies used by the seller agent. In Section 7.2 we introduce
the simulation environment used for testing the performance of the strategies. We
present the simulation results of the conducted computer experiments in Section 7.3.
Conclusions follow in Section 7.4.
7.1 One-to-many bargaining
Bargaining is performed using the bilateral bargaining protocol described previously
in Section 6.1.3. Although the protocol allows for multiple issues to be negotiated
simultaneously, we concentrate on single-issue bargaining (e.g. the price) in this
chapter and consider the (expected) utility obtained by the agents in the system.
The multi-issue aspect is addressed in Chapter 6. We assume here that buyers
are impatient and have an incentive to reach agreements early. The buyers’ time
pressure is further discussed in Section 7.1.1.
An agent representing a business can be endowed with various bargaining strate-
gies. We present a number of strategies for the seller agent in Section 7.1.2. These
bargaining strategies take into account a notion of fairness, such that diﬀerent buy-
ers are treated equally whenever that seems fair. For a detailed description of the
fairness concept applied by the seller agent, we refer to Section 6.1.2.7.1 One-to-many bargaining 131
We note that the reader is assumed to be familiar with the contents of Sec-
tions 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 of the previous chapter in the following.
7.1.1 Time pressure
An important assumption is that buyers are impatient and prefer an early agreement.
Time pressure or time impatience is a common assumption in bargaining, e.g. [110]
(see also Section 2.3.2). The seller is simultaneously and continuously negotiating
with many buyers and is therefore less concerned with immediately reaching an
agreement for a particular bargaining outcome, i.e., he is relatively patient. Fur-
thermore, we assumed earlier that the seller can reproduce the oﬀered goods quickly
and at low costs. Therefore, a seller can respond timely to the demand and with lit-
tle additional costs for matters such as storage of the goods. We model this relative
time patience by assuming that the seller, unlike the buyers, has no time pressure.
At least in theory, the seller can beneﬁt from buyers’ time-pressure by introduc-
ing a delay before submitting a counter oﬀer. An important question is then which
bargaining strategies can most eﬀectively utilise these potential beneﬁts. Experi-
mental results discussed in Section 7.3 show that auction-inspired strategies, which
we will present in the next Section, are very eﬀective: depending on the time pres-
sure, they are capable of extracting very large shares of the bargaining surplus (see
Section 1.1.2) for the seller.
7.1.2 Bargaining strategies
The challenge is to develop bargaining strategies for the seller that maximise ex-
pected utility by utilising diﬀerences in buyers’ willingness to pay without violating
the fairness constraint. Instead, these strategies make use of diﬀerences indirectly
through buyers’ time pressure. In order to beneﬁt from time pressure all the strate-
gies discussed below introduce a (ﬁxed) delay before the seller agent submits a
counter oﬀer.
Fixed and time-dependent threshold strategies
For purpose of comparison we introduce a ﬁxed threshold strategy, where the the
seller’s desired expected utility level or aspiration level (see Def. 113.1) remains
constant through time. The seller only accepts oﬀers above the aspiration level and
counter oﬀers always have an expected utility level equal to the aspiration level.
Whenever the seller agent accepts two diﬀerent oﬀers within a certain time interval,
the bargaining outcome may be unfair. To rule out an unfair outcome, the seller
agent immediately engages in post-agreement negotiation with all buyers from which
it accepted an oﬀer. During these negotiations the seller agent oﬀers a buyer agent
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aspiration level. In case of multiple issues, the seller will concede on one or more
issues, and not change the value of the remaining issues.2
Clearly, the ﬁxed threshold strategy is not capable of utilising buyers’ time pres-
sure. The purpose of the strategy is to provide some insights in the minimal ex-
tractable proﬁt, given strategic behaviour of the buyers.
The second strategy we consider is a time-dependent threshold strategy: the
current aspiration level depends on time. The aspiration level only changes from
one period to the next. Again, the seller only accepts oﬀers above a (time-period
dependent) aspiration level and counter oﬀers are always equal to the current as-
piration level. As before, the seller agent immediately engages in post-agreement
negotiation in case the seller accepts a buyer’s oﬀer to ensure fairness.
Unlike the ﬁxed-threshold strategy the time-dependent strategy is capable of
utilising buyers’ time pressure. Its success, however, depends on how much it knows
about buyers’ preferences, or how easily buyer preferences can be learned, in relation
to time-based pricing strategies.
Auction-inspired strategies
We introduce a bargaining strategy which is inspired by the ﬁrst-price auction. The
auction-inspired strategy operates as follows. The seller agent collects all oﬀers
submitted within a certain ﬁxed time interval, after his last oﬀer. Then it sets the
aspiration level to the current highest utility level, which is equal to the best oﬀer
from the collection of oﬀers. It accepts all oﬀers equal to the current aspiration level
and counters the unaccepted oﬀers by setting the counter oﬀer’s expected utility
equal to the current aspiration level. The strategy introduces a ﬁxed time delay
before countering the unaccepted oﬀers. Note that because the auction-inspired
strategy only accepts oﬀers with the same expected utility within a certain time
interval, post-agreement negotiation is not necessary to ensure fairness.
The success of the auction-inspired negotiating strategy does not depend on
some (a priori) knowledge of buyer preferences, unlike the ﬁxed and time-dependent
strategies. Intuitively, buyers who, due to time pressure, suﬀer more from delay
are inclined to bargain less “hard-headed” than other buyers. Consequently, these
buyers may reach a deal sooner and pay more. Thus, at least potentially, the
strategy is capable of utilising buyers’ time pressure without requiring (a priori)
knowledge of buyer preferences. Unlike auctions, actual bargaining occurs in an
alternating exchange of oﬀers and counter oﬀers, typically initiated by a buyer.
Even though the seller’s strategy can be auction-inspired, buyers will be unaware of
this fact. They do not know the opponent’s bargaining strategy on forehand; they
2Note that this approach assumes that the agents have conﬂicting interests on individual issues
and nonsatiation of buyers (i.e., buyers always prefer more than less). If this is not necessarily the
case, a weaker form of fairness can be used instead, where the seller tries to improve the oﬀer to
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perceive the bargaining process to be bilateral. Buyers may of course suspect some
relationship with other ongoing negotiations. The point is that unlike a true auction
the relationship with other simultaneously submitted oﬀers is not speciﬁed up front,
through a set of rules.
Reservation value
A drawback of the auction-inspired strategy is that it becomes vulnerable whenever
groups of buyers experience very little time pressure. Without time pressure, buyers
have no incentive to buy soon and could independently decide to initially submit very
low oﬀers; consequently proﬁts will be very low. To circumvent this we also consider
auction-inspired strategies with a reservation value (i.e., a lowest acceptable utility
level). A seller agent is never willing to sell below the reservation value. This means
we alter the earlier deﬁnition of the current highest utility level. It now becomes the
maximum of the reservation value and the utility of the best oﬀer from the oﬀers
collected within a certain time interval. An interesting advantages of introducing a
reservation value occurs when some but not all buyers experience very little time-
pressure. The auction-inspired strategy can then still utilise the time-pressure of
the other buyers.
We consider two approaches for determining the reservation value. Either the
reservation value is ﬁxed, like the ﬁxed-threshold strategy, or it is time dependent,
like the time-dependent threshold strategy. Thus the auction-inspired strategy with
a reservation value is actually a combination of the auction-inspired strategy (with-
out reservation value) and either the ﬁxed or time-dependent threshold strategies.
7.2 Bargaining simulation environment
We apply a simulation environment in order to evaluate the performance and robust-
ness of the above negotiation strategies against many learning buyers. The agents
in the simulation are assumed to be boundedly rational: they can learn and adapt
their strategies by a process of trial and error, and they do not know the seller’s
strategy. The bargaining process is repeated many times, enabling buyers and the
seller to learn from past interactions. An evolutionary algorithm is used to model
the learning aspect of the agents. A similar approach was used in previous chapters
(Chapters 3-5).
7.2.1 The bargaining game
The seller agent negotiates with many buyer agents simultaneously by alternating
oﬀers and counter oﬀers, where the buyer agents initiate the negotiations. For
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large such that it has no signiﬁcant impact on the results. At the start of the
negotiation, buyer agents submit their oﬀers to the seller agent, which responds by
either accepting an oﬀer or sending a counter oﬀer in the next round. Oﬀers consist
of a single issue, viz. the price of the negotiable good. Negotiation continues after
all buyer agents have reached an agreement or the maximum number of rounds is
reached, which concludes a so-called bargaining game. We note that buyer agents
in the simulation do not leave the negotiations or enter later.
We assume that, since buyers are impatient, buyer agents in the simulation will
respond to the seller agent’s counter oﬀer without delay. This is modelled by having
the buyer’s counter oﬀer occur in the same round as the seller’s counter oﬀer.
7.2.2 Buyers and their agents
Buyers are interested in buying at most one unit of the oﬀered good in each bar-
gaining game. They can have diﬀerent preferences regarding their time pressure and
valuation of the good, which together characterise the buyer type. For the analysis
we assume buyers can be grouped into a ﬁnite number of k types. The number of
buyer agents of each type participating in a negotiation game varies randomly and is
unknown to the seller agent. The seller agent is also uninformed about the identity
or type of a speciﬁc buyer agent. The actual number of participants of each type is
determined independently by a Poisson distribution with average λ.
A buyer agent tries to maximise a given utility function for buyer type i, ui,
which is deﬁned as follows:
ui = (vi − p)δ
t
i, (7.1)
where vi is the buyer’s valuation of the good, p is the negotiated price, δi is the
discount factor used to model the time pressure, and t is the negotiation time. In
the simulation negotiation occurs at ﬁxed time intervals. Therefore, δ is the discrete
representation of time pressure and t therefore also indicates the negotiation round.
Note that discount factors are commonly used for modelling time pressure, e.g. in
the Rubinstein-St˚ ahl alternating-oﬀers model (see Section 2.3.2). The agents are
furthermore assumed to be individually rational (see Def. 4.2): they will not bid nor
accept oﬀers with a negative utility.
Within the simulation, buyer agents are endowed with adaptive time-based
strategies to produce oﬀers and evaluate the seller’s oﬀers. Although this is a rel-
atively simple strategy, the adaptive nature of the strategies provides buyer agents
with suﬃcient ﬂexibility to bid eﬀectively in the long run. A strategy consists of
a piece-wise linear function, which determines the price level of new oﬀers and is
also used as threshold to accept or reject the seller’s oﬀers: if the seller’s oﬀered
price is above the threshold, the oﬀer is accepted, otherwise the oﬀer is rejected. A
post-agreement oﬀer is automatically accepted if this is beneﬁcial for the buyer.7.2 Bargaining simulation environment 135
Figure 7.1: The EA cycle for negotiations with two buyer types and an adaptive
seller
We also applied an extended strategy in our experiments, where the threshold
and oﬀers are determined by separate piece-wise linear functions. The separation of
the two functions enhances the bargaining capabilities of the buyer agent. Results
using the two representations are very similar. The outcomes presented in this
chapter are obtained using the extended strategy.
7.2.3 Seller agent
The seller agent bargains with a number of buyers simultaneously, without knowing
the type of these buyers. The seller agent’s utility is equal to the total utility or
proﬁt obtained over all buyers (recall from Section 7.1.2 that the we can assume the
seller has no time pressure). Production costs are set to zero.
We consider ﬁve strategies for the seller agent: ﬁxed threshold, time-based
threshold, auction-inspired strategies and two combined strategies. The ﬁrst two
strategies and the combined strategies are adaptive: strategies that maximise total
utility are learned using an EA. The time-based threshold strategy is similar to the
strategy used by the buyer.
7.2.4 The evolutionary system
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are used to produce eﬀective bargaining strategies
for the buyer agents and seller agent. The implementation used is described in detail136 Bargaining strategies for one-to-many bargaining
in Section 1.2. The strategies for buyer agents of each type are produced by separate
EAs, which operate in parallel. Furthermore, a separate EA can also be used to
produce strategies for the seller agent, in case the seller uses an adaptive strategy.
An example of the evolutionary system with two buyer agents and an adaptive
seller agent is depicted in Figure 7.1. Note that, whereas in previous chapters a
single EA was used with several evolving populations, the current implementation
applies several (independent) EAs. This enables for instance the seller agent to use
a diﬀerent strategy representation than a buyer agent.
The ﬁtness of the strategies is determined by the average utility obtained in a
number of bargaining games, which go as follows. At the start of each bargaining
game, the number of participating buyer agents of each type is determined randomly
using a Poisson distribution as described above. Buyer agents are then assigned a
randomly selected strategy from either the parent or oﬀspring population of the
corresponding type. Similarly, a strategy is selected randomly for the seller agent
(in case of an adaptive seller). The bargaining game is played for a ﬁxed number of
times, re-establishing the number of buyer agents and assigning new strategies at
the start of each game.
Strategy encoding
As mentioned in Section 7.2.2, the buyer agent’s strategy consists of two piece-wise
linear functions: an oﬀer and a threshold function. The functions are encoded using
real values, where each bending point of a function is encoded by two real values.
Additionally, two end points mark the values for the ﬁrst and last rounds. For
example, 8 real values are needed to encode a pair of functions with two line pieces
each.
The same representation is used for the seller agent if he uses a time-based
threshold strategy. If a ﬁxed threshold is used, only a single real value is needed to
encode this. Note that the seller agent uses the same function for both the threshold
and for producing oﬀers.
7.3 Experimental results
This section reports on computational experiments using the bargaining simulation
environment.
7.3.1 Settings
The following settings are used for the experiments reported in this chapter. Buy-
ers are grouped into three types, each type having adaptive bargaining strategies
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is set as a control parameter. A type’s valuation, on the other hand, is randomly
selected from a uniform distribution at the beginning of each experiment. In order
to make sure that all types have diﬀerent valuations, the valuation of type 1 is se-
lected between 0 and 1000, type 2 between 1000 and 2000, and type 3 between 2000
and 3000.
The piece-wise linear functions of the buyer agents, and of the seller agent in case
of time-based threshold strategy consist of two line pieces. The number of buyers of
each type participating in a bargaining game is determined randomly by a Poisson
distribution with the average λ = 10. The length of a bargaining game is set to 40
rounds.
The EA settings are chosen such that results are robust and the EAs are able
to ﬁnd good solutions. All buyer types use equal settings, with 20 strategies in
the parent populations and 20 oﬀspring strategies. An exponential decay model
is selected to determine the mutation standard deviation (see Section 1.2.3). The
mutation standard deviation is initially set to 0.2, and decays with a half-life value of
50 generations. The EA settings for the seller are the same, except that each seller
population only contains 10 strategies. Buyers have larger populations because
more buyers than sellers participate each game, and because in case of the extended
buyer strategy (with two functions) the search space for the buyer is larger (a higher
population size is often recommended for larger search spaces). The ﬁtness of the
strategies for a single generation is determined by 200 bargaining games. The EAs
using these settings are able to ﬁnd almost optimal solutions for simple test cases.
7.3.2 Results
The reported results are obtained after a process of learning, when the strategies
have converged. It is important to note that during learning, the preferences of the
buyers remain unchanged, although the number and composition (i.e., number of
each type) of buyers can diﬀer in each bargaining game. Experiments are run for
100000 bargaining games (500 generations). Results are averaged over the last 1000
bargaining games of an experiment, and over 30 experiments, accounting for random
settings such as the number of participating buyers and the buyer valuations.
The performance of the strategies is evaluated by comparing the fraction of bar-
gaining surplus or just surplus (see Section 1.1.2) obtained by the seller agent. Since
the seller beneﬁts from any positive agreement (there are no costs for the seller, see
Section 6.2.1), the bargaining surplus in this case is equal to the buyer’s valuation of
the good. Figure 7.2a compares the seller’s obtained fraction of surplus for diﬀerent
seller strategies and buyer discount factors, where the buyer types have equal dis-
count factors. The average round an agreement is reached is shown in Fig. 7.2b. The
results when buyers have diﬀerent discount factors are shown in Table 7.1, where δi
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Figure 7.2: Seller’s obtained fraction of bargaining surplus (a) and average round
of agreement (b) using 5 bargaining strategies: (1) ﬁxed threshold, (2) time-based
threshold, (3) auction-inspired, (4) combined (3) and (1), and (5) combined (3) and
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Fig. 7.2. As shown in Fig. 7.2a and Table 7.1, a ﬁxed threshold strategy (1) is able
to extract around 65% of the surplus. Note that the outcomes are independent of
the discount factor. Clearly, the ﬁxed threshold strategy is unable to beneﬁt from
the buyers’ time pressure.
The time-based threshold strategy (2), on the other hand, shows that higher
proﬁts can be obtained if the threshold changes in time, see Fig. 7.2a and Table 7.1.
Buyers with a high valuation will settle for an agreement relatively early, since
waiting for a better deal does not compensate the loss due to time discounting.
Buyers with a low valuation, on the other hand, have the incentive to reach an
agreement in a later stage if they can get a better price for it. This way the seller can
indirectly discriminate between buyers with diﬀerent valuations and time pressures.
A disadvantage, however, is that this leads to much eﬃciency loss due to delayed
agreements. Figure 7.2b and Table 7.1 show that the average round in which an
agreement is reached is relatively high when a time-based strategy is used, resulting
in a lower ﬁnal expected utility for the buyers.
Note that with no time discounting (i.e., when the discount factor is 1) the
ﬁxed threshold strategy performs better. This is due to the diﬀerence in strategy
complexity: only a single value needs to be optimised in case of a ﬁxed threshold,
whereas an entire function (encoded by 4 values) needs to be learned in case of the
time-based threshold. This is clearly more diﬃcult, especially within a dynamic
environment with learning buyers.
Outcomes using the auction-inspired bargaining strategies (see Fig. 7.2a and
Table 7.1, strategies (3),(4) and (5)) show an impressive increase in the fraction of
surplus when buyers are impatient. If the time pressure becomes suﬃciently high,
the seller obtains almost the entire surplus. Even for lower time pressure, results are
much better for the seller compared to the ﬁxed and time-based threshold strategies.
For the case of no or very low time pressure, the results also show that simple
auction-like mechanisms are not suﬃcient in case of unlimited supply. Without
competition between buyers, the market price goes to cost level, resulting in a zero
proﬁt for the seller. This problem can be resolved in bargaining by combining the
auction-inspired strategy with an adaptive reservation value. As shown in Fig. 7.2a,
this results in very good outcomes, even if buyers are very patient. This makes the
combined strategy very versatile. We note that these outcomes also generalise to
settings where diﬀerent buyer types have diﬀerent time preferences, assuming that
buyers with higher valuation have a higher time pressure, as indicated by Table 7.1.
7.3.3 Bargaining revisited
An important aspect of the bargaining protocol is the ability of the seller to produce
counter oﬀers in the next round of bargaining. The auction-inspired strategy only
accepts the highest oﬀers in each round. Usually, only a single bid will be accepted140 Bargaining strategies for one-to-many bargaining
strategy δ1 δ2 δ3 round fraction
1 1.0 0.95 0.90 0.88 ± 3.28 0.65 ± 0.09
2 1.0 0.95 0.90 23.94 ± 3.92 0.82 ± 0.08
3 1.0 0.95 0.90 5.75 ± 0.93 0.74 ± 0.08
4 1.0 0.95 0.90 11.88 ± 5.63 0.90 ± 0.06
5 1.0 0.95 0.90 18.05 ± 7.28 0.91 ± 0.03
1 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.00 ± 0.01 0.65 ± 0.08
2 0.95 0.90 0.85 22.44 ± 5.07 0.82 ± 0.05
3 0.95 0.90 0.85 6.29 ± 0.86 0.91 ± 0.04
4 0.95 0.90 0.85 6.75 ± 2.36 0.93 ± 0.03
5 0.95 0.90 0.85 17.02 ± 5.90 0.95 ± 0.03
Table 7.1: Average round an agreement is reached (column “round”) and seller’s
fraction of surplus (column “fraction”) when diﬀerent buyer types have diﬀerent
discount factors and for diﬀerent seller strategies (the strategy numbers correspond
to the strategies of Fig. 7.2).
due to diﬀerences in the buyer agents’ strategies. Even if buyers are of the same
type, small diﬀerences remain because of mutations. The outcome where all buyers
make the same oﬀer is therefore unstable (this can be compared to e.g. “trembling
hand” in game theory, where players are assumed to make small mistakes when
executing their strategies). This would result in large ineﬃciencies because of delays.
The counter bid in the next round, however, enables remaining buyers with similar
valuations (i.e., of the same type) to accept the seller’s bid (albeit with a certain
time delay). This way, all remaining buyers of the same type can reach an agreement
within a single round. Results (see Fig 7.2b and Table 7.1) show that, in fact, buyers
reach agreements on average in the 6th negotiation round when the auction-inspired
strategy is used, even though on average 30 buyers participate in each negotiation.
This is much more eﬃcient than e.g. the time-based threshold strategy.
A possible disadvantage of producing counter oﬀers by the seller is that buyers
could bid very low, and then accept the counter oﬀer of the seller. Such a strategy
could be beneﬁcial in case the seller’s counter oﬀer is inﬂuenced by the buyers’ oﬀers,
as with the auction-inspired strategies. This could then result in low proﬁts for the
seller. To see if indeed buyers proﬁt by using such a strategy, the strategy repre-
sentation for buyers was extended by separating the functions for producing oﬀers
and determining the threshold (see Section 7.2.2). Even with separated function,
however, the auction-inspired strategy performs very much in favour of the seller (as
shown by the results). This occurs because the counter oﬀer is delayed by the seller,
although agreements occur without delay, providing the buyers with an incentive to
try and get an agreement immediately.7.4 Concluding remarks 141
7.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we consider strategies for a seller agent who negotiates with many
buyers simultaneously in a bilateral fashion. These strategies respect a notion of fair-
ness such that buyers are treated similarly. An important assumption is that buyers
are impatient and prefer early agreements. Furthermore, buyers can have diﬀerent
valuations and time preferences. A buyer’s actual valuation and time preference is
only known to himself (i.e., a buyer’s type constitutes private information).
We investigate several seller strategies for bilateral bargaining in a one-to-many
setting, and introduce several auction-inspired strategies. Five diﬀerent seller strate-
gies are evaluated and compared: (1) ﬁxed threshold, (2) time-dependent threshold
strategies, (3) auction-inspired, (4) auction-inspired with ﬁxed reservation value, and
(5) auction-inspired with time-dependent reservation value. The last two strategies
are actually a combination of the auction-inspired strategy with the ﬁrst two strate-
gies.
We use an evolutionary simulation to analyse the performance of the diﬀerent
strategies. The buyers’ bargaining strategies adapt and learn through the use of
an evolutionary algorithm (EA). The seller’s strategies (1) and (2), and the com-
bined strategies (4) and (5) also adapt and learn using an EA. The auction-inspired
strategy (3), on the other hand, determines the threshold value based on the oﬀers
received by the buyers, and does not require any learning.
The auction-inspired strategies appear to be very successful in utilising the time
pressure and consequently extract a very high share of the surplus. For suﬃciently
high time pressure, the seller obtains approximately the entire surplus, indicating
that buyers almost bid their valuations. This is achieved without much delay. Thus
buyers self-select to pay their valuation, while the bargaining outcomes respect our
notion of fairness. The results also show superior performance of the combined
strategies (4 and 5) compared to the auction-inspired strategy (3), in case some or
all buyers have very little time pressure. In other words, the combined strategy is
very versatile.Chapter 8
Discussion and conclusion
We investigated both fundamental aspects of bargaining and introduced real-world
business applications of bargaining using autonomous agents in this thesis. We
applied computational simulations to analyse various situations of bargaining that
are diﬃcult to approach mathematically, and demonstrated the feasibility of the
suggested applications. The agents in these simulations are not assumed to be com-
pletely rational, but rather they learn by doing, and adjust their bargaining policies
based on feedback from interactions with other agents. Complete rationality is usu-
ally not realistic for actual multi-agent systems, mainly for two reasons. Firstly,
agents may not have suﬃcient time and/or computational power to ﬁnd optimal
or rational outcomes. Secondly, in a multi-agent system with diﬀerent agents pro-
grammed by diﬀerent parties, one cannot rely on the other agents to act rationally.
Nevertheless, game-theoretic or “rational” outcomes serve as a useful benchmark to
validate our computational approach.
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are used in this thesis to govern the adaptive
behaviour of the agents in the computational experiments. EAs are increasingly
being used to model societies of learning computational agents and humans, espe-
cially within the ﬁeld of agent-based computational economics. As shown in this
thesis, EAs can be used eﬀectively for bargaining both in case of population learn-
ing, where several agents select their strategies from a common strategy pool, and
individual learning, where genetic material is not exchanged between agents. A
possible drawback for using EAs in practice is that oﬀ-the-shelf implementations of
EAs may require many ﬁtness evaluations before converging to good solutions. If
such evaluations are expensive or limited, e.g. when each bargaining game involves
large sums of money, a more specialised approach may be required. The applications
discussed here, however, mainly involve relatively small-risk transactions that are
repeated frequently. Nevertheless, many solutions for learning using limited evalu-
ations already exist in the literature which can be used for high-risk applications.
However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss such approaches in detail.
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In order to validate our evolutionary approach, we ﬁrst compared experimental
results to game-theoretic outcomes for relatively simple cases. In Chapters 3 and 4
we considered the game-theoretic subgame-perfect equilibrium as the benchmark for
the bilateral bargaining game. Interestingly, in many cases the emerging behaviour
of the evolutionary system did coincide with “rational” or game-theoretic behaviour
in the long run. In Chapter 5, a validation was carried out for market setting
where evolving agents learn to bid in a second-price auction. The second-price
auction provides bidders with the incentive to bid truthfully in case of independent
valuations. This outcome was indeed found in the evolutionary simulation.
After validating our experimental approach, we applied the evolutionary simu-
lation to analyse situations which are hard or unwieldy to analyse theoretically. In
Chapter 3 the agent model was extended with a fairness norm for multi-issue nego-
tiations. The evolutionary outcomes showed that the surplus is more evenly divided
when the fairness norm is applied, and that these outcomes are relatively insensi-
tive to the fairness curve if the norms are consequently applied in each negotiation
round. If the Pareto-eﬃcient frontier is asymmetric, diﬀerent types of agreements
are reached in the various rounds. Chapter 4 considered a diﬀerent extension, where
agents can have additional opportunities if negotiations fail. Each agent is charac-
terised by her state, denoting the number of opportunities remaining. If the agent’s
state is common knowledge, the number of opportunities only has a slight impact
on the division of the surplus in the simulation. If this information is only privately
known, however, the division of surplus reverses if the number of opportunities is
suﬃciently large and equal for both players. Further extensions, such as the in-
ﬂuence search costs and uncertainty about future opportunities were also analysed
using the evolutionary framework.
The power of evolutionary algorithms for analysing complex behaviour was also
demonstrated in Chapter 5 in a market setting. A framework was presented for sell-
ing consumer attention space or “banner space” to the highest bidders (suppliers)
in an auction. The value of the attention space is not a-priori known to the bidders
and can only be learned with consumer feedback. This value depends on the pro-
ﬁle of the consumer, but may also be inﬂuenced by other banners which are shown
concurrently. Such a setting involving multiple goods, complex interdependencies,
and uncertainty in the valuation of the goods is diﬃcult to analyse theoretically.
A computational simulation with evolving bidding agents was therefore applied to
demonstrate the feasibility of the approach and to compare the eﬀectiveness of
various auction designs. With no interdependencies, the adaptive suppliers could
accurately learn the proﬁle of the consumers. In case of interdependencies, however,
the suppliers also need to take into account the eﬀect of competitive banners. In-
terestingly, the agents in the framework then learn to target speciﬁc niches in the
market. The performance of the system, i.e., if a good match between consumers
and suppliers is found, appeared to depend on the auction rules in case of interde-145
pendencies. Results indicated that the so-called next-price auction (where goods are
sold at the price of the next-highest bidder) performed well in general.
An important advantage of bargaining is that not only the price, but other prod-
uct and service related issues can be taken into consideration as well. This can reduce
the competitiveness of negotiations if agents have diﬀerent preferences regarding the
relative importance of the issues. The multi-issue aspect has therefore been given
much consideration throughout this thesis, especially in Chapters 3, 4 and 6. The
main objective of such negotiations is to obtain Pareto-eﬃciency by ﬁnding optimal
trade-oﬀs between issues. Chapter 3 showed that the evolutionary agents agree on
Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes after a relatively short learning period. Chapter 4 intro-
duced a parameter to tune the competitiveness of two-issue negotiations. Using
the evolutionary simulation, the impact of competitiveness in the game with mul-
tiple opportunities was investigated. Chapter 6 introduced advanced strategies for
autonomous agents that are capable of approximating Pareto-eﬃciency within a
single alternating-oﬀers bargaining game. These strategies require no learning or
knowledge of the opponent’s preferences. In the example of information goods, we
demonstrated that these strategies work well even for non-linear preferences.
In Chapters 6 and 7 bilateral bargaining was applied to the case of virtually
unlimited supply as with information goods. Using an alternating-oﬀers protocol
as in Chapter 3, a seller negotiates with many buyers simultaneously and aims at
reaching as many agreements as possible, and at the same time obtain a large share
of the surplus. Chapter 6 focused on the multi-issue problem within the domain of
information goods, whereas Chapter 7 considered the proﬁts gained by the agents.
For the latter we introduced a number of seller strategies that also take into account
a fairness constraint; a negotiation between a buyer and a seller should be fair
relative to other concurrent negotiations. One of the introduced strategies is able
to extract almost the entire surplus, provided that buyers are suﬃciently impatient
and prefer to reach agreements early in the negotiation process. This strategy is
inspired by the ﬁrst-price auction, and simply accepts the highest oﬀer received in
each period. As before, we carried out evolutionary experiments to compare the
performance of the seller strategies. The results showed that, in the absence of time
pressure, there is no real competition and prices using the auction-based strategy
dropped to cost level. We prevented such low prices by incorporating either a ﬁxed or
time-dependent reservation price into the seller’s strategy. This combined strategy
indeed showed superior performance in the evolutionary experiments.
To conclude, we considered both bilateral bargaining and auction approaches in
this thesis, and successfully applied these approaches to several practical settings.
An evolutionary framework was developed to investigate various bargaining settings
and business applications. The outcomes of the computational experiments resulted
in insights that go beyond current game-theoretic ﬁndings and demonstrated the
eﬀectiveness of automated bargaining for the application to real-world domains.Appendix
Game-theoretic analysis
In this Appendix we derive subgame perfect equilibrium (see Def. 18.3) strategies
for multiple-stage games from Chapter 3 using a backward induction approach. We
follow the same approach as in [126], but extend the analysis to multi-issue nego-
tiations and the extended model where the agents perform an additional fairness
check. Appendix 1 studies the multi-issue models and is related to Section 3.3.2.
In Appendix 2 we analyse the extended model with fairness and is related to Sec-
tion 3.4.4.
1 Multi-issue bargaining
In Appendix 1.1, we study a model for multi-issue bargaining without a risk of break-
down. The more general model (with a risk of breakdown) is then investigated in
Appendix 1.2. Furthermore, Appendix 1.3 presents equations for calculating Pareto-
eﬃcient (see Def. 4.3) utility pairs for additive multi-attribute utility functions (see
Def. 3.1), given any number of issues and weight settings of the agents.
1.1 Model without a risk of breakdown (p = 1)
Because time plays no role in the model without a risk of breakdown, the last agent
in turn has the opportunity to reject all proposals from his opponent and demand
the entire surplus (for each issue) in the last round. In subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE), the other agent accepts this proposal (see also the discussion in [11, pp. 200-
201]). If the maximum number of rounds n is odd, agent 1 will therefore receive the
entire surplus, whereas agent 2 receives all in case n is even. Due to the absence of
time pressure, multiple subgame perfect equilibria exist in this case. Although these
equilibria diﬀer in the timing of the agreements, all result in the same outcome (i.e.,
the agent in turn at t = n − 1 always receives the entire surplus for all issues). It is
for instance subgame perfect for the last responder to concede the entire surplus (for
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all issues) to his opponent before the deadline is actually reached or, alternatively,
to accept a take-it-or-leave-it deal from the opponent at any point in time.
1.2 Model with a risk of breakdown (p < 1)
We calculate the SPE for the model with a risk of breakdown in this Section. We ﬁrst
show that in Nash equilibrium (see Def. 18.2) the deals are always weakly Pareto-
eﬃcient (and therefore also in subgame perfect equilibrium). A deal is called weakly
Pareto-eﬃcient if there exists no other deal that both agents prefer. We assume in
the following that the agents’ decision to accept or reject an oﬀer is determined by
a threshold value τ: the oﬀer is accepted if the utility level is above the threshold,
and rejected otherwise. Consider a proposing agent i making an oﬀer   oi(t) to his
opponent, agent j, in round t of the negotiations (t < n). Assume that agent i
knows that agent j’s threshold is equal to τj(t). It is then a best response for agent
i to propose a weakly Pareto-eﬃcient deal to agent j.
We show this by contradiction. Suppose agent i proposes an oﬀer   oi(t) to agent j
which is not Pareto-eﬃcient and agent j accepts this oﬀer. Since the oﬀer is Pareto-
ineﬃcient, there exists an oﬀer   o′
i(t) which results in a higher utility for agent i and
the same utility or higher for agent j. Since agent j is either indiﬀerent between   oi(t)
and   o′
i(t) or prefers   o′
i(t), agent i would do better by oﬀering   o′
i(t) instead (which
agent j will also accept).
The SPE partitioning can now be calculated as follows. If the maximum number
of rounds n is even, agent 2 will be the proposer in the last round (i.e., at t = n−1).
Agent 2 will then demand the whole surplus for each issue and agent 1 will receive
nothing. This division of the surplus would yield agent 2 a payoﬀ (expected utility)
of π2(t = n−1) = pn−1, where πi(t) denotes agent i’s payoﬀ in the bargaining game
starting at time t. We now analyse the previous round (t = n − 2). Suppose agent
1’s oﬀer to agent 2 is   o1(t = n − 2). Agent 2’s payoﬀ π2(t = n − 2) would then be
pn−2u2[  o1(t = n − 2)]. In equilibrium, at t = n − 2 agent 1 should propose agent
2 a payoﬀ-equivalent deal [i.e., π2(t = n − 2) = π2(t = n − 1)], . This implies
that u2[  o1(t = n − 2)] should be equal to p. Agent 1’s payoﬀ π1(t = n − 2) is
then pn−2f1(p), where f1(u2) describes the location of the Pareto-eﬃcient frontier.
This function returns the utility of agent 1 when agent 2’s utility is equal to u2
and the agreement is Pareto-eﬃcient.1 At t = n − 3, agent 2 can, in a similar
fashion, propose an equivalent oﬀer (in terms of payoﬀ) and receive a payoﬀ of
π2(t = n−3) = pn−3f2[pf1(p)]. (The f2(u1) function is the inverse of the f1 function.)
This procedure is then repeated until the beginning of the game is reached (at
t = 0). The same line of reasoning holds if the number of rounds is odd (simply
switch the roles of agent 1 and agent 2). As in the inﬁnite-horizon game [110],
1For the bargaining problem studied in this paper (depicted in Fig. 3.3), the Pareto-eﬃcient
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the agents agree immediately on a deal. Table .1 shows the SPE partitionings for
diﬀerent game lengths.
n Payoﬀ agent 1 [π1(t = 0)] (SPE) Payoﬀ agent 2 [π2(t = 0)] (SPE)
1 1 0
2 f1(p) p
3 f1(pf2(p)) pf2(p)
4 f1(pf2(pf1(p))) pf2(pf1(p))
5 f1(pf2(pf1(pf2(p)))) pf2(pf1(pf2(p))))
6 f1(pf2(pf1(pf2(pf1(p))))) pf2(pf1(pf2(pf1(p)))))
... ... ...
Table .1: Payoﬀs for agent 1 and agent 2 for diﬀerent lengths n of the alternating-oﬀers
game, assuming that both agents use SPE strategies.
1.3 Calculating the Pareto-eﬃcient frontier
We now show how Pareto-eﬃcient values can be calculated if the agents use an addi-
tive multi-attribute utility function. The functions f1 and f2 are used to determine
the Pareto-eﬃcient utility of agent 1 and 2 respectively, given the utility received
by the opponent. We will ﬁrst give a recursive formula for f1 and f2 which can be
used for any number of issues, and then present an example for two issues. As was
described in section 3.1, each issue i is associated with a weight wi
j for agent j. We
assume that, without loss of generality, the issues are sorted such that
∀i ∈ {1,2,...,m − 1} :
wi
1
wi
2
≥
w
i+1
1
w
i+1
2
.
We begin by deriving f2, the maximum utility which agent 2 can obtain, given
that agent 1 receives a utility u. Starting with demanding the full dollar on each
issue, agent 2 needs to concede on zero or more issues such that a utility level u for
agent 1 is reached. Agent 2 will ﬁrst concede on issues with a relatively low loss in
utility for agent 2 (i.e. with a low weight for agent 2) and a relatively high gain for
agent 1. The issues are now sorted in such a way that agent 2 will ﬁrst concede on
issue 1, then on issue 2, etc., until the desired utility level for agent 1 is reached.
This is reﬂected in the following formula, given agent 1’s utility u: f2(u) = 1−r1
2(u)
where r2 is a recursively deﬁned function:
r
i
2(u) =



r
i+1
2 (u − wi
1) + wi
2 if u > wi
1,
wi
2
wi
1u otherwise.
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Similarly, agent 1 will start conceding on the last issue. The function for agent 1
is deﬁned as f1 = 1−rm
1 (u) where m is the number of issues, and r1 is a recursively
deﬁned function:
r
i
1(u,i) =



r
i−1
1 (u − wi
2) + wi
1 if u > wi
2,
wi
1
wi
2u otherwise.
(.2)
For any number of issues m ≥ 1 and any weights, given that
 m
i=1 wi
1 =
 m
i=1 wi
2 =
1 and wi
j > 0 for all i ∈ {1,...,m},j ∈ {1,2}, the following properties hold: f1(1) =
f2(1) = 0, f1(0) = f2(0) = 1 and f1(f2(u)) = f2(f1(u)) = u for all u : 0 ≤ u ≤ 1.
The next equation is an example of a two-issue bargaining situation with weight
vectors   w1 = (0.7,0.3)T and   w2 = (0.3,0.7)T for agents 1 and 2 respectively:
f1(u) = f2(u) =
 
0.7
0.3(1 − u) if u > 0.7.
1 − 0.3
0.7u otherwise, (.3)
This function yields the Pareto-eﬃcient frontier depicted in ﬁgure 3.3. Note
that when the weights are diametrically opposed, the same function applies to both
agents, i.e. f1(u) = f2(u) for all u : 0 ≤ u ≤ 1.
2 Extended model: Fairness
The fairness models evaluated in Section 3.4.2 (i.e., with a fairness check at the
deadline only) and in Section 3.4.3 (i.e., with a fairness check in each round) are
analysed in this appendix. As in Appendix 1.2, we apply backward induction to
deduce the SPE partitioning.
2.1 General analysis
The fairness function is now formally denoted as gr(u). This (real-valued) function
returns the probability of acceptance of a proposal in round r in case the responding
agent’s utility is equal to u. If a fairness check is performed only in the last round,
gr(u) = 1 for all r < n (where n is the number of rounds). In case the same fairness
check is performed each round, gr(u) is independent of r. We assume that the fairness
function is a monotonic non-decreasing function of u and that gr(u = 1) = 1. Let
agent j be the agent proposing a deal at round r and agent −j the responder. We
then abbreviate gr[u−j(  oj(r))] (the probability of acceptance of agent j’s oﬀer   o in
round r) as pacc
r (  o).
If n is even, agent 2 will propose an oﬀer in the last round (at r = n). Agent
2 will then propose an oﬀer   o2(r = n) which, in SPE, maximises his payoﬀ, i.e.,
his expected utility. The payoﬀ π2 received by Agent 2 if his oﬀer is accepted
equals pnu2[  o2(r = n)], where u2 is agent 2’s utility function (see Section 3.1). The2 Extended model: Fairness 151
acceptance probability is equal to pacc
n [  o2(r = n)]. Agent 2’s payoﬀ in round r = n
is therefore:
π2(r = n) = max
  o2(r=n)∈P
p
nu2[  o2(r = n)]p
acc
n [  o2(r = n)], (.4)
where P ⊂ [0,1]m is the set containing all Pareto-eﬃcient oﬀers. Analogously, the
payoﬀ π1 for agent 1 in round r = n is equal to:
π1(r = n) = p
nu1[  o2(r = n)]p
acc
n [  o2(r = n)], (.5)
where u1 is agent 1’s utility function.
It is again straightforward to show that it is optimal to propose a Pareto-eﬃcient
deal. Assume for instance, that a Pareto-ineﬃcient oﬀer is made. The proposer of
this oﬀer can then improve his payoﬀ by selecting an oﬀer on the Pareto-frontier
which yields his opponent the same payoﬀ. Because the probability of acceptance
only depends on the responder’s utility of this oﬀer, this will not aﬀect the fairness
evaluation.
We now analyse the previous round (r = n − 1). In SPE, at r = n − 1 agent 2
only accepts a deal which is at least equal to the payoﬀ π2(r = n) that he receives in
the next round (in SPE). Therefore, π2(r = n − 1) ≥ π2(r = n) in SPE. Eﬀectively,
π2(r = n) acts as a threshold used by agent 2 to determine the minimal acceptable
oﬀer at r = n − 1. Some elementary manipulations then show that in SPE agent 1
should make an oﬀer   o1(r = n − 1) such that
p
n−1u2[  o1(r = n − 1)] ≥ π2(r = n), (.6)
otherwise, agent 2 rejects the proposal at r = n − 1 to earn π2(r = n) in the last
round. We now deﬁne R ⊂ [0,1]m to be the set of oﬀers for which Eq. .6 is not
violated. In SPE, agent 1’s payoﬀ in round r = n − 1 then equals
π1(r = n − 1) = max
  o1(r=n−1)∈P∩R
p
n−1u1[  o1(r = n − 1)]p
acc
n−1[  o1(r = n − 1)]
+{1 − p
acc
n−1[  o1(r = n − 1)]}π1(r = n). (.7)
In a similar fashion, we can calculate agent 2’s payoﬀ at r = n − 1 in SPE:
π2(r = n − 1) = p
n−1u2[  o1(r = n − 1)]p
acc
n−1[  o1(r = n − 1)]
+{1 − p
acc
n−1[  o1(r = n − 1)]}π2(r = n). (.8)
For r = n − 2 expressions very similar to Eqs. .7 and .8 can be derived (but the
roles of the two agents switch). This procedure is then repeated until the beginning
of the game is reached (at r = 1). The same line of reasoning holds if the number
of rounds is odd (simply switch the roles of agent 1 and agent 2).152 Game-theoretic analysis
In the basic model without fairness all agreements occur in the ﬁrst round in
SPE (for p < 1). When the agents apply a fairness check in each round, however,
even in SPE a signiﬁcant number of agreements occurs after the ﬁrst round. In this
case, the strategy followed in all rounds comes to play a role in determining the
outcome of the game.
We also remark that, although a responder’s fairness considerations determines
for a large part the oﬀers made by a proposing agent, this does not make the respon-
der’s thresholds superﬂuous in SPE. Recall that the role of the threshold is reﬂected
in Eq. .6.
2.2 Application to a simple case
We will now apply the general approach presented above to a relatively simple
example with m = 1 (a single issue), n = 3 (3 rounds) and p = 1 (no time pressure).
Because m = 1, the oﬀer vector  o(t) has only a single component. We denote he value
of this component as x(t) in the remainder of this appendix. It is obvious (because
the agents are assumed to be risk neutral, see Section 3.1) that u1[x(t)] = x(t), and
u2[x(t)] = 1−x(t) for 0 ≤ t ≤ n−1. In this example, the agents evaluate the fairness
of the oﬀers (in each round) using fairness function 4 in Figure 3.7 [i.e., gt(u) = u].
Furthermore, we take n = 3 and p = 1. Notice that, because the number of rounds
n is odd in this example, we need to switch the roles of agent 1 and agent 2 when
we apply Eqs. .4-.8 in the following.
Agent 1 makes an oﬀer to agent 2 in the ﬁnal round (at t = 2). In SPE, agent
1 applies Eq. .4 to maximise his payoﬀ π1(t = 2). Substituting parameters for this
problem, the product term on the RHS of Eq. .4 becomes u1[x(t = 2)]g2[u2(x(t = 2)],
which can be simpliﬁed further to x(t = 2)[1 − x(t = 2)]. This term is maximised
for x(t = 2) = 0.5, which results in π1(t = 2) = 0.25. Using Eq. .5, the payoﬀ of
agent 2, π2(t = 2), is then also equal to [1 − x(t = 2)]x(t = 2) = 0.25.
Agent 2 makes a move at t = 1. We initially assume that the condition stated
in Eq. .6 is not violated by agent 2’s oﬀer. Agent 2’s payoﬀ is then determined by
applying Eq. .7. Substituting the parameters of this problem and simplifying, the
term that should be maximised in Eq. .7 becomes equal to [1 − x(t)]x(t) + [1 −
x(t)]0.25. This term is maximised for x(t = 1) = 0.375. The condition stated in
Eq. .6 is not violated because u1(0.375) = 0.375 ≥ 0.25. Our initial assumption
therefore turns out to be valid. We can now apply Eqs. .7 and .8 to derive that
π1(t = 1) ≈ 0.297 and π2(t = 1) ≈ 0.391.
Agent 1 proposes an oﬀer in the ﬁrst round (at t = 0). Again, we initially
ignore Eq. .6. Using Eq. .7, agent 1 then maximises his payoﬀ π1(t = 0). This
results in x(t = 0) ≈ 0.648. However, this oﬀer violates the condition in Eq. .6,
since u2(0.648) = 0.352 < π2(t = 1). Agent 1 should therefore propose a payoﬀ-
equivalent deal to agent 2 [i.e., π2(t = 0) = π2(t = 1)]. For x ≈ 0.609 this condition2 Extended model: Fairness 153
is satisﬁed and agent 2 becomes indiﬀerent between accepting or refusing this deal.
Subgame perfection then predicts that agent 2 accepts this proposal, yielding agent
1 a payoﬀ of ≈ 0.419. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in Chapter 3 summarise these theoretical
results. Notice that, in this example, Eq. .6 (i.e., the responder’s threshold) indeed
plays a role in round 1, whereas in the rounds 2 and 3 the equation does not inﬂuence
the proposals made in SPE.Bibliography
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167Samenvatting (Dutch)
Onderhandelen speelt een steeds grotere rol door de ontwikkelingen binnen de elek-
tronische handel, met name door de ontwikkeling van autonome software agenten.
Dit zijn programma’s die, ge¨ ınstrueerd door een gebruiker, in staat zijn zelfstandig
en op een intelligente wijze een gegeven opdracht te verwezenlijken. Door middel
van autonome software agenten kan het onderhandelingsproces worden geautoma-
tiseerd, waarmee goederen en diensten met de daarbij horende voorwaarden, zoals
garantie en leveringstijd, ﬂexibel kunnen worden afgestemd op de individuele wensen
van de betrokkenen. In dit proefschrift wordt aandacht besteed aan zowel funda-
mentele aspecten van onderhandelen als bedrijfstoepassingen van geautomatiseerd
onderhandelen dmv software agenten.
Het fundamentele deel houdt zich bezig met de vraag wat de uitkomst van on-
derhandelende agenten zal zijn in een gestileerde wereld en hoe deze uitkomst wordt
be¨ ınvloed. Hierdoor kunnen inzichten worden verkregen voor het produceren van
agenten, strategie¨ en en het opstellen van onderhandelingsregels voor praktijksitu-
aties. Wij bestuderen deze aspecten aan de hand van computer simulaties van
onderhandelende agenten. Hierbij wordt gekeken naar adaptieve systemen, dwz
waarbij agenten leren hun onderhandelingsstrategie aan te passen aan de hand van
ervaringen uit het verleden. Het leergedrag wordt gesimuleerd door evolutionaire
algoritmen. Deze algoritmen komen voort uit de kunstmatige intelligentie en zijn
ge¨ ınspireerd door de evolutie theorie uit de biologie. Oorspronkelijk zijn de evoluti-
onaire algoritmen ontwikkeld om optimalisatieproblemen op te lossen, maar binnen
de economie wordt deze methode steeds vaker toegepast om leergedrag van mensen
te modelleren. Naast computer simulaties bestuderen wij voor relatief eenvoudige
gevallen wiskundige oplossingen uit de zogenaamde spel theorie. De spel theorie
houdt zich met name bezig met de ”rationele mens”, dwz met optimale oplossing in
een geabstraheerde situatie (of spel), gegeven dat iedereen zich rationeel gedraagt.
De spel-theoretische uitkomsten worden gebruikt om de computer experimenten te
valideren. Het voordeel van de computer simulaties is dat minder stricte assump-
ties nodig zijn en dat complexere interacties die dichter bij de werkelijkheid staan
kunnen worden bestudeerd.
169Allereerst wordt een onderhandelingssituatie onderzocht waarbij twee spelers bo-
den en tegen boden tegen elkaar uitwisselen, het zogenaamde alternerende boden
spel. Dit spel wordt vaak gebruikt als model voor onderhandelen over bijvoorbeeld
de prijs van een product of dienst. Het is echter belangrijk om ook andere product
of dienst gerelateerde aspecten in beschouwing te nemen zoals de kwaliteit, leve-
ringstijd en garantieperiode. Dit geeft namelijk de mogelijkheid om compromissen
te sluiten door toe te geven op minder belangrijke aspecten en meer te vragen voor
belangrijke aspecten. Hierdoor zijn onderhandelingen minder competitief en kunnen
uitkomsten ontstaan die voor beide partijen aantrekkelijk zijn. Derhalve onderzoe-
ken wij middels computer simulaties een variant op het alternerende boden spel,
waarbij meerdere aspecten gelijktijdig worden onderhandeld. Daarnaast gebruiken
wij de speltheorie om resultaten van de simulatie te valideren. De simulatie laat
zien dat lerende agenten in korte tijd tot optimale compromissen komen, ook wel
Pareto eﬃci¨ ente oplossingen genoemd. Vervolgens bestuderen wij het eﬀect van
tijdsdruk die ontstaat als onderhandelingen met een kleine kans worden afgebroken,
bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van externe factoren. Bij het ontbreken van tijdsdruk en
een maximum aantal rondes, zijn de uitkomsten zeer onevenwichtig: de speler die
als laatste de kans krijgt om een bod uit te brengen doet een “alles of niets” bod
in de laatste ronde, wat voor de andere speler slechts een fractie beter is dan hele-
maal geen overeenkomst. Bij een relatief hoge tijdsdruk, is juist het eerste bod het
belangrijkste, en worden bijna alle overeenkomsten in de eerste ronde afgesloten.
Een andere interessante uitkomst is dat de simulatie resultaten na een lange leer-
periode in grote lijnen overeenkomen met oplossingen uit de speltheorie, ondanks
dat de lerende agenten niet “rationeel” zijn. In de werkelijkheid is niet alleen de
uitkomst belangrijk, maar spelen ook andere factoren mee, zoals de eerlijkheid van
de uitkomst. Middels de simulatie wordt gekeken naar de invloed op de onderhande-
lingsuitkomsten als door de agent met dergelijke normen rekening wordt gehouden.
Door deze normen zijn de uitkomsten veel evenwichtiger, ook bij het ontbreken van
tijdsdruk, en lijken meer overeen te komen met de werkelijkheid.
Onderhandelingen staan vaak niet op zichzelf, maar worden bepaald door externe
factoren zoals additionele onderhandelingsmogelijkheden. Naast het ge¨ ısoleerde on-
derhandelingsspel, bestuderen wij daarom ook onderhandelingen binnen een markt-
achtige omgeving, waarbij zowel kopers als verkopers meerdere keren kunnen onder-
handelen met verschillende spelers om tot een overeenkomst te komen. Deze onder-
handelingen worden opeenvolgend uitgevoerd totdat een overeenkomst is gesloten
of totdat er geen onderhandelingsmogelijkheden meer zijn. Elk onderhandelingsspel
tussen twee spelers wordt hier beperkt tot ´ e´ en ronde, waarbij speler 1 een bod doet,
en speler 2 kan dit bod weigeren of accepteren. Met een evolutionaire simulatie
onderzoeken wij verscheidene eigenschappen van het markt spel. Het blijkt dat de
uitkomsten erg afhangen van de informatie die beschikbaar is binnen het spel. Als
de spelers op de hoogte zijn van elkaars onderhandelingsmogelijkheden, dan doet
170de biedende speler telkens een alles of niets bod en krijgt het grootste voordeel.
Dit komt overeen met speltheoretische uitkomsten die wij tevens presenteren in dit
proefschrift. Als deze informatie niet bekend is, wordt een theoretische analyse heel
moeilijk. De evolutionaire simulatie laat dan echter zien dat de tweede speler, dwz
de speler die het bod weigert of accepteert, de beste onderhandelingspositie bezit.
Dit komt omdat de eerste speler niet kan inschatten wat de reactie zal zijn van de
tweede speler, en hierdoor lager inzet. In het proefschrift wordt verder ook gekeken
naar andere factoren die de uitkomsten be¨ ınvloeden, zoals het onderhandelen over
meerdere aspecten tegelijkertijd, zoekkosten en afbreekkansen.
Naast de aandacht voor fundamentele vraagstukken worden in dit proefschrift
een aantal bedrijfsgerelateerde toepassingen van geautomatiseerd onderhandelen ge-
presenteerd alsmede generieke onderhandelingsstrategie¨ en voor de agenten die in
gerelateerde applicaties kunnen worden ingezet. Als eerste toepassing introduceren
wij een raamwerk waarbij onderhandelen wordt gebruikt voor het aanbevelen van
winkels aan klanten, bijvoorbeeld op een webpagina van een elektronisch winkel-
centrum. Middels de marktwerking van een veiling wordt op een gedistribueerde
wijze een relevante selectie van winkels voor de klant bepaald. Hiertoe worden een
beperkt aantal advertentieplaatsen in een elektronische veiling aangeboden. Voor
elke individuele bezoeker van de pagina kunnen winkels via hun winkel agent ge-
automatiseerd bieden voor deze ”aandachtsspanne” van de klant. Het bieden door
deze software agent geschiedt op basis van een klantenproﬁel, wat persoonlijke ge-
gevens bevat van de bezoeker, zoals zijn/haar interessen, leeftijd, en/of opgegeven
zoekwoorden. De winkel agenten zijn adaptief en leren, gegeven terugkoppeling van
de klant, op welke proﬁelen ze zich moeten richten en hoe hoog ze moeten bieden.
De hoogste bieders worden vervolgens aan de klant getoond. De werking van het
op deze wijze gedistribueerd bepalen van relevante winkels is aangetoond middels
een evolutionaire simulatie. Wij onderzoeken verschillende modellen van klanten en
veilingmechanismen, en laten zien dat het veilingsysteem resulteert in een passende
selectie van winkels voor de klant.
Onderhandelen kan vooral van belang zijn als niet alleen de prijs, maar ook an-
dere aspecten een rol spelen. Hierdoor kunnen bijvoorbeeld goederen en diensten
beter worden afgestemd op individuele wensen van de gebruiker. Dit aspect wordt
benut in een systeem wat wij hebben ontwikkeld voor de verkoop en personalisa-
tie van zogenaamde informatiegoederen, zoals nieuws artikelen, software en muziek.
Middels het alternerende boden protocol kan een verkopende software agent met
meerdere kopende software agenten tegelijkertijd automatisch onderhandelen over
een vaste prijs, een “stukprijs”, en de kwaliteit van een bundel informatiegoederen.
Het systeem houdt ook rekening met belangrijke bedrijfsgerelateerde voorwaarden
zoals de eerlijkheid van de onderhandeling. De agenten gebruiken een combinatie
van een concessiestrategie en een zoekstrategie om een onderhandelingsbod te gene-
reren. De concessiestrategie bepaalt hoeveel elke ronde wordt toegegeven, terwijl de
171zoekstrategie zorgt voor gepersonaliseerde boden. In dit proefschrift introduceren
wij een tweetal zoekstrategieen, en wij laten middels computer simulaties zien dat
bij gezamenlijk gebruik door een kopende agent en een verkopende agent deze stra-
tegie¨ en leiden tot gepersonaliseerde oplossingen, ook in combinatie met verschillende
concessiestrategie¨ en. Deze zoekstrategie¨ en kunnen ook gemakkelijk worden toepast
bij andere onderhandelingssituaties waarbij personalisatie een rol speelt.
Naast bovenstaande zoekstrategie¨ en hebben wij ook een aantal concessiestra-
tegie¨ en ontwikkeld voor een verkopende agent die met meerdere kopende agenten
tegelijkertijd onderhandelt. Ook al is het onderhandelingsproces op zich bilateraal
(dwz tussen twee partijen), kan de verkopende agent gebruik maken van het feit
dat meerdere onderhandelingen tegelijkertijd plaatsvinden. De ontwikkelde onder-
handelingsstrategie¨ en zijn gericht op situaties waarbij het aanbod ﬂexibel is en kan
worden afgestemd op de vraag, zoals bij informatie goederen. Wij bestuderen hier-
bij vaste strategie¨ en, tijdsafhankelijke strategie¨ en, en introduceren tevens een aantal
strategie¨ en die ge¨ ınspireerd zijn door veilingen. Veilingen worden vaak gebruikt in
situaties waarbij ´ e´ en partij onderhandelt met meerdere partijen tegelijkertijd. Hoe-
wel deze laatste strategie de voordelen heeft van een veiling, blijft de onderhandeling
zelf bilateraal en bestaat uit het uitwisselen van boden en tegen boden. Een evo-
lutionaire simulatie omgeving is ontwikkeld om de strategie¨ en van de verkoper te
evalueren. Hierbij wordt voornamelijk gekeken naar de situatie waarbij de kopers
tijdsdruk ondervinden en onder druk staat om snel tot een overeenkomst te komen.
Uit de simulatie blijkt dat de op veiling ge¨ ınspireerde strategie¨ en van de verkopende
agent in staat zijn bijna de maximale winst uit de onderhandelingen te halen bij
voldoende tijdsdruk van de kopers.
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Bargaining is becoming increasingly important due to developments within the ﬁeld
of electronic commerce, especially the development of autonomous software agents.
Software agents are programs which, given instructions from a user, are capable of
autonomously and intelligently realise a given task. By means of such agents, the
bargaining process can be automated, allowing products and services together with
related conditions, such as warranty and delivery time, to be ﬂexible and tuned to
the individual preferences of the people concerned. In this theses we concentrate on
both fundamental aspects of bargaining as well as business-related applications of
automated bargaining using software agents.
The fundamental part investigates bargaining outcomes within a stylised world,
and the factors that inﬂuence these outcomes. This can provide insights for the pro-
duction of software agents, strategies, and setting up bargaining rules for practical
situations. We study these aspects using computational simulations of bargaining
agents. Hereby we consider adaptive systems, i.e., where agents learn to adjust
their bargaining strategy given past experience. This learning behaviour is simu-
lated using evolutionary algorithms. These algorithms originate from the ﬁeld of
artiﬁcial intelligence, and are inspired by the biological theory of evolution. Origi-
nally, evolutionary algorithms were designed for solving optimisation problems, but
they are now increasingly being used within economics for modelling human learn-
ing behaviour. Besides computational simulations, we also consider mathematical
solutions from game theory for relatively simple cases. Game theory is mainly con-
cerned with the “rational man”, that is, with optimal outcomes within an stylised
setting (or game) where people act rationally. We use the game-theoretic outcomes
to validate the computational experiments. The advantage of computer simulations
is that less strict assumptions are necessary, and that more complex interactions
that are closer to real-world settings can be investigated.
First of all, we study a bargaining setting where two players exchange oﬀers and
counter oﬀers, the so-called alternating-oﬀers game. This game is frequently used for
modelling bargaining about for instance the price of a product or service. It is also
important, however, to allow other product- and service-related aspects to be nego-
173tiated, such as quality, delivery time, and warranty. This enables compromises by
conceding on less important issues and demanding a higher value for relatively im-
portant aspects. This way, bargaining is less competitive and the resulting outcome
can be mutually beneﬁcial. Therefore, we investigate using computational simula-
tions an extended version of the alternating-oﬀers game, where multiple aspects are
negotiated concurrently. Moreover, we apply game theory to validate the results of
the computational experiments. The simulation shows that learning agents are ca-
pable of quickly ﬁnding optimal compromises, also called Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes.
In addition, we study the eﬀects of time pressure that arise if negotiations are broken
oﬀ with a small probability, for example due to external eventualities. In absence
of time pressure and a maximum number of negotiation rounds, outcomes are very
unbalanced: the player that has the opportunity to make a ﬁnal oﬀer proposes a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer in the last round, which leaves the other player with a deal
that is only slightly better than no deal at all. With relatively high time pressure,
on the other hand, the ﬁrst oﬀer is most important and almost all agreements are
reached in the ﬁrst round. Another interesting result is that the simulation out-
comes after a long period of learning in general coincide with the results from game
theory, in spite of the fact that the learning agents are not “rational”. In reality,
not only the ﬁnal outcome is important, but also other factors play a role, such as
the fairness of an oﬀer. Using the simulation we study the inﬂuence of such fairness
norms on the bargaining outcomes. The fairness norms result in much more bal-
anced outcomes, even with no time pressure, and seem to be closer outcomes in the
real world.
Negotiations are rarely isolated, but can also be inﬂuenced by external factors
such as additional bargaining opportunities. We therefore also consider bargaining
within a market-like setting, where both buyers and sellers can bargain with several
opponents before reaching an agreement. The negotiations are executed consecu-
tively until an agreement is reached or no more opportunities are available. Each
bargaining game is reduced to a single round, where player 1 makes an oﬀer and
player 2 can only respond by rejecting or accepting this oﬀer. Using an evolutionary
simulation we study several properties of this market game. It appears that the
outcomes depend on the information that is available to the players. If players are
informed about the bargaining opportunities of their opponents, the ﬁrst player in
turn has the advantage and always proposes a take-it-or-leave-it deal that leaves
the other player with a relatively poor outcome. This outcome is consistent with
a game-theoretic analysis which we also present in this thesis. If this information
is not available, a theoretical analysis is very hard. The evolutionary simulation,
however, shows that in this case the responder obtains a better deal. This occurs
because the ﬁrst player can no longer anticipate the response of the other player, and
therefore bids lower to avoid a disagreement. In this thesis, we additionally consider
other factors that inﬂuence the outcomes of the market game, such as negotiation
174over multiple issues simultaneously, search costs, and break oﬀ probabilities.
Besides fundamental issues, this thesis presents a number of business-related
applications of automated bargaining, as well as generic bargaining strategies for
agents that can be employed in related areas. As a ﬁrst application, we introduce
a framework where negotiation is used for recommending shops to customers, for
example on a web page of an electronic shopping mall. Through a market-driven
auction a relevant selection of shops is determined in a distributed fashion. This
is achieved by selling a limited number of banner spaces in an electronic auction.
For each arriving customer on the web page, shops can automatically place bids for
this “customer attention space” through their shop agents. These software agents
bid based on a customer proﬁle, containing personal data of the customer, such as
age, interests, and/or keywords in a search query. The shop agents are adaptive
and learn, given feedback from the customers, which proﬁles to target and how
much to bid in the auction. The highest bidders are then selected and displayed
to the customer. The feasibility of this distributed approach for matching shops
to customers is demonstrated using an evolutionary simulation. Several customer
models and auction mechanisms are studied, and we show that the market-based
approach results in a proper selection of shops for the customers.
Bargaining can be especially beneﬁcial if not only the price, but other aspects
are considered as well. This allows for example to customise products and services
to the personal preferences of a user. We developed a system makes use of these
properties for selling and personalising so-called information goods, such as news
articles, software, and music. Using the alternating-oﬀers protocol, a seller agent
negotiates with several buyers simultaneously about a ﬁxed price, a per-item price,
and the quality of a bundle of information goods. The system is capable of taking
into account important business-related conditions such as the fairness of the nego-
tiation. The agents combine a search strategy and a concession strategy to generate
oﬀers in the negotiations. The concession strategy determines the amount the agent
will concede each round, whereas the search strategy takes care of the personalisa-
tion of the oﬀer. We introduce two search strategies in this thesis, and show through
computer experiments that the use of these strategies by a buyer and seller agent,
result in personalised outcomes, also when combined with various concession strate-
gies. The search strategies presented here can be easily applied to other domains
where personalisation is important.
In addition, we also developed concession strategies for the seller agent that can
be used in settings where a single seller agent bargains with several buyer agents
simultaneously. Even if bargaining itself is bilateral (i.e., between two parties), a
seller agent can actually beneﬁt from the fact that several such negotiations occur
concurrently. The developed strategies are focussed on domains where supply is
ﬂexible and can be adjusted to meet demand, like for information goods. We study
ﬁxed strategies, time-dependent strategies and introduce several auction-inspired
175strategies. Auctions are often used when one party negotiates with several oppo-
nents simultaneously. Although the latter strategies beneﬁt from the advantages of
auctions, the actual negotiation remains bilateral and consists of exchanging oﬀers
and counter oﬀers. We developed an evolutionary simulation environment to eval-
uate the seller agent’s strategies. We especially consider the case where buyers are
time-impatient and under pressure to reach agreements early. The simulations show
that the auction-inspired strategies are able to obtain almost maximum proﬁts from
the negotiations, given suﬃcient time pressure of the buyers.
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